


























In this thesis I answer two closely related questions: answering each of them 
gives us insight into the other. They are 1) How do we help someone to come 
to “love” learning? And 2) what characterises those who love learning? To 
begin with, I establish that an approach to learning that prioritises cognitive 
control is the “best” kind of learning for facilitating love for learning. Then, I 
show that pleasure is an important aspect in fostering love for learning and 
that lovers of learning find learning pleasurable. Following that I argue that 
lovers of learning are vulnerable and “open” to learning. Finally, I show that a 
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In an article for the Guardian newspaper, George Monbiot argued that 
children in the U.K.’s schools are being turned into robots and having their 
spirits crushed by teaching methods akin to indoctrination. He rightly laments 
that these old-fashioned methods of teaching and learning do not support 
children’s love of learning and encourage them to be like machines. Halfway 
across the world in Singapore, a country renowned for its education system, 
Bobby Jeyaraman writes in the Straits Times newspaper that the “drilling” 
method of educating children may result in high test scores (and worldwide 
acclaim) but “kills a love of learning” and that the “force-feeding of 
knowledge” is an “ageing education strategy that won’t take Singapore to the 
next level of growth”. 
 
The culprit responsible for turning children into “machines” who are at risk of 
irrelevance, is, in both cases, a style of educating that prizes the accumulation 
of knowledge and content over creativity, exploration, discovery, critical 
thinking and autonomy. These rote learning, force-feeding, indoctrination-
style educational strategies are also those that inadvertently bore students, 
prevent them from retaining knowledge, and support the idea that what they 
learn in school is often going to be useless to them in real life – ultimately 
making the educational experience seem of little value. Studies conducted by 
the Department for Education and Skills in the UK show that these are some of 
the reasons that learners left school prematurely, or stayed on only as 
disinterested and impassive learners. 
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Over the course of my twenty-year career in education, I have heard 
politicians, civil servants, educators, parents and even students say that a key 
solution to this problem is to inculcate the “love for learning”. I have read 
policy documents, manifestos and curriculum plans that use the phrase “love 
for learning” liberally, believing that it is this “love for learning” that will 
“stoke the fires” of learning and keep students wanting to engage more 
deeply and meaningfully in their learning, and to see value in it. Yet, in spite of 
the “linchpin” role that the “love for learning” apparently plays in our learning 
lives, one is hard-pressed to find answers to questions about what this love of 
learning involves, how we might foster and encourage it, and exactly why it is 
valuable. Trying to offer some answers to these questions was what inspired 
me to take on this research project. 
 
In this thesis, I seek to answer two closely related questions:  
 
1) How do we help someone to come to “love” learning?  
2) What characterises those who love learning? 
 
In many ways these two key questions share a symbiotic relationship. In 
answering one, we also gain insight into the other - where I show how we 
might help someone to come to love learning, I also show what characterises a 
lover of learning. For example, I say that facilitating pleasurable experiences in 
learning is important to nurture a love for learning, but one can also see how 
finding learning pleasurable is a characteristic of someone who loves learning.  
 
As teachers who hope to encourage a love for learning, knowing where we 
want our students to “get to”, that is the goal we want to achieve, is of crucial 
importance. The goal is made clearer for teachers by understanding the 
characteristics of a lover of learning – these are the traits that we want to 
facilitate and support our students to develop, embody and preserve. As such, 
the characteristics of a lover of learning are of significant interest. 
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Educational activists such as Monbiot and Jeyaraman, pedagogical experts as 
well as educational psychologists, suggest that one of the most successful 
ways to foster the “love for learning” is to turn away from the emphasis on 
surface approaches to learning, that is, those focusing largely on simply 
increasing knowledge content, acquiring facts and information, memorisation 
and drilling, in order to improve test scores, and focus instead on strategies 
that encourage deep learning.1  
 
I begin by exploring this concept of deep learning from the empirical side, as 
this is where this term “deep learning” originates, and where studies have 
been done to support the claim that this approach is successful in engaging 
learners. I then show that many of the characteristics of this approach have a 
strong footing in philosophy that goes as far back as Plato, all the way down to 
Rousseau, Dewey and contemporary philosophers such as Alison Hills and 
Duncan Pritchard. I do some exegetical work here, explaining these theories 
and then critically examining them, responding to relevant criticisms. I also 
establish pertinent links between these existing theories, the empirical 
research, and my own views on learning.  
 
Next, I establish that Alison Hills’ account of cognitive control offers a 
philosophical account of characteristics very similar to deep learning and does 
	
1 Many of the activists, like those I have mentioned, have painstakingly 
brought to attention the problems that our education systems and strategies 
cause. Those who have crafted educational approaches have dedicated 
resources and passion to their projects, providing us with excellent and 
meaningful solutions to these problems. The role of this thesis is to provide an 
account of that which seems consistently to be the shared goal of these 
activists and educators: their desire to foster a love of learning, which often, 
though expressed as the overarching ambition, itself goes unexplored.  
	 9	
so with more robustness and comprehensiveness than the more empirical 
accounts. Hills’ theory argues that understanding why refers to a special kind 
of “intellectual know-how” that is different from knowledge that p and 
knowledge how p (663). She offers a set of six abilities that one must possess 
in order to claim that one has cognitive control. I argue that it is cognitive 
control that is one of the key factors that will help students come to “love” 
learning. One will also, no doubt, see similarities between cognitive control 
and the historical material I present in the chapters on Plato, Rousseau and 
Dewey. All these philosophers clearly value this sort of learning over the 
surface approaches. Additionally, I present reasons why cognitive control is 
valuable and worth having.  
 
Following this, I suggest that the second factor that will help students “love” 
learning is making learning as pleasurable as possible. In this chapter I refer to 
Aristotle’s ideas on pleasure, showing how his work on the relationship 
between pleasure and contemplation is similar to the relationship between 
cognitive control and pleasure, since I assert that cognitive control is similar to 
contemplation. My aim is to convince the reader that cognitive control is 
pleasurable. In this chapter I also draw inspiration from “flow theory”, which is 
a psychological theory that explores the value of creating opportunities for 
“flow” in learning. I do this in order to investigate optimal situations for 
enabling pleasure in learning. Since flow theory draws insight from Aristotle’s 
work on unimpeded activity, which is a crucial component of Aristotelian 
pleasure, the links I make between cognitive control, flow and pleasure are 
further fortified by Aristotle’s theories. I also respond to some of the relevant 
criticisms here concluding that “flow” promotes pleasurable experiences of 
learning and that such experiences could be of great help in nurturing and 
sustaining the “love for learning”. 
 
Next I explore two other characteristics - vulnerability in learning and 
wholeheartedness in learning – that lovers of learning possess. Those who 
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possess these traits tend to persevere with learning in spite of challenges and 
setbacks, develop confidence and independence and find learning 
pleasurable. I hold that these traits will facilitate the love for learning, if they 
are carefully and diligently encouraged and developed with a robust focus on 
deep learning, and, in particular, developing cognitive control. 
 
In the chapter on vulnerability, my aim is to first contribute to the existing 
literature on vulnerability in philosophy by fleshing out a concept called 
“inherent vulnerability”, something we all possess, and explaining how this 
sort of vulnerability and the potential for “wounding” can be helpful in a 
learning context if experienced appropriately and carefully. By way of 
contributing to the existing literature, I also explore the idea of “epistemic 
vulnerability” which refers to situations in which “wounds” come about as a 
result of one being “carried away” or “drifting away” from the truth, for 
example, by acquiring false beliefs during learning. I conclude that lovers of 
learning are characterised by their willingness to be “open” to learning, to 
overcome “wounding” and to persist with learning even if they have 
experienced “wounding” because they acknowledge that the advantages can 
often outweigh the detriments. 
 
In the final chapter, I discuss wholeheartedness. My point here is that a lover 
of learning is one who possesses volition with respect to learning. This means 
that lovers of learning want to learn and they endorse their desire to learn. It 
also means that they persevere with learning in the face of difficulties and 
experiences of “wounding”. I draw mostly from the work of Harry Frankfurt in 
this section but I recommend a “softer” approach to wholeheartedness than 
that offered by Frankfurt. I argue that this “softer” approach makes some 
room for changing circumstances and takes into account the fuller picture of 
an agent’s life and their on-going attitudes. Given that learning is a lifelong 
process and there are times when both learning and life are challenging, it is 
helpful to allow for some ambivalence to commitments of learning, so long as 
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this ambivalence is for good reasons and the decision finally taken remains in 
line with one’s “principles of action” – this is a term I discuss in more detail in 
the chapter itself but which refers to how we decide to act based on our 
broader principles, our longer term projects and ways of life. I explain that this 
better describes our real-life experiences of learning. Additionally, making 
some room for ambivalence might actually aid our learning in cases where 
giving up a particular experience of learning results in some other experience 
of learning that is more relevant, useful, or that yields greater benefits in some 
way. It also makes “love for learning” more achievable, which I think is 
important because setting theoretical standards that disregard actual life 
experiences of many people can make some goals seem pointless to pursue in 
the first place. 
 
I do think that the “love for learning” is something that can be fostered. I 
believe that students can be helped to see learning as something that is 
deeply valuable and worth committing to even when they find it challenging 
and in spite of “wounds” they might experience in the process. Some students 
may see this value of learning without much assistance and commit themselves 
to it readily. Even in those cases though, it is important that this “love for 
learning” be sustained, and help may be required to do that.  Others may 
require more support in cultivating this sort of relationship with learning and 
this may require schools and teachers to think creatively and thoughtfully 
about how to incorporate the factors I discuss here into as many of their 
students’ learning experiences as possible. The inspiration for this thesis came 
from my own teaching experiences, which are happily reinforced by the 
philosophical discourse I have researched. I know this will help me in future 






Chapter 1: Explaining “Love” in “Love for Learning” 
 
Since this thesis is about “love for learning”, a good place to begin would be 
to explain what we actually mean when we use the word “love” in “love for 
learning”. In this short chapter I set out that “love” as it is used in this phrase 
actually means to deeply value learning. I assess the value of learning 
throughout this thesis, but pay special attention to it in chapters 4, 5 and 6 
where I consider the value of cognitive control and explore in much more 
detail the characteristics of a person who values learning in this way. I do not 
consider the value in great detail here because I think it comes more naturally 
after I have laid out the groundwork for what learning should entail in order to 
enable this sort of valuing. That said, I hope that the brief explanation here 
means that our exploration of the topic is clearly guided by this meaning. 
 
In everyday speech, most of us use the word “love” in a few different senses 
and contexts. I say that I love my child or partner, and this is a reference to 
personal love, or love for a person. Bennett Helm points out that philosophers 
normally focus on personal love when they discuss the topic of love. Even 
when some of us say that we love our pets, this is similar to personal love in 
some ways, but perhaps a more diluted version. I also say that I love Mexican 
food, for example. When we use love in this way, what we mean is that we 
really like Mexican food. When I say I love being a teacher, what I mean is that 
being a teacher is something I deeply value. So, which of these, if any, best 
corresponds to what we mean when we say we “love” learning? To give a 
philosophical account of “love” as used in a non-personal way, that is, in a way 
where the love is not focused on a person, is problematic. It is problematic 
because, while there are countless accounts of love by philosophers, almost all 
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of these refer to personal love. So, an account of love for learning, learning 
being a non-personal phenomenon or experience, is simply not available.2  
 
Personal accounts of love refer to agents who are autonomous individuals in 
their own right. These autonomous agents have their own cares, concerns, 
motivations and so on, and the various accounts of love aim at exploring love 
in the context of how these autonomous agents recognise and interact with 
each other. As such, it would make no sense to apply these accounts to 
learning because learning is not an autonomous agent, it has no concerns or 
cares of its own, and it is unable to reciprocate care in any way, or to actively 
form any kind of a union with the lover of learning. For instance, most 
philosophical accounts of love claim that love involves some element of 
objective care or interest in the welfare of the beloved for their own sake. The 
accounts that focus most prominently on this are usually called “robust 
concern” or “care” accounts of love. Proponents of this view include Taylor, 
Newton-Smith, LaFollette, Frankfurt and White. It makes little sense to say that 
one objectively cares about the welfare of learning, or that one is motivated to 
choose and act in particular ways as a response to concerns about or for 
learning. Another familiar philosophical account of love is one that focuses on 
the idea of love as “union”. This also requires that the interests and cares of 
the beloved are given significant importance, and for this theory of ‘union’ in 
particular, joined with the lover’s own cares and interests in such a way that 
the lover and beloved become a unit or a “we”. Contemporary proponents of 
this view include Solomon, Scruton and Nozick.3 
	
2 There are discussions on the “love of wisdom” and “love of the “good”” 
where the “good” is akin to knowledge from the likes of ancients such as Plato 
and Socrates and contemporary philosophers such as FC White but these do 
not discuss the nature of the ‘love’ with specific reference to wisdom.  




In light of this, my view is that applying existing theories of personal love to 
learning is not the best way forward. Instead, I wish to suggest that when 
someone talks about having a “love” for learning, what they really mean by 
“love” is something more along the lines of deeply valuing learning. Likewise, 
when educational policies and curricula call for the inculcation or 
encouragement of “love for learning”, as they often do, I think what they really 
mean is that they want learners to truly value learning and find it meaningful. I 
think the word “love” is usually used in this situation more as a way to denote 
the depth, extent and genuineness of the valuing.4 Most of us can appreciate 
that the use of “love” in describing our responses towards something in non-
personal situations is meant to indicate that we have strong feelings towards 
it, so it is reasonable to ask that we do not take love in its literal sense here. 
Essentially, in using “love” to reference the attitude one should have towards 
learning, I think educators want to covey that the ideal is more than just liking 
learning; it is finding learning to be deeply valuable and meaningful.5 As I said 
earlier, I will leave it at that for now and return to fuller explorations in later 
chapters. For now, I move on to establishing the foundations for this 
discussion by considering a theory of learning called deep learning which I 




4 There are also philosophical accounts of love that argue that love is 
essentially valuing – Velleman and Singer are two examples. These accounts 
cannot be adapted for a non-personal object of love-related value either 
because these accounts are also grounded in beliefs about well-being, 
autonomy and additionally, dignity; all of which are characteristics of a person.  
 
5 I will nevertheless continue to use the phrase “love for learning” as this is 
how this ideal attitude is described in so much of the literature on education. 
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Chapter 2: Deep Learning and Surface Learning 
 
Deep and surface learning are two approaches to learning that can be found 
predominantly in research on educational theory and psychology. They were 
first presented on the basis of studies conducted by researchers Roger Säljö 
and Ference Marton. Following their studies, more researchers, including 
Entwistle, Ramsden and Biggs carried out further studies, which corroborated 
and elaborated on the work by Marton and Säljö.6 
 
Marton and Säljö’s influential paper was based on the observation that one 
common example of the different ways in which people perceive learning can 
be seen in the fact that some believe learning is about acquiring many facts 
and committing them to memory so they can reproduce them when 
necessary, while others believe that learning is more about trying to 
understand the material for themselves and relate it to their experiences. With 
these observations in mind, in the hope of pinning down precisely how 
people, particularly students, conceive of learning, Marton and Säljö carried 
out a variety of studies.  
 
In one such study, students were asked to read academic articles and told they 
would be questioned on what they read afterwards. Some students saw the 
academic text as a collection of information that they needed to memorise so 
that they could answer the questions. Other students approached the text as 
something that contained meaning to be understood in light of the text’s 
claims, arguments and implications. The first approach was referred to as the 
“surface approach”, and the second, the “deep approach”. Describing the 
two approaches based on Marton and Säljö’s research, Tamsin Haggis writes: 
 
	
6 See bibliography for full listings. 
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…quantitative, memorising and acquisition conceptions 
underlying a 'surface' approach (in which the student's intention 
is to memorise the text), and abstraction, understanding reality 
and developing as a person underlying a 'deep' approach (in 
which the student's intention is to understand the meaning of 
the text) (90). 
 
Students who employed the “deep” approach appeared to understand and 
remember the main messages, arguments and conclusions of the article and 
examine the logic of these. They were also better able to answer questions 
about the article. On the other hand, the surface approach was restricted to 
memorisation of facts without much real understanding and meaning. 
Students who employed this approach tended to reproduce rather than 
engage with the material.7 These two approaches have also been described as 
“information reproducing” for the surface approach and “knowledge 
transforming” for the deep approach.   
 
The original study and those that followed showed that “reproducing” of 
information tends to happen with students who see learning as something that 
is a means to passing exams or satisfying the minimal criteria. In line with this, 
they accept information passively, focusing only what they think will be 
assessed and approaching the material with that attitude. They are also less 
inclined towards seeing patterns and principles in what they learn. It would 
seem that these patterns or any other attempt to interact with knowledge 
content would be of interest to such learners only if they are to be tested on it. 
On the contrary, the idea of “transforming” knowledge (the deep learning 
approach) refers to the relating of new knowledge to one’s previous 
knowledge and experiences, organizing and integrating ideas in such a way 
	
7	Researchers such as Gibbs, Kember & Gow and Marton & Säljö have 
discussed this in more detail. See bibliography for full listings.	
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that the new knowledge ceases to be simply new facts and information for the 
purposes of restating but is now material that the student can more readily 
interact with and shape for more learning, independent learning and problem-
solving.  
 
Research shows that it is the deep approach to learning that consistently yields 
better and higher quality learning outcomes. According to Biggs and Tang, 
the surface approach, which is connected with low level learning activities like 
memorization, nearly always leads to poorer quality of learning outcomes and 
the deep approach leads to more meaningful ones (50-63). What exactly are 
these outcomes though? Though the literature on this can be varied, what is 
consistent in almost all the definitions of learning outcomes is that they 
describe what students are able to demonstrate in terms of knowledge, skills 
and attitudes upon completing the learning activity. Haggis writes, 
summarising one of the main focuses on the literature on this subject: 
 
…'without exception', deep approaches to learning and 'ways 
of understanding which include more complete ways of 
conceiving something' are 'more likely' to result in high quality 
learning outcomes (Prosser & Trigwell, 1999, p. 4) (91). 
 
Surface learning approaches lead to outcomes such as a shorter retention of 
information and limited application and transfer of what is learned. This would 
make sense if we consider that students who adopt this approach may often 
do so with the intention of learning in order to produce what is minimally 
necessary for assessments. Some of the learning outcomes of those who 
employ the deep approach include: the ability to transfer the knowledge and 
use it more broadly, to teach it to others; and an awareness that the learning is 
not finished, that is, there is more to learn or that learning can be deepened or 
extended. Again these outcomes would seem to make sense with the 
characteristics of the deep approach. Interacting with knowledge in such a way 
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that it “responds” and relates to experiences and previous knowledge would 
make it more likely that such students would be better equipped to assess the 
logic of arguments and putative claims rather than simply accepting them, and 
see gaps in their current learning and realise that there is more to be learned. 
If students can also see the relationships between principles and examples, for 
instance as opposed to seeing either the principle or the example as the only 
point of the learning material or text they are studying, then one might say 
they have understood how the example and the principle relate to each other. 
If they understand this, they are also more likely to be able to explain the 
relationship or teach it to someone else.  
 
The theory of deep and surface learning in general is not without some 
criticism of course. There are standard questions challenging methodology: for 
example, critics such as Haggis point out that interview questions are 
presented in such a way that responses elicit socially desirable answers, which 
may not reflect the truth. Further, the original study by Marton and Säljö also 
presented six “qualitatively different” ways that students were believed to 
conceptualise the idea of learning, some of which lack clarity. These were the 
six ways:  
 
(starting at the lowest level) as a quantitative increase in 
knowledge; as memorisation; as the acquisition of facts for 
subsequent use; as the abstraction of meaning; as a process 
aimed at understanding reality; and finally, as 'developing as a 
person' (Marton & Säljö, [1984] 1997; Marton et al., 1993) (qtd. 
in Haggis 90). 
 
So for example, criticisms were fielded against the conception of “meaning” 
as used by Marton and Säljö, because meaning is “non-specific” and could 
refer to finding the right links between knowledge within the subject area, or 
to personal meaning for the student, as in: links made between their subjects 
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and other aspects of life which are not linked to learning. As Haggis writes, “it 
is conceivable that studying may only be a small part of whatever 'meaningful' 
activities a person is engaged in.” (94). A related concern is with the 
interpretation of “understanding”. Haggis states that: 
 
'Understanding', like 'meaning', is non-specific, and therefore 
inherently problematic. Like meaning, what it signifies varies 
according to discipline, subdiscipline, and tutor. 'Assessment for 
understanding' tends to imply that understanding is a state that 
is attainable, and demonstrable. (95) 
 
Whether or not “meaning” and “understanding” are “non-specific” or 
“attainable” and “demonstrable” are certainly up for debate. Over the years, 
researchers participating in this debate have attempted to address these 
concerns by offering more specific accounts of these six ways, or by moving 
away from them to produce descriptions of deep learning that are true to the 
original research but not hemmed in by them. For example, Noel and Abigail 
Entwistle have offered one of the clearer and more complete lists detailing the 
characteristics of deep learning, focusing with greater precision on the 
experiences related more specifically to learning processes, and in particular 
to understanding. As such the wider issues with regards to personal meaning 
and change do not complicate the discussion and we have a little more insight 
into what understanding, as a crucial component of deep learning, is meant to 
achieve. In light of this, I have chosen to use the Entwistles’ list drawn from a 
range of their publications, as a starting point for the discussion going 
forward.  
 
The characteristics of deep learning according to the Entwistles are: 
 
(1) understanding material for oneself 
(2) being able to engage vigorously and critically with material 
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(3) relating ideas to one’s previous knowledge and experience 
(4) discovering and using organising principles to integrate ideas  
(5) relating evidence to conclusions 
(6) examining the logic and plausibility of the content or arguments 
 
I go into greater detail about each of these characteristics in Chapter 4, and 
not here, because I think it is useful to compare them, each in turn, to the 
characteristics on another list based on the research by philosopher Alison 
Hills, that I suggest offers us a very good account of understanding, and 
through that, a clear perspective on what deep learning looks like. However, 
what I would like to point out here is that the Entwistles’ supporting literature, 
though offering more clarity than others on the topic of understanding, still 
has also not quite nailed down the phenomenon of understanding as robustly 
as one might like. For instance, the concept of “understanding” in the first 
characteristic “Understanding material for oneself” is not explained fully or 
satisfactorily, so one is unclear as to what it actually means to “understand”, or 
when one might be certain that one has actually “understood” something. My 
position on this matter is that the philosophical research on “understanding”, 
particularly the work by Hills, might help to address some of these concerns 
about whether understanding is attainable and demonstrable, showing that 
indeed understanding can be attained and demonstrated. This is something 
vital that philosophical research is able to do to support and elevate the 
important work that educational psychologists like Marton and Säljö, as well as 
the Entwistles, have done. 
 
I think it is also worth clarifying here that surface learning is important and 
valuable too. There are times when rote learning and memorising, or even 
regurgitating facts could be useful, and enjoyable. Take for example subjects 
like law or medicine where memorising basic facts or laws is essential in order 
to master the subject. However, it is also clear that as one progresses in one’s 
learning, and one is required to apply the facts one has acquired to different 
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situations, surface learning is no longer sufficient and deep learning clearly 
becomes the better approach. 
 
One way in which we can account for the roles that both surface and deep 
learning can play in learning is to suggest that the appropriate approach to 
learning be used at the appropriate times, depending on the situation and 
requirements.8 
 
To summarise the key differences between surface and deep learning, here is 




8 For example, in “Promoting Deep Learning through Teaching and 
Assessment” Entwistle has suggested applying a “strategic approach” to 
learning within the contexts of school-based learning that culminates in 
examinations (11). Strategic learners are those who decide which approach to 
use and how to organise their time based on marking rubrics and 
requirements as well as reflection on their own learning methods and 
outcomes. Entwistle points out that the interest of strategic learners in 
academic content is typical of deep approaches but that the reasonable 
intention to score well in systems of assessment and examinations does 





Table 1: Examples and Features of both Surface-based and Deep learning 
approaches. 
 
Deep Learning Surface Learning 
Relates topic and ideas to past 
knowledge and experiences 
Unreflective approach; facts usually 
not elaborated on 
Thinks critically about newly 
learned material 
Little or no interaction with content 
or ideas 
Ties in information from other 
sources 
Concentrates only on 
memorisation 
Creates new arguments and 
understands logic based on new 
information 
Underlying argument seldom 
comprehended 
Recognises a structure in the 
content 
Tends to be more monotonous 
and does not seek to present 
structures  
Motivation from within, wants to 
learn 
External incentive, based on 
demands of a test 
Aims to understand the meaning 
behind the material 
Aims to recite and regurgitate 
material inactively 
 
In the next chapter, I explore how deep learning has roots in the works of 






Chapter 3: The ‘Origins’ of Deep Learning 
 
The philosophers I consider here, namely Plato, Rousseau and Dewey, have all 
robustly defended what modern educational theorists and psychologists now 
refer to as deep learning. In that sense, they were the forefathers of this 
contemporary theory that distinguishes between different approaches to 
learning and singles out one, deep learning, as superior. Since their theories 
have helped shape modern theories and highlight what is valuable about 
taking approaches to learning that are very similar to deep learning, I believe 
these philosophical theories can help illuminate the characteristics of what we 
now call deep learning and offer invaluable reasons as well as invaluable 
groundwork for new arguments that support the crucial role of understanding 
in learning.9 I begin with Plato. 
	
9 I am aware that there are methodological differences across subject areas 
and where necessary I either carefully interpret empirical findings or present 
them alongside arguments and suggestions as additional support. This 
method is not uncommon in the field of the philosophy of education. 
Philosophers of education often present empirical findings alongside theories 
as a way to encourage conversation between educational theory, educational 
psychology and philosophy. Some of the key researchers in this area, including 
Burbules, Arcilla and Cholbi, present educational psychology and pedagogical 
theory alongside philosophy, and many also do so while attempting to 
foreground the value and importance of philosophy as the historical basis for 
many of these newer theories. Other notable philosophers of education, such 
as Christopher Winch acknowledge the significance of work done by 
psychologists and scientists but hold that purely psychological, linguistic or 
scientific approaches tend to pay less attention to the social, affective and 
religious aspects of life, thereby providing an incomplete picture (The 








Plato’s work on education is foundational and pioneering. Any research that 
explores the roots of deep, transformative learning cannot sidestep Plato 
without the risk of missing out on some of the origins of the most insightful 
and influential ideas about learning. Plato championed the importance of 
learning as a transformative process. In Plato’s’ dialogues, Socrates is 
presented as someone who responds to the undefended and inconsistent 
logic of his peers and political rulers by showing them that their views fail to 
distinguish actual patterns and principles, that their arguments and 
conclusions are unreflective (characteristics of surface learning approaches) 
and even invalid, when they should ideally reflect an understanding of past 
experiences and knowledge and be relatable to actual evidence that one has 
carefully considered (traits of deep approaches).10 The hope here is that 
Socrates’ interlocutor might come to view things differently, that is, more 
deeply, reflectively and with genuine understanding, and change his mind. 
And even if not his interlocutor, then at least his reader would do so. As I have 
alluded to above, these Platonic criticisms of the superficial engagement with 
knowledge are also distinctly similar to criticisms of surface approaches by 
educational psychologists.  
 
We see further Platonic encouragement towards the transformative powers of 
learning and the deep approach to this sort of learning in the well-known 
allegory of the cave in The Republic. The allegory tells us of prisoners chained 
	
10 As an example, refer to Apology (21c-22d) for how Socrates uses elenchus 
to reveal these superficialities of his interlocutors.  
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in a cave who think that the shadows they see on the walls are real, that is, 
they are not aware that there are real, actual things that cause the shadows. 
One of the prisoners escapes and leaves the cave and when he encounters the 
light of the sun, he is shocked by what he sees outside the cave. As he adjusts 
to these new surroundings he realises that the idea of reality that he and the 
others in the cave had was wrong. When he returns and tries to explain this to 
the other prisoners, they do not believe him and Plato suggests they may even 
prefer to kill him. This allegory is an important one for Plato’s ideas about 
knowledge and understanding as it demonstrates the value of seeking out 
knowledge in a critical and engaging way, in contrast to passively accepting 
what one is presented with – a crucial difference between deep and surface 
approaches and as we shall see in Chapter 4, a key advantage of exercising 
cognitive control.11 It also shows how one might become especially vulnerable 
to ostracism by coming to learn that something their “tribe” believes is 
actually false – I consider this sort of vulnerability in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
The Allegory of the Cave 
 
This allegory is complex and layered because through it Plato makes many 
observations about many things, such as knowledge, perception and politics. 
The aspect of it that is relevant to the point I want to make here is that Plato 
could be read as distinguishing those who challenge what they are presented 
with, who are willing to question what they know and have learned, who 
examine the logic and likelihood of what is presented to them and seek out 
real knowledge, from those who simply accept what they are presented with 
	
11 Not all surface learning approaches are entirely passive of course, as even 
rote learning could involve elements of engagement. So this point refers to 
the more basic iterations. However, surface learning, by definition, is not the 
sort of learning that involves understanding, reflection or interaction with the 
ideas.  
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passively and fail to reflect on deeper possibilities. In the Republic, Plato says 
of the freed prisoner, describing how he pieces past and new knowledge 
together to come to new conclusions: 
 
At that point he would work out that it was the sun which 
caused the seasons and years, which governed everything in the 
visible realm, and which was in one way or another responsible 
for everything they used to see (516b-c).  
 
The escaped prisoner has now learned that the shadows are caused by the 
sun, as is everything else that he sees. The escaped prisoner’s experience can 
be considered in the frame of deep or transformative learning, while the other 
prisoners’ experiences show us the potential dangers of a purely surface 
approach.  
 
The “unfreed” prisoners are portrayed by Plato as ones who are in fact 
satisfied with passively accepting what they are presented with and who are 
unwilling to free themselves from the binds of this sort of blind acceptance. 
The very fact that they ridicule the freed prisoner, who Plato describes as 
being more enlightened now that he has left the confines of the cave, could 
suggest that they are so comfortable in believing the superficial that the very 
idea of it being questioned could lead them to think the freed prisoner is the 
blind and insane one (Republic 517a).  The cave then can be seen as the place 
which symbolises the sort of learning environment for those who take surface 
approaches and the sun on the outside can be seen as the representation of 
the sorts of attitudes and approaches that allow one to be truly educated; that 
is, to question what they see, make deep and astute connections and see the 
world around as it more truly is.12 Plato continues with an argument that is 
	
12 Not everyone who takes surface approaches to learning would be 
necessarily wilfully blind to the truth or unwilling to consider other 
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compelling and also one that seems to support my claim that the argument for 
approaches to learning that reach beyond the superficial were pioneered by 
philosophers. Here is what Plato says, 
  
Education is not what some people proclaim it to be. What they 
say, roughly speaking is that they are able to put knowledge 
into souls where none was before. Like putting sight into eyes 
which were blind…Whereas our present account indicates that 
this capacity in every soul, this instrument by which each person 
learns, is like an eye which can only be turned away from 
darkness and towards the light by turning the whole body. The 
entire soul has to turn with it…Education…would be the art of 
directing this instrument of finding the easiest and most 
effective way of turning it round. Not the art of putting the 
power of sight into it, but the art which assumes it possesses 
this power – albeit incorrectly aligned and looking in the wrong 
	
perspectives. The allegory of the cave, owing to the fact that it is an allegory, 
presents a particularly harsh and dangerous scenario for those who prioritise 
surface learning and neglect or avoid a deeper approach. Additionally, Plato’s 
distinction between the two types of prisoners and those people they 
symbolise can sometimes be read to carry particularly harsh and even elitist 
tones. I discuss some of the concerns with this elitism later on, but here I want 
to clarify that I do not subscribe to any prejudice of that kind. In the spirit of 
allegories, I wish this allegory to be taken as an exaggerated version aimed at, 
as I have mentioned, representing perhaps the worst outcomes of the sort of 
superficial acceptance, reproduction and rote learning that surface approaches 
tend to encourage, as such, for example, learners who take a surface approach 
are not necessarily equivalent to chained prisoners.   
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direction – and contrives to make it look in the right direction 
(Republic 518c-d).  
 
Here Plato seems to criticise the idea that education is “putting” knowledge 
into people. Conceiving of learners as a vessel inside which information is 
poured is not the version of education that Plato holds in esteem. Instead he 
seems to be advising that education is about guiding the learner to “align” 
her entire self with the right attitudes and beliefs. Again, this is very similar to 
the deep approach, which I recommend as the ideal one when it comes to 
learning. This passage from Plato that we have just looked at is also rich in 
offering perspectives on how we might understand ability and aptitude and 
how educators might approach teaching with this in mind. The line “Not the 
art of putting the power of sight into it, but the art which assumes it possesses 
this power” references the general point that one approach to teaching and 
learning is to assume that all learners already have potential and that true 
education (as opposed to surface education) is about “contriving” the learner 
to “look in the right direction.”13 This means offering the appropriate support 
and guidance to learners so that they learn independently, and ultimately, 
according to Plato, develop wisdom.14 
	
13 More precisely, what Plato is most likely referring to here is the belief that 
knowledge is essentially the act of recollection. This is not a point I want to 
delve into as it is not relevant to my thesis; however, the wider argument here 
could be seen as one that diminishes the value of imposing facts and 
information onto the learner as if she were simply a vessel. I say more about 
this in the Chapter 4. 
 
14 Reading the Republic, it would be fair to say that Plato values learning and 
knowledge extremely highly. His argument is that true learning, and in fact, 
love for every kind of learning produces expertise, knowledge of ethical 
matters and virtue. Interestingly (and predictably), Plato’s exemplary learner is 
	 29	
Problems with Plato’s views on learning 
 
One of the main concerns with Plato’s educational theory is that it is 
considerably elitist. In the Republic, while we find that he discourages the sort 
of learning that simply pours knowledge into the soul (518c) and instead 
encourages a transformation through “directing” and “turning around” the 
	
the philosopher. While I do not argue that the philosopher is the model 
learner, I do agree with some of Plato’s descriptions of the model learner and 
genuine seeker of wisdom – while to Plato these are uniquely characteristic of 
philosophers, to me, they reflect the values and characteristics of deep 
approaches to learning. Earlier on I mentioned the learning traits of critically 
engaging with knowledge content, examining the logic and validity of 
arguments and relating ideas to one’s previous knowledge and experience; all 
of which Plato encourages through the escaped prisoner in the allegory of the 
cave. While I think these traits are something that philosophy as a subject 
could be said to strongly demand, these characteristics of deep learning could 
hold true regardless of whether the learner is a philosopher or not; it so 
happens that deep learning approaches are usually essential for learning 
certain subjects, like philosophy. Additionally, Plato argues that philosophers 
love every kind of learning (Republic 474c-475c) and that no one else loves 
every kind of learning (Republic 475c-480a), so only philosophers are capable 
of being experts in ruling, ethics and virtue. The question of expertise in 
ruling, ethics and virtue is not a claim I wish to pursue in my thesis and there is 
not enough room here to give adequate attention to whether the claim that 
philosophers love every kind of learning is true. However, as this question is 
mostly relevant as a justification for why only philosophers should be rulers, 





soul (518d), we also see that this sort of teaching and learning is aimed at the 
upper echelons of Plato’s societal hierarchy. It is the gifted students that 
should be exposed to these methods while others lower in the hierarchy 
(“children and people with no judgement” (598c)) should be banned from 
reading certain books, mostly poetry, because they would be too easily 
swayed by the content; content deemed to be valorising imitation and falsity 
and that encouraged the indulgence of the appetites. Plato also seems to 
suggest that most adults are unable to critically understand the knowledge 
that they are engaging with and incapable of examining the logic of that which 
they are presented. One of the main tensions in Plato’s educational theory 
arises from the fact that he seems to want a city of blindly obedient citizens, 
who do not question the authority or critically engage with the wisdom of the 
wiser guardians and rulers of the city (414e) but at the same time he is fully 
aware of the value of the sort of education that encourages thinking, analysis 
and critical interaction, because it is this kind of learning that, as he says, 
results in good ruling, good moral theories and virtuousness. So it seems that 
the way Plato deals with this to some extent is to reserve this sort of deeper 
teaching and learning for those who have the potential to be philosophers, 
while the rest are told his “noble lie” so that his ideal city can function 
optimally.15  
 
In the Republic, Plato envisioned his ideal city as one where everyone belongs 
to specific social classes, and each class is assigned to its own roles and carries 
them out obediently (415b-c). Social mobility for bright and gifted children of 
the bronze and iron classes, while possible (415b-c), is not something Plato 
	
15 Plato recommends that citizens be told a lie, or a myth which suggests that 
all of them sprang fully grown from the earth and as such either have gold, 
silver, bronze or iron mixed into their souls. As such it is the gods who decide 
their position in the city prior to their “springing forth”. Any memory of 
childhood or education is simply a dream (Republic 414b-415d). 
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actually fully explores. He certainly does not seem to have any plan in place 
for how these bronze and iron children may be identified and offered the 
education given to the gold and silver classes. The growth, development and 
happiness of individuals is not Plato’s priority, they are treated more like non-
distinct parts of a wider mechanism that needs to be kept functioning well, 
rather than as unique individuals.  
 
While Plato’s educational theory has “hit the nail on the head” when it comes 
to the right conception and approach to learning itself, the underlying idea 
that individuals from certain classes are meant to do their given tasks and no 
more or less is something that the best contemporary educational theories 
and practices now rightly shun. Although modern social, political and 
educational systems are not able to altogether avoid the correlative effects 
between social classes and access to good education, when students from any 
background do have access to good education, there is an ever-increasing 
push to give them opportunities to develop the sort of deep approaches to 
learning that Plato seems to have reserved only for the higher classes.  
 
In his book Learning to Teach in Higher Education, Paul Ramsden writes that 
all students can be orientated towards one or the other approach (that is, 
surface or deep) depending on the clarity of their goals, the degree of choice 
they have over what they are learning, and their perceptions of teaching, 
workload and assessment (39-47). In “Styles and Approaches In Problem 
Solving”, Diana Laurillard points out that research has also found that the 
same students can switch between learning approaches depending on their 
interest in the subject, the nature of the task, their understanding of the 
demands of the task, which suggests that these approaches are not 
personality traits and certainly not something that is innate (134).16 If we return 
	
16 Though we must remember that by referring to it as a noble lie, it would 
seem that Plato himself was aware that the explanation for social position and 
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to the allegory of the cave and compare Plato’s description of the chained 
prisoners to this research, we might see that perhaps not all those who 
remained chained, that is, who have been used to taking surface approaches 
will necessarily respond with mistrust and hostility when asked to question 
their beliefs and attitudes towards knowledge. This is where Plato’s allegory 
assumes that the “unenlightened” are unable to change the way in which they 
approach learning, which is not necessarily true. I show later on in Chapter 4 
that there is a set of skills, called cognitive control, that characterise deep 
learning - these skills are certainly teachable and very likely to improve with 
practise, as evidence has shown. Therefore the idea that only certain classes of 
people are capable of this sort of learning (in so far as we agree that deep 
approaches are better approaches) cannot be justified.  
 
We have seen thus far that some of the key features of the best contemporary 
approaches to learning according to educational psychologists and 
pedagogues is very similar to some of the key features of Plato’s ancient 
educational theory; contemporary research shows that the students who take 
this approach conceive of the process of learning as an abstraction of 
meaning, an interpretive process aimed at better understanding the world 
they live in and independently applying what they have learned to living their 
lives.  
 
It is evident from what we have seen that Plato’s perspective on learning is 
that learning is best understood as a process that importantly includes features 
very much like those of the deep approach. As I pointed out earlier, we see 
this very evidently in the way Socrates is represented as the sort of person who 
challenges those who display characteristics of a very surface approach; 
	
intellectual promise was only a myth created to keep his ideal city functioning 
well and not something he necessarily believed was innate. 
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confronting interlocutors who simply rely on anecdotes and who fail to reflect 
on and adequately defend their positions. Plato would hold that deep learning 
(as we call it now) is valuable because it is the sort of learning that is more 
likely to lead a person to examine their beliefs and not take them entirely as a 
given. Relying entirely on belief that is unexamined can lead to falsehoods, 
errors and importantly, to a life that is not virtuous; and this would be 
inconsistent with Plato’s fundamental aim of education – to make us virtuous. 
While this final aim of learning is not one that I share, it is clear that Plato 
highly regards the abilities to question, challenge, and think critically and 
independently. Exactly how a person might do this is modelled by Socrates. I 
believe that apart from being an excellent tool for teachers, the Socratic 
method is useful for independent reflection too. Socrates applies the dialectic 
technique with his students and opponents. He uses probing questions to go 
beneath the superficial, encouraging his students and opponents to defend 
their beliefs and perspectives – often this challenge leads them to realise that 
their beliefs are problematic in some way, that they are misinformed or 
illogical, prejudiced, partial to something or the other, or that they have not 
thought deeply enough or believed something without sufficient justification. 
This method is presented with Socrates as the teacher or opponent; but I 
believe that deep learning approaches can help us to apply this sort of 
challenge to our thinking and beliefs independently, as an exercise in 
reflecting on and synthesising what we have learned.  
 
Platonic philosophy has had significant and valuable contributions to make 
towards how we conceive of learning today, but Plato is neither the only 
philosopher to present a form of educational theory, nor the only one to 
propose and argue for features of learning that resemble the deep approach. 
Other philosophers have championed an understanding of learning as 
something defined not simply by how much information a student is able to 
passively acquire from their teachers and appropriately regurgitate for the 
purposes of assessment, but by the students’ ability to think critically, better 
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understand the world around them and themselves. Next, I assess some of the 
ideas associated with the theories of Rousseau and Dewey. Each has 
characteristics that are very similar to deep approaches to learning. Some of 
the methods suggested by Rousseau and Dewey have shaped contemporary 
approaches to deep learning. Others face challenges that we should consider 
carefully: some of these challenges are justified and should be recognised, 
while others can be accommodated with enhanced clarity or better re-
interpretation in line with more contemporary attitudes and practices. Where 
possible I attempt to address the concerns that are relevant to my thesis 
taking into account both the spirit of the original views and current attitudes 






The 18th century philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau’s contributions to what 
we now refer to as the deep approach are significant. He argued against rote 
memorisation and in its place, he encouraged discovery, independent thinking 
and a problem-solving approach to learning, by which I mean that he strongly 
advocated for students to engage with the world, and especially with nature, 
to explore and discover things for themselves and to learn by solving 
problems on their own, rather than by being taught the solutions. Rousseau 
wrote: 
 
Put the problems before him (child) and let him solve them 
himself. Let him know nothing because you have told him, but 
because he has learnt it for himself. Let him not be taught 
science, let him discover it. (Émile 131) 
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These characteristics are very similar to those listed in deep approach theorists 
Entwistle and Entwistle’s list (for example, discovering and using organising 
principles to integrate ideas, and relating evidence to conclusions, are skills 
very much in line with those Rousseau as we can see from the quote above) as 
well as to the skills on the list for cognitive control. This indicates that 
Rousseau had a clear grasp on the value of cognitive control at a time when 
force-feeding knowledge through rote learning and punishment was the norm 
in formal education.17 He also advocates for teachers to apply teaching 
methods that encourage discovery and independent learning – these are the 
sorts of teaching pedagogies that are aligned with contemporary deep 
learning approaches. For this reason at least, Rousseau’s views are worth 
considering because they offer us an insight into the origins of deep learning 
and what continues, to this day, to be valuable about it.  
 
Rousseau also advocates for the value of disruptions and “pain” when one is 
learning, the experience of discomfort is not something Rousseau shies away 
from and this is aligned with my own contributions on vulnerability in learning 
in Chapter 6, and how this can be valuable if appropriate.  
 
The importance of independent learning and critical engagement 
 
Most of Rousseau’s views on learning are contained comprehensively in his 
work Émile originally published in 1762. The eponymous Émile is a fictional 
pupil who Rousseau schools according to his theory of learning.  This theory 
focuses very much on the student’s understanding and relationship with the 
	
17 Iheoma writes “Traditionally educators have tended to swing from one end 
of the pendulum to the other. Before Rousseau's time the practice was to 




world he lives in. Rousseau was highly critical of learning that was aimed at 
preparing children to enter into an adulthood where they thought and acted 
on the basis of what society expects of them. He was very much concerned 
with what he considered to be the corruptive role of society. Peter Lindsay 
writes that this was a particularly valid concern in his time because learning 
involved directing existing human motivations into socially acceptable 
behaviour rather than transforming them altogether (2), which essentially 
meant that behaviours were not authentic but simply conformed to fit with 
social expectations. This was presumably problematic because it meant that 
behaviour was not motivated by genuine understanding and desire but by 
societal pressure and fear of social alienation. The goal for Rousseau was to 
ensure that Émile, “he uses his own reason not that of others, for there must 
be no submission to authority if you would have no submission to convention” 
(169). He wanted his student to be able to think independently, interpret and 
understand what he was learning for himself, rather than deferring to authority 
or societal norms and expectations. As this stands, it seems to be a good goal. 
When we think of the outcomes of a good education, we think of students 
who are able to intelligently and thoughtfully question what they are told to 
believe, assess the logic of claims and conclusions so they are not misled, and 
make independent decisions based on knowing, understanding and wisely 
interpreting the world they live in, even when the “crowd” is doing or 
pressuring them to do otherwise. These are all characteristics of people who 
conceive of learning as far more than just a quest to collect information and 
reproduce it when necessary, and so we see here that Rousseau’s 
understanding of learning is as a process of understanding and interpreting 
the world in line with one’s own experiences and previous knowledge.  
 
As we saw earlier, according to Marton and Säljö and other researchers such 
as Entwistle, the way in which we perceive the world and how circumstances 
appear to us are what principally influence our approaches to learning. If this is 
indeed the case then we can see why Rousseau pays such intense attention to 
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the circumstances and environment of the student. Let us consider what 
Rousseau has to say about this and what we might be able to learn from this 
about creating learning environments that encourage students to engage in 
deep learning.18 
 
A discussion of this must begin with his views on ‘nature’. Nature is an 
important concept in Rousseau’s theory of education. He writes about nature: 
 
We are born sensitive and from our birth onwards we are 
affected in various ways by our environment. As soon as we 
become conscious of our sensations we tend to seek or shun 
the things that cause them, at first because they are pleasant or 
unpleasant, then because they suit us or not, and at last 
because of judgments formed by means of the ideas of 
happiness and goodness which reason gives us. These 
tendencies gain strength and permanence with the growth of 
reason, but hindered by our habits they are more or less warped 
by our prejudices. Before this change they are what I call Nature 
within us (Émile 7). 
 
From this we see that for Rousseau, sensation is the source of our knowledge 
and following this, the mind judges these sensations. The activity of judging is 
based to some extent at least on a combination of character and reasoning 
abilities. These can develop for better or worse, and looking at Rousseau’s 
	
18 Rousseau’s work covers education from early childhood onwards, whereas in 
this thesis I apply my theories on love for learning to students who are already 
capable of self-reflexivity when it comes to learning. As such, young children 
are not my focus. However, to fully understand Rousseau’s views we will, on 
occasion, have to discuss aspects of his theory that are also related to young 
children. 
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conclusion that we are best off going with our original inclinations, or our 
nature, we can assume he does not have much faith in that stage of 
development where we might start forming our opinions, especially if they do 
not conform to our original nature.  
 
Rousseau was a believer in what is rather confusingly called “negative 
education”. It was something that he believed best preserved our nature. 
Eugene Iheoma explains “negative education”: 
 
The philosophical assumption which underlies Rousseau's idea 
of negative education is his famous proposition that man is 
naturally good. Taken at its face value and understood in the 
context of Rousseau's (1911) belief that "all that we lack at birth, 
all that we need when we come to man's estate, is the gift of 
education," (p. 6) it seems quite logical to conclude, as some 
critics have done, that Rousseau's meaning is that whatever evil 
we find in man is due to faulty education or to the corrupting 
influence of society. Good education will therefore consist 
merely in the protection of man's natural goodness from 
corrupting social influences, and thus protected, the child's 
natural good self will be free to develop of its own accord 
(Dent, cited in Rousseau, 1911, pp. xiv-xv). This is the usual 
interpretation given to Rousseau's directives on education in the 
early years: "The education of the earliest years should be 
merely negative. It consists, not in teaching virtue or truth, but 
in preserving the heart from vice and from the spirit of error" 
(Rousseau, 1911, p. 57). (70) 
 
Rousseau’s desire for his students to conform to their natures can be explained 
by considering Rousseau’s concerns about authority and influence. He argued 
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that education comes from three sources, namely “nature, from men, or from 
things” (Émile 6). Later in the same text he writes,  
 
There are two kinds of dependence: dependence on things, 
which is the work of nature; and dependence on men, which is 
the work of society. Dependence on things, being non-moral, 
does no injury to liberty and begets no vices; dependence on 
men, being out of order, gives rise to every kind of vice, and 
through this master and slave become mutually depraved (49). 
 
His ideal world was one that was as close as possible to the natural state in 
which reasoned, natural inclination ruled behaviours in place of societal norms. 
Rousseau repeatedly states in both The Social Contract and Émile that man is 
born good. When man is in touch with this natural state of being, only then is 
he truly free and happy, and Rousseau’s main aim is to make Émile, his 
student, happy, self-sufficient and free. According to Winch, Rousseau 
believes that certain social interactions, specifically ones where there is an 
imposition of one’s will over another’s, would be extremely detrimental to the 
student’s development, and it is essentially the chance of this that he wishes to 
avoid at all cost (Strong Autonomy and Education (SAE) 25).  
 
It is clear that Rousseau is much concerned about students lacking the ability 
to think critically and independently resulting in them being influenced by 
corruptive elements of society. This was no doubt a legitimate concern in his 
day, but arguably even more so now, when students have access to so many 
more sources of information (a significantly worrying amount of which is fake) 
and influence than they ever did before. Thinking critically and independently 
are skills of crucial importance now, and deep approaches to learning which 
foreground understanding over the acquisition of facts tend to prioritise these 
skills. Rousseau famously wrote “God makes all things good; man meddles 
with them and they become evil.” (Émile 5). It would be fair to say this is a 
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rather extreme view, but it is one that Rousseau held to be largely true. “Man” 
refers to a society that corrupts man’s essentially good nature by encouraging 
in him vice, misery and most importantly an inflated sense of self-worth. 
Rousseau was extremely sensitive to how students might be influenced by 
others’ perceptions and judgements of the world we live in and his fear was 
that these influences were often not positive. In fact, he was so concerned 
about it that he even argued for safeguarding the student from the teacher – 
believing that any explicit authority or will by the teacher will result in failure; 
this explicit authority and will was something he felt tends to manifest itself in 
standard curriculum set out by the teacher. 
 
To explore this idea further, let us consider two tendencies that Rousseau calls 
amour de soi and amour propre, which he says all of us possess. These 
tendencies must be carefully managed in students in order for them to be free 
and happy. By “free” here Rousseau means that the student is not under 
constraints or pressures imposed by society. The first, amour de soi, 
references a sort of survival and preservation instinct that is aimed at our own 
well-being. This instinct for the self’s well-being is reserved only for the self 
and not applied to others. Amour propre on the other hand is the tendency 
we have that references our relationship with other human beings. It can be 
described as the desire to be recognised by other human beings as an equal 
and to be treated with respect. Winch writes that at its most fundamental it is 
nothing more than a wish to be properly recognised as a human creature by 
other human creatures (SAE 29). However, Riley and Welchman write that 
Rousseau wishes for amour propre to be developed beyond just this most 
fundamental level and to essentially inspire citizens to be civically and morally 
motivated (97). Since amour propre relates to our interactions with others, and 
learning is an activity that involves us relating to others, the development of 
this tendency throughout the learning process is what Rousseau is especially 
concerned about. For amour propre to be healthy, students must neither have 
their wills dominated by others, nor seek to subjugate others. Since the 
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development of personal judgement was thought to be subject to the 
influence of others, it was important for Rousseau that amour propre be 
developed correctly so that the students’ judgement is sound.  
 
A positive reading of Rousseau would hold that he attempts to bridge the 
tensions between nature and society – one stays in touch with one’s original 
nature (which according to Rousseau is good) but through one’s various stages 
of development, one must, from relying on one’s nature (and tutor’s guidance) 
gradually grow and change from being concerned mainly with amour de soi to 
being able to balance amour de soi with that which becomes the more 
important, amour propre. Riley and Welchman refer to Rousseau’s educational 
theory as “radically transformative education” because 
 
For Rousseau, the ‘’Great Legislator” (more accurately the great 
civic educator) must, over educative time, “change the nature of 
man” by turning self-lovers into “Spartan mothers” (who ask not 
whether their own sons have survived battles but whether the 
“general good” of the city still lives) (96) 
 
The aim of Rousseau’s education then, is that the student develops through 
his own interpretation of the world around him, and acquires learning and 
knowledge that he is able to transform into support for his own change from a 
self-loving creature to a robustly civic-minded one. This is arguably the only 
transformation that Rousseau would “allow” because it is in line with his view 
of “natural” development: that is, the originally good nature changing from 
one that focuses on its own development and well-being to that of others, 
which is what it would naturally do anyway. For Rousseau, change is not 
acceptable if it diverts from natural inclinations.19  
	
19 Remember here that Rousseau already assumes that our original nature is 
good. The question of whether or not we are “born good” is a very complex 
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The use of the term “Spartan mothers” is of course a loaded one. Rousseau 
does use Spartan analogy and he does prioritise the well-being of society over 
that of the individual, and it is a fair criticism that at times Rousseau can come 
across as rather extreme and cold in his approach. But I do also believe that 
he shows genuine concern that students are treated with respect and dignity 
and holds that their flourishing is important too. I will point to evidence of this 
as we go along. 
 
How then does Rousseau intend to provide his student with an environment 
that protects the natural state and one where amour propre can be correctly 
developed? Rousseau divides up the developmental stages of a person and 
advises as to how they should be taught appropriately at each of these stages. 
In books one to three of Émile, we see that shielding the child and keeping 
him as isolated as possible is encouraged so that his amour propre can be 
properly developed. It is only when the student is at the appropriate age to 
reason that the teacher is invited to find ways in which the child can discover 
reasoning, but even then, the teacher is required to be careful about exerting 
her authority over the student in any way. Rousseau argues that reason is the 
last stage to develop and so should never be the medium of instructing a 
student. He writes: 
 
Of all man’s faculties, reason, which is, so to speak, 
compounded of all the rest, is the last and choicest growth, and 
it is this you would use for the child’s early training. To make a 
man reasonable is the coping stone of a good education, and 
	
one that the limits of this thesis do not permit me to explore. While this is an 
important aspect of Rousseau’s own theory, it is not a necessary condition to 
the points I am interested in for this thesis. 
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yet you profess to train a child through his reason! You begin at 
the wrong end, you make the end the means. (Émile 53) 
 
In Émile’s case, the first signs of reasoning appear when he is older and gets 
lost in the woods of Montmorency and has to use astronomy to find his way 
back, combining “reason of the senses” with “intellectual reason” in an 
independent way (65). As mentioned earlier, the teacher or caregiver should 
not tell the student what to think or do but provide carefully orchestrated 
opportunities for the student to learn and come to conclusions through self-
exploration. In Émile, Rousseau provides many examples of how this can be 
achieved. One such example pertains to teaching a child about the concept of 
property. Rousseau suggests that children, although they may have a very 
basic idea of what it means to own something, such as “his clothes, his 
furniture, his playthings” (62), have no real understanding of the concept of 
ownership. To effectively teach a student about ownership, Rousseau suggests 
that one needs to “go back to the origin of property” (62). So he takes Émile 
to some unclaimed fields and they plant beans there and care for the land and 
the beans. After some time of doing this, Rousseau then tells Émile, 
 
We water the beans every day, we watch them coming up with 
the greatest delight. Day by day I increase this delight by 
saying, “Those belong to you.” To explain what that word 
“belong” means, I show him how he has given his time, his 
labour, and his trouble, his very self to it; that in this ground 
there is a part of himself which he can claim against all the 
world. (63) 
 
Rousseau’s point here is that Émile eventually learns about ownership through 
the direct experience of owning and caring for the land, by facilitating Émile to 
feel for himself the sense of ownership, and not by being told the meaning or 
definition of ownership or property. Rousseau is very much against the 
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approach to teaching where children’s heads are over-filled with words that 
have no meaning within their reach while teachers believe they have instructed 
them very well (76). This way the correct amour propre is also developed 
because Émile understands that he has claim over the land because he himself 
has worked hard on it. 
 
What Rousseau wants to model here is the process by which a student is 
allowed to engage directly and naturally with an experience. He is able to 
relate experiences to one another and integrate them in such a way that he 
better understands something about the world around him and how to relate 
to it. The deep approach also calls for the understanding of material for 
oneself, discovering (for oneself) and using organizing principle to integrate 
ideas and relate them to one’s own previous knowledge and experiences. One 
of the many positive outcomes of this kind of attitude and approach to 
learning, for both Rousseau and those who apply the deep approach is in the 
fact that such attitudes towards learning enable the student to come to 
understand something and form ideas about things in a way that is less 
influenced by someone else. We can certainly see that Rousseau attributes 
value to ensuring that students are able to explore, examine and think about 
the world and what others tell them in a thoughtful and critical way, so as not 
to blindly believe something simply because someone has told them it is true 
or right, or on the basis that others believe it. It would be fair to say that one 
of the key aims of learning is to equip students with the ability to think 
critically and for themselves, this is a crucial skill that is cultivated and 
encouraged in Rousseau’s theory as well as in contemporary theories that 
centre on deep approaches.20 Surface approaches on the other hand, because 
they focus predominantly on acquiring and retaining information through rote 
	
20 It is also worth noting that Rousseau references “joy” in the quote above. 
The role that pleasure plays in learning, and particularly in cognitive control 
and independent learning is something I consider in Chapter 5. 
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learning methods, do not foreground skills pertaining to understanding and 
critical thinking, so the development of these are not prioritised.  
 
Criticisms of Rousseau’s view 
 
Rousseau’s solution to the problem of untoward influence was to ensure that 
students are critical, independently minded thinkers who rely on their own 
discoveries and reasoning. This seems to me a good solution, however one of 
the significant criticisms that Rousseau faces is with how he suggests that this 
can be achieved. He has been criticised for being overly cynical and overly 
protective of children to the point that it seems he is advocating for the 
isolation of children, particularly from the city environment, including schools, 
and from other people (who are not part of his immediate learning 
experience). Relatedly, he has been disparaged for seemingly promoting the 
idea that reasoning is dangerous, and should not be taught to students, and 
that learning should always be pleasurable and painless. He has also been 
criticised for his view that disruptive or distressing moments inhibit learning, 
therefore leading to teachers, even in contemporary settings, overly 
protecting their students from challenges and useful learning experiences 
believing that these are necessarily harmful. There is also the claim that he 
diminishes the role of the teacher, making the teacher’s contribution to 
learning insignificant, thereby leading teachers to adopt a laissez faire attitude 
to their students. In contrast to this accusation is another one that criticises 
him for encouraging teachers to control and manipulate their students. I 
consider each of these criticisms briefly below and conclude that Rousseau’s 
writings can be confusing and even overly-dramatic at times, but that at the 
heart of it all, he values independent learning that concerns itself with both 
cognitive and reasoning skills as well as civic/humane development. He 
emphasises a careful balance between pain and pleasure in learning; he holds 
the teacher in very high esteem; but he often expects a lot from the teacher, 
making it a difficult role to successfully fulfil in an education system that is poor 
	 46	
on resources and does not usually allow for adaptive or one-to-one teaching. 
The manipulation factor is an interesting one, and I show that although 
Rousseau does encourage that situations be “set-up” for the student to learn, 
to call this “manipulation” in as negative a sense as it has been by some critics 
is rather ungenerous.  
 
Isolation and Reasoning 
 
Rousseau condemns the city life and educational institutions as being corrupt, 
and suggests that children be taken away to the countryside where they may 
be kept separate from the city life and social institutions until they are of a 
suitable age to re-join society. At the start of Émile, Rousseau describes such 
institutions as “ridiculous”, teaching children to become “hypocrites, always 
professing to live for others, while thinking of themselves alone” (8). Rousseau 
believed that more intimate communities allow parents to shield their children 
from these “vile morals of the town” (59) and that children should align 
themselves with their natural inclinations to be good. Even if we assume these 
naturally good inclinations to be true, there is no reason to believe that 
opinions different to those aligned with one’s original nature would necessarily 
be corrupting or evil. It is possible that our experiences of the world around 
us, even if this immediate environment is “the town”, could, at least 
sometimes, offer positive and useful perspectives to our natural inclinations. 
They could perhaps refine those inclinations, and even add contexts to our 
natural inclinations that might help us to understand them better, thereby 
guiding us to better and more effective or efficient decisions and actions. As 
someone who believes that learning should be a process by which the student 
discovers and independently interprets the world around them, for Rousseau 
to show disdain for personal opinions that are shaped and can be changed by 
real world engagements and experiences does indeed seem inconsistent – but 
is it really?  
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To answer this we need to note that Rousseau held a developmentalist view of 
education, namely that timing is very important in education because people 
develop in specific ways at different stages in their lives; they go through 
phases of development and learning should serve these phases of 
development. Throughout the early phases of the student’s development, in 
order for amour propre to develop correctly, the student should be kept 
isolated from society so as to ensure that his or her will is not dominated by 
another’s. This separation was not limited only to the city but also to materials 
thought to exert too much influence on young minds. Rousseau also had 
strong views against young children reading books. Like other influences, he 
felt reading of books mediated what was “natural” and caused young children 
to only ‘”know” what someone else decided was worth knowing and even 
went so far as to say that “I hate books” (Émile 147). Elsewhere, he wrote, 
 
. . .our first teachers in natural philosophy are our feet, hands, 
and eyes. To substitute books for them is not to teach us to 
reason, it teaches us to use the reason of others rather than our 
own; it teaches us to believe much and know little. (Émile 90) 
 
Like Plato’s disdain for certain poetry and art that he considered to be 
influencing the youth to hold highfalutin or pompous ideas about heroism and 
reality, Rousseau held disdain for books, at least in the early developmental 
stages of a student, because he felt that the ideas in books would corrupt their 
minds and give them a sense of reality that was mediated, as opposed to real. 
One of the reasons Rousseau finds books problematic is that he simply does 
not seem to have much faith in the role of others (other than the teacher, and 
even then he is cynical) in the education of the child. Like Plato, he was 
worried about the student being manipulated, brainwashed and shaped by a 
society that does not have the right moral and civic attitudes.  
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Noddings writes that for Rousseau, education was given the task of 
transforming students into self-reliant, compassionate, civic-minded people 
who were able to reconcile their true nature as free and good creatures with 
living conjointly in society (14). So, at the same time as believing that schools, 
institutions and the city were corrupt, Rousseau also believed that all 
education is aimed at one very specific sort of transformation: from self-loving 
child to civic-minded person.  
 
In light of this, the question of isolation seems especially concerning to critics. 
They may argue that there is no reason to believe that amour propre can only 
be successfully developed through this isolation. To be properly integrated 
into civic life, would not engagement with civic institutions and the civic life of 
the city be important? Additionally, if Rousseau is suggesting that we should 
heed what is “natural” then could he also see learning as a transformative 
process? If we agree that learning involves genuine understanding, then we 
must be open to the fact that learning might, and often does, lead us to 
question our own views, and sometimes this results in us changing our minds 
and even changing fundamental views that may bring about personal 
transformation. This is the value of being “open” to the world and to various 
perspectives, which I explore as an argument in itself in Chapter 6. Worries 
that Rousseau may seem to have about his students being vulnerable and 
getting “hurt” or influenced by “corrupted” views and personalities are of 
course legitimate, but does the answer lie in seeking to over-protect students 
and make them as invulnerable as possible? How can we make sense of 
Rousseau’s views that we should be in touch with our natural state but still be 
transformed into a civic-minded member of society, and that we should avoid 
significant aspects of civic life and environment but know how to live conjointly 
in society?  
 
Critics may also point out that one can imagine exposing one’s children to 
books and them still developing views of their own, “unsullied” so to speak by 
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the views of authors in books. In fact, books, and even fiction, can be an 
incredibly useful tool to get students to challenge their own assumptions, 
learn about the world they live in, acquire information and facts, and change 
their minds about things. This can be done successfully, for example if the 
teacher facilitates the reading process by asking thoughtful and probing 
questions.  
 
I think the response to these critics lies in a more careful reading of Rousseau, 
one that acknowledges that “negative education” is part of a pedagogical 
process that spans the many years of a child’s learning – from early childhood 
through to early adulthood – and that has many stages, each different and 
planned as a progression from the next when the child is ready to move on. As 
such, isolation from potentially corruptive or highly influential people and 
materials, be it the city, schools or books, is not for life, but for the early 
developmental period of a child’s life. This means that exposure to the city life 
and to books of all sorts is permissible, and even to be encouraged when the 
student is old enough to make up her own mind. The concept of “negative 
education”, according to Rousseau, is only really reserved for the earliest 
stages of a child’s education. He writes: 
  
Therefore the education of the earliest years should be merely 
negative. It consists, not in teaching virtue or truth, but in 
preserving the heart from vice and from the spirit of error. 
(Émile 57) 
 
Rousseau’s “negative education” makes sense within the context of his views 
about how we receive our education. He says we do so from three sources, 
namely nature, men, and things (Émile 6). Nature educates us about our 
biologies – that is, our organs and our faculties. Men teach us how to put our 
biologies into use – that is, how to utilize our organs and exercise our faculties. 
Things educate us by offering us the physical environment with which we 
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interact, using our senses. The first of these “teachers” should be nature, says 
Rousseau. His reason for this is that nature is the “teacher” we cannot control 
in any way. Teaching methods, he holds, should be aligned with the child’s 
developmental stages. He writes: 
 
Nature would have them children before they are men. If we try 
to invert this order we shall produce a forced fruit immature and 
flavourless, fruit which will be rotten before it is ripe… (Émile 54) 
 
By “invert this order” Rousseau meant that children should not rely on 
reasoning to teach them what to think or how to be at this early 
developmental stage as the child’s development would not be at a stage 
where actual, intelligent reasoning would be possible. This was perhaps the 
key reason why Rousseau seems to have despised the city life for young 
children. He felt that the social settings and pressures would compel parents 
to teach their children to blindly conform to societal pressures. Not being able 
to reason like adults do, children, who are more “innocent”, vulnerable and 
naturally “open” to the world will then adopt certain beliefs, attitudes and 
practices without fully understanding the reasons for doing so. In Confessions, 
Rousseau talks about the “intimate” setting and community style of living that 
was characteristic of the countryside, making life there simple (24). This 
simplicity would allow parents better control of the environment, making it an 
ideal environment for teaching them first about their faculties and how to use 
their senses, before then slowly progressing to teaching them how to reason 
via means of experiences rather than commands.21 He felt that rushing this 
	
21 It is evident in today’s context that packing our children away to country 
homes with private tutors reeks of privilege. In the context of the 18th century 
it did too and Rousseau keeps advocating it because his personal experiences 
of time spent in the countryside as a child were remarkably positive and 
nurturing in ways that city life was not. If we excuse Rousseau this oversight, 
	 51	
stage would do more harm than good, and that a child should be around 
twelve before reasoning is taught to some basic degree. He writes: 
 
A child knows he must become a man; all the ideas he may 
have as to man’s estate are so many opportunities for his 
instruction, but he should remain in complete ignorance of 
those ideas which are beyond his grasp. My whole book is one 
continued argument in support of this fundamental principle of 
education. (Émile 141) 
 
We now know better that children in general are capable of reasoning before 
they are twelve, we also know that all children do not develop at the same 
rate, so ascribing an age, like twelve, at which a child is capable of intelligent 
reasoning is inaccurate. So the suggestion that they should remain in 
“complete ignorance of those ideas which are beyond their grasp” seems 
unhelpful as what is within children’s grasps at different ages is much more 
varied than Rousseau seems to have understood. Matching learning outcomes 
to a child’s developmental stage is perhaps the most difficult task at hand here 
and Rousseau has been too prescriptive in attributing a specific age range to 
this development. Or, rather, it is clear to us now that adopting Rousseau’s 
advice on age suitability, as some progressivists continue to do, in the world 
we now live in, would be misguided. If for example one were to time the 
period of isolation wrongly and keep one’s student in isolation for a significant 
	
what we can take very usefully from his imploring to take our children away to 
the countryside is that it is worth being mindful of how much our environment 
can affect our learning and shape our beliefs. In fact, Rousseau can be 
credited with bringing this observation about the influence of our 
environments to our learning, to the fore at a time when people naturally fell 
into the belief that schools were necessarily the best place of learning for 
every child. 
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period of time after she is “ready” to “progress” into society, the isolation and 
excessive shielding could diminish her ability to abstract meaning, relate new 
ideas to previous ones, challenge the logic and validity of beliefs and 
arguments – because the student struggles to develop her thoughts and 
beliefs alongside the experience of seeing different approaches to problems 
and hearing different views. This is essentially the opposite of what Rousseau 
desires. In light of this, I think what is useful to retain from Rousseau’s views on 
isolation is not so much the exact age suitability for different levels of 
progression in learning, but the more fundamental position that aligning what 
we teach with what a child’s mental development will yield success.22 This is 
now an elemental principle of curriculum planning (though curriculum planners 
cannot always get it right either), so it is not a contentious position to hold. We 
realise how crucial timing is to imparting knowledge and skills but also to 
maintaining and developing a child’s confidence in learning. In further support 
of this reading of Rousseau’s position, consider the following quote: 
 
I am far from thinking, however, that children have no sort of 
reason. On the contrary, I think they reason very well with 
regard to things that affect their actual and sensible well-being. 
But people are mistaken as to the extent of their information, 
and they attribute to them knowledge they do not possess, and 
make them reason about things they cannot understand. (Émile 
72) 
	
22 This is a fair interpretation because Rousseau advises strongly against 
forcing lessons and activities on to children before they are ready – the age 
range therefore might be seen more a guide than a rule if we are being 
generous. He writes “Mankind has its place in the sequence of things; 
childhood has its place in the sequence of human life; the man must be 




Rousseau is clearly addressing the fact that he believes children are capable of 
a certain level of reasoning, but not capable of reasoning like an adult. This 
seems to me a fair observation and one that clearly does not, as some 
opponents argue, diminish the value or position of reasoning in learning. What 
Rousseau is claiming seems to be quite clearly that what we teach children 




The claim that Rousseau promotes over protectiveness and a pain-free 
education is not entirely accurate.23 While it is true that Rousseau held that 
“the age of gaiety passes amidst tears, punishments, threats, and slavery,’’ 
and that one must avoid the:  
 
What is to be thought, therefore, of that cruel education which 
sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, that burdens a child 
with all sorts of restrictions and begins by making him 
miserable, in order to prepare him for some far-off happiness 
which he may never enjoy? (Émile 42-43)  
 
Rousseau also believed that happiness was more than just pleasure, meaning 
that when he talks about happiness and gaiety in these quotes, he means well-
	
23 Reese writes that progressivism, for which Rousseau has been widely held as 
the founding father, has been described as “part and parcel of wider reform 
movements in the Western world that sought the alleviation of pain and 




being and something more akin to “flourishing”.24 For Rousseau, well-being 
lies in keeping one’s desires and faculties in balance. He wrote,  
 
… True happiness consists in decreasing the difference between 
our desires and our powers, in establishing a perfect equilibrium 
between the power and the will. Then only, when all its forces 
are employed, will the soul be at rest and man will find himself 
in his true position. (Émile 44) 
 
This balance was not achieved by ensuring that learning was always and only 
ever pleasurable. In fact, quite oppositely, Rousseau clearly advocated for 
some pain and suffering in learning too. He says of Émile’s learning, that ‘‘if 
you take too much pains to spare [children] every kind of uneasiness you are 
laying up much misery for them in the future’’ (50). He also writes - in praising 
Montaigne – that the more a child is able to cope with suffering the stronger 
his “soul” becomes (95). Surely this is not a person who seeks to remove all 
suffering from learning. Avi Mintz writes: 
 
Rousseau conceded that children should be protected from the 
extreme dangers of their environments, but he also required 
that appropriate dangers should be sought out. Jean-Jacques 
would keep Émile from a rocky area where he would need to be 
protected from falling, for example; instead, however, he would 
take Émile to a field so that he may run and fall without the 
need for protection by adults. (256) 
 
	
24 Consider also this quote from Rousseau: “…the pleasantest habit of mind 
consists in a moderate enjoyment which leaves little scope for desire and 
aversion.” (Émile 191). 
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It is clear then that Rousseau does not require that suffering be removed from 
learning but rather that appropriate suffering should be experienced and 
these experiences should be contextualized and guided by the teacher. It is 
also useful to note that the kinds of suffering to be experienced differ with the 
development of the student. These first encounters are with the physical 
environment and nature, as in the example above. Following this, students 
learn about suffering when they encounter the unfamiliar or failure. For 
example, in the scenario we saw earlier, where Émile learns about property by 
planting beans in a field, it is the case that Émile plants these beans on 
property that is not his - this is something planned by his tutor to guide Émile 
through the process of learning about ownership, loss and perseverance – as 
such the owner of the garden uproots Émile’s beans, destroying the efforts of 
Émile’s diligent labour. Realising this has happened Émile becomes very 
upset. Rousseau writes:  
 
The young heart revolts; the first feeling of injustice brings its 
sorrow and bitterness; tears come in torrents, the unhappy child 
fills the air with cries and groans. (63) 
 
The destruction of the beans has taught Émile about property rights, about 
the loss of something treasured, and the fact that sometimes, hard work does 
not see its just fruition. In later coming to a happy compromise with the owner 
of the garden, Émile also learns about relating to others. Mintz writes: 
 
Émile is interested in the fate of his beans and the lesson he 
learns is presented as more meaningful, more productive, more 
likely to have a lasting effect and be remembered because of 
how much it pains him. In addition… Rousseau valued 
disturbing, unexpected events in learning. It is the unexpected 
destruction of the beans, an event for which Émile had no 
preparation, that causes the pain that Émile experiences. (260) 
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The extent to which distressing moments and disruptions are valuable to 
learning is something I explore in greater depth in the chapter on vulnerability. 
I think that they are valuable if appropriate and if one is well-equipped to 
engage with the world in this “open” way. As Rousseau suggests in this 
example, I hold that openness could bring about some distress and disruption 
to one’s ways of viewing the world, to one’s self-confidence and to one’s 
emotions, but in some of these instances, one could stand to gain more than 
one might lose in the process. The point to convey here, at this point though, 
is that it is clear that the criticisms leveled against Rousseau about being over-
protective and concerned only with happiness and ease for his students, 
thereby diminishing the scope of their learning experiences, are not justified. 
Crucial to Rousseau’s advocacy of an education in suffering is that the 
particular types of suffering that Émile experiences are of utmost importance. 
In the context of the preceding examples, Rousseau advocated letting 
children suffer the various pains and discomforts that arise in their interactions 
with the world and others around them, but that these be carefully thought 
through, even orchestrated so that the lessons can yield the learning points 
that are necessary and that the teacher be of critical guidance in the whole 
process. Which brings me to the puzzling criticism that Rousseau does not 
value the role of the teacher. 
 
Manipulation and the Role of the Teacher 
 
As we have seen, some of Rousseau’s views betray a rather strong contempt 
for the role that others can play in one’s learning – according to Timothy 
O’Hagan, Rousseau even held that schools were “unsound”(56) because they 
essentially corrupted students and compelled them to turn away from their 
naturally good natures. Rousseau has also standardly been categorised with a 
variety of other educationalists (such as Pestalozzi, Froebel and Neill) who held 
that teachers should play as much of a noninterventionist role in learning as 
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possible, leading to the conclusion that the role of the teacher was no longer 
as essential as was once held. However, I think this is a mistaken “lumping 
together” of Rousseau with other progressivists or a misreading of Rousseau 
from the onset.25 It seems to be the case that Rousseau’s position was that a 
teacher should not command or coerce the students, and it is not impossible 
to see why Rousseau was concerned with the role of figures of authority in 
learning. Students often trust their teachers and as such, teachers have a 
significant role in shaping how students learn and understand learning. 
Rousseau was undoubtedly more cynical than we should encourage our 
educators to be. His belief that schools were “unsound” was derived from 
hostility towards the methods used there to coerce students into being 
complicit in society’s corrupt ways. According to Mintz teachers in these 
schools were deemed to be part of a system of: 
 
… ‘traditional’ education by which the child is made miserable 
because they subject him to ideas and practices that inhibit, 
compromise, and destroy his natural interests, desires, and joys. 
(53) 
 
This as we know was something Rousseau was strongly against. However, 
there is enough evidence to suggest that Rousseau did not only value the role 
of the educator, but valued it greatly. Iheoma writes that Rousseau felt that the 
quality of a child’s education depended crucially on the teacher’s ability to 
“follow nature’s lead” and such was the significance of this role that not being 
adept at understanding the child’s development and needs could result in the 
	
25 Mintz points out that various influential progressivists, including Herbert 
Spencer, either refused to read Rousseau or misread him. In his footnotes he 
points to work by William Kessen, ‘‘Rousseau’s Children,’’ as well as Jürgen 
Oelkers’ ‘‘The Reception of Rousseau’s ‘Natural Education’’ as evidence. (252) 
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child’s ruin (73); that over and above intellectual ability, a teacher must 
possess mastery over the “science of humanity”, meaning that the teacher 
must be extremely skilled at understanding human development and nature, 
and be able to pass on these crucial, but extremely difficult to “teach” skills to 
the student without commanding, coercing or indoctrinating – as Iheoma says 
“a tall order indeed” (77). This does not suggest a diminishing of the role of 
the teacher – quite the opposite. 
This establishes, I think, that Rousseau was not non-interventionist when it 
came to the role of the teacher. He advised not that the teacher “step aside” 
but that her methods of teaching are based on helping her student to discover 
rather than be taught at, explain rather than regurgitate, question and reflect, 
rather than blindly accept what they have been told. LF Claydon writes: 
We can understand Rousseau to be saying not that the tutor 
may not teach, but that he may not teach in certain ways. Today 
we may learn from Rousseau the valuable insight that the 'role 
of the teacher' is inclusive of more things than the activity of 
teaching and that these things may exercise a considerable 
influence upon the manner of teaching. (23) 
By this, I think Claydon means that the teacher is not just the provider of 
information, but someone who is in the important role of guide. Guidance is 
different from traditional methods of teaching, which tend to involve more 
focus on directly communicating content than assisting students to acquire 
understanding, or, as I explain in this thesis, cognitive control. The “teaching” 
of cognitive control requires that a teacher put emphasis on the students’ 
ability to explain and apply what has been learned, with a focus on equipping 
them to learn and problem-solve independently; as we have seen, this is also 
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exactly what Rousseau has in mind.26 This involves finding teaching methods 
that ensure that skills rather than content are imparted. Rousseau’s suggestion 
is for the teacher to orchestrate situations that will help the student discover 
learning points independently, and for the teacher then to help guide the 
student in making sense of or grasping this learning point. It is this suggestion 
that has been met with concerns about the teacher being encouraged to be 
controlling and manipulative. As I explained earlier in Chapter 3, concerns are 
also felt about Plato’s manipulation via the “noble lie” but in the case of 
Rousseau, unlike Plato, the criticism is not particularly strong, as we shall see 
shortly.  
Critics such as John Darling and Robin Barrow, for example, argue that Émile 
is manipulated by his tutor. Darling writes that “Émile's tutor may, to a great 
extent, remain in the background but his aim is to achieve and maintain total 
control" (173-185) and that the manipulation is significant enough that 
"Rousseau's approach to the growing child is crucially defective" (182). Barrow 
believes that Émile’s tutor is manipulative and uncaring and he writes “there is 
little warrant for seeing Rousseau as the precursor of those who see a loving 
relationship or even respect for persons as crucial to the business of 
education" (37-38). 
The main problem with these criticisms of Rousseau is that they fail to take into 
account that the aim of Émile’s education is to make him independent, and to 
equip him with precisely the sorts of skills that will alert him to attempts to 
manipulate and control him and his thinking. This is not the case for Plato’s 
“noble lie”, which is designed to keep those of the silver and bronze classes 
	
26 Iheoma writes that Rousseau’s “teacher must not play the pedant or the 
dispenser of wisdom” (77) and Rousseau himself writes that the teacher "must 




permanently in their supposed place. The setting up of teaching scenarios in 
advance, and the attempt by the teacher to control the factors of these 
scenarios so that Émile learns the planned, “appropriate” lessons, can be seen 
as a maneuvering of the setting and circumstances; but to refer to it as 
manipulation seems unfair mostly because we tend to understand 
manipulation benefitting the manipulator and not the manipulated, and, in this 
case, the benefactor is clearly meant to be Émile. Also, it is clear that 
Rousseau expects the teacher to stop maneuvering such situations after a 
certain period in Émile’s education - at a time when Émile will be able to 
reason and reflect independently enough that parity can be achieved between 
the teacher and Émile. Émile’s tutor acknowledges the gradual change in their 
relationship towards this goal. He says,  
…the time is coming when our relations will be changed, when 
the severity of the master must give way to the friendliness of 
the comrade; this change must come gradually. (138) 
At the end of the learning journey with his teacher, Émile says that he feels 
truly free from the shackles of money, prejudice and other non-necessities 
because he has learned to reason and think independently and as a result 
developed wisdom (436).  
This is of course an ideal outcome. We can certainly think of counter-examples 
where a student realizes at some point that their teacher is maneuvering 
situations and creating contexts to appear real when they are in fact not. A 
discovery like that could easily engender mistrust and erode the relationship 
between teacher and student, especially if it does not go as planned. It is also 
an approach that seems to take it for granted that circumstances and students 
can be “set up” in this way, that there is a constant level of “controllability” in 
all these situations, which is rather naïve. Moreover, predicting, establishing 
and maintaining learning scenarios like this requires great skill and stamina by 
teachers and this is difficult enough to achieve in a one-to-one scenario, let 
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alone in the most common setting in contemporary education – classrooms of 
up to forty students. However, all good teachers think ahead about their 
lessons – in the preparation of curriculum, materials, teaching points, methods 
and approaches. So, planning ahead and prearranging are in themselves not 
problematic. The issue lies perhaps in the extent of the prearranging and the 
measure of control exerted by the teacher unbeknownst to the student. 
 
In conclusion, while we may defend Rousseau from some of the less just 
criticisms of his pedagogy, we may have to concede that these expectations 
are idealistic, and therefore can be seen more as an ideal model from which to 
draw inspiration rather than as one to reproduce. As there in no opportunity to 
discuss ideas to put into actual classroom practice in this thesis, some of the 
fundamental “tenets” we might take into consideration when thinking about 
approaches and curriculum are that: 
 
i) learning should be focused on (progressively, and at a rate that suits their 
abilities) teaching students skills that nurture independent thinking and skills 
associated with cognitive control – a crucial reason for this is so that potentially 
corruptive or damaging influences can be noted and challenged by the 
students themselves, to more astute and higher standards as their own 
reflective and reasoning abilities mature and become honed 
ii) lessons, activities and learning points should be thoughtfully planned and 
executed with respect and versatility, and teachers need not shy away from 
appropriate levels of difficulty and challenge 
 
While these approaches may sometimes involve pre-planning and pre-setting 
learning scenarios, the teacher should always be mindful that students are 
vulnerable when learning and be careful about maintaining the fine balance 
between respect and control (both of which are crucial in a teacher-student 
relationship, particularly in a classroom setting). I now move on the discussing 







The 19th century philosopher John Dewey’s contributions to the philosophy of 
education make him significant to any historical review of the subject. Dewey's 
ideas have been used by academics and practitioners in every conceivable 
field of education – from moral and peace education to teacher training, 
vocational and community education, as well as outdoor education, and his 
works are accessible in over 35 different languages. It would be remiss to 
consider the history of the philosophy of education without discussing Dewey. 
It is worth noting, though, that his work is both ground-breaking as well as 
highly controversial. Nel Noddings writes that he has: 
 
been hailed as the saviour of American education by those who 
welcome greater involvement of students in their own planning 
and activity [but also] he has been called ‘worse than Hitler’ by 
some who felt that he infected schools with epistemological and 
moral relativism, and substituted socialisation for true education 
(22). 
 
His inclinations towards giving students autonomy in their own learning, the 
democratic principles he applied to classroom teaching, as well as his vision of 
the ideal teacher, have been considered by some to be inspirational and worth 
reviving. Others have found his ideas to be far-fetched and impractical; some 
of his philosophical views are arguably vague and therefore problematic, and 
some have accused him of unacceptable social engineering on the basis of his 
views on the relationship between science and political practice.   
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Dewey is neither a saviour nor even remotely comparable to someone as 
atrocious as Hitler. His work on education surfaced at a time of great debate 
between those who held that education should be child-centred, generally 
meaning that education should be based on children’s interests, and those 
who argued that a curriculum-centred approach, where content was key and 
mastery of this content the fundamental pursuit of education, was ideal. The 
former, also sometimes called the “progressives”, favoured creativity and 
believed that children should be active agents in their learning; and the latter, 
the “traditionalists”, favoured discipline, which usually manifested itself in 
book-based learning, memorisation and recalling facts. Dewey was not a 
progressive, and believed that children should not be the sole and only 
starting point when it came to education. But he was very much against 
traditional approaches to learning that exalted memorisation and 
regurgitation. He held a more balanced perspective than the progressives: 
one that respected and prioritised children’s active agency and autonomy in 
their learning, but which held that other social groups such as family and 
community had an important role to play. I believe Dewey’s thoughts on 
education are worth considering because he took a strong and successful 
approach against purely surface approaches to learning. As we saw earlier in 
this chapter, applying only these approaches, or prioritising them, which many 
educational institutions continue to do to this day, has not proven to be 
successful in engaging learners, sustaining their interest and curiosity and 
preparing them for a workforce that is more creatively demanding than that of 
the industrial revolution, when national curriculums first came into play in such 
ways that we are now familiar with. Dewey spent his lifetime producing a tome 
of innovative work that suggests that education should be built on human 
experience and be part of the wider context of self-discovery, growth, 
personal and intellectual maturation, as opposed to what it often was – an 
automaton-like experience for the student who was “fed” copious of amounts 
of historically sanctioned knowledge and patterns, often without relevant 
context, to be stored for future use. There is value in his argument for why 
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students should be allowed autonomy and ownership over their learning and 
why the interests and experiences of the learner should be given due 
consideration.  
 
I am particularly interested in Dewey’s ideas about 1) active and passive 
learning, 2) the importance of the learner’s agency and 3) the value of past 
experiences, contexts and future aims and goals to the process of learning. I 
believe these are significant contributions towards highlighting the value of 
deeper approaches to learning. Consequently, these three ideas have 
important bearing on what it means to truly “understand” what we learn. 
 
These three ideas, like many of his ideas, are frequently discussed in relation 
to Deweyan “experience”, which has long been a contentious and 
problematic area of Dewey’s philosophy. So, to begin with, I offer a brief 
discussion of Dewey’s concept of experience. I present his thoughts in his 
terminology, sticking to the use of the word experience because it is so widely 
used in his own writings. Where relevant, I point out how his thoughts on 
experience are clear and accurate or where they might be confusing or 
problematic. I suggest that in some cases, if we permit ourselves to be 
generous, it is possible to extract astute observations from even some of 
Dewey’s more convoluted ideas, and kernels of truth and wisdom that are 
worth paying attention to. Where that is the case, I offer a suggestion of how 
we might be inspired by Dewey to re-think some of the educational practices 




Like others, I too have found that the lack of clarity in Dewey’s conception of 
“experience” makes his work liable to confusion and misinterpretation. As his 
theory of “experience” is one of the most fundamental theories underpinning 
his educational philosophy, it is problematic that it can be vague and 
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confusing. Scholars in support of Dewey’s theories have attempted to explain 
what he means by “experience” but even amongst his supporters, there are 
disagreements. I have come to the conclusion that the general principles he is 
championing are important and still relevant to contemporary education, and 
can helpfully point us in the direction of solving some of the major problems 
we continue to face as a result of over-focusing on rote-learning and other 
surface approaches to learning; I believe Dewey was “on to something” in a 
way that no one else was in his time, and as such, he opened our eyes to new 
ways of perceiving of learning and teaching that are inspirational even today. 
However, I also conclude that his theory of experience is confusing and too 
far-reaching, or all-encompassing, to give us a meaningful sense of what it 
means to experience something. As such, it is difficult to pin down what an 
experience actually is and to identify when we might be “experiencing” 
something. While I keep the term experience in this discussion (because so 
much of Dewey’s work references it) I also suggest that instead of trying to 
untangle Dewey’s theories on experience in itself, it might be useful to draw 
advice about learning from some of his ideas about how experience relates to 
learning. Taken in this more contextual way, much of Dewey’s otherwise 
confusing thoughts on experience might offer us some useful suggestions for 
how to perceive learning. As such, my suggestion is to draw from Dewey, the 
helpful idea that experiences of learning should ideally localised within one’s 
past, present and future experiences and personal contexts (which might 
include one’s social and community contexts). 
 
Now, to exploring Dewey’s ideas about experience: In familiarising oneself 
with Dewey’s work, one will find that that there are constant references to 
experience as the central point from which one makes sense of, and organises, 
the knowledge and information one gathers. Dewey writes in his seminal work 
on education, Democracy and Education (DE), about what education is: 
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(the) reconstruction or reorganisation of experience which adds 
to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to 
direct the course of subsequent experience (81-2). 
 
“Experience” emerges three times in this definition and as such, to 
understand Dewey’s perspectives on education, we must first appreciate what 
he means by experience.27 However, to do complete justice to this requires 
exploration of multiple major works, including but not restricted to Experience 
and Nature (EN), Art as Experience (AE) and Experience and Education (EE), so 
for the purposes of this project, I summarise some of Dewey’s key ideas about 
experience.  
 
The quote above suggests that the nature of experience is self-referencing, 
possible to restructure, and continuous. This means that the re-forming and 
reordering of our experiences, presumably in reference to other experiences 
we have had, both gives meaning as well as guides our following experiences. 
The experiences that follow then are again restructured in relation to the 
experiences past and so on and so forth. There is something to be said here 
for the idea that experiences are not entirely “stand-alone”; that experience is 
informed and understood in relation to our past experiences and context. This 
	
27 Dewey believed that understanding and defining “experience” was 
fundamental to understanding everything about humans and nature. He was 
heavily influenced by the work of Darwin (who held that interactions in nature 
were constantly changing and transactional), James (whose work on 
perspectival experience was studied closely by Dewey), and Hegel (who 
argued that the self was constituted through transactional experiences). In 
studying Dewey’s explanations of experience, the transactional, constitutive 
and never-ending nature of experience is evident and it is possible to see that 
his aim was to carefully stitch together the views of experience of these three 
thinkers he greatly admired. 
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seems entirely plausible if we recall some of our own experiences, and how 
engaging in them might have been affected by previous experiences or life 
contexts. Take this simple personal example of one way in which past 
experiences can sustain learning: previously joyful experiences with reading 
and literature as a child most certainly had an impact on future encounters 
with literature; I came to see literature lessons at school as worth sticking with, 
in spite of regularly boring and repetitive lessons, because as a child I had 
always had wonderful experiences with books and stories – being read to, 
reading, making up new characters and alternative endings for stories and re-
enacting fairy and folk tales in my grandmother’s garden with my sister and 
cousins. An additional contextual aspect was that reading was a “big deal” in 
my home, as was performing versions of the books we had read – and we 
would be praised to no end if found engaged in either of these activities. We 
came to generally associate experiences with books as experiences that were 
pleasurable and that made us feel good. At secondary school, my experiences 
of literature lessons were informed by those joyful past experiences and even 
when lessons got tedious, I could ‘hang in there’ because my previous 
pleasurable experiences with literature informed me that there was fun to be 
found in these stories: if the teacher could not provide the fun, I could do so 
independently as I now had experiences that had been fun that I could adapt. 
This then informed my decision to read literature at A Levels, where I had a 
fantastic teacher who fancied himself Richard Burton, and then I read literature 
again at university – in spite of some tedious instances of learning, past 
pleasurable experiences of learning sustained me and provided me with some 
of the skills, learned through experience, to independently find pleasure in my 
learning of literature. It makes sense that paying attention to, and “tapping” 
into past experiences can be useful when it comes to learning as we can draw 
on past experiences to inspire our learning.  
 
Teachers too can draw both on their student’s past experiences and their own 
to inspire pleasure, help cope with stress, encourage patience, perseverance 
	 68	
and creativity. So here Dewey does offer us a very useful way, at least in the 
context of learning, to think about experience as having a continuous effect.  
 
However, some ambiguity is also immediately evident in the quote referencing 
the “reconstruction and reorganisation of experience”. For example, what is 
meant in the quote by “adds to the meaning of experience” – does “add to” 
here mean enhance and improve, or does it mean contribute? How much does 
it enhance, or contribute? How does it enhance or what does it contribute? 
How do we reconstruct and reorganize? Do we all do this in the same way or is 
this reorganizing subjective and subject to past experiences as well? Dewey 
does not shy away from exploring and explaining the notion of experience, in 
fact he acknowledged that it was a historically “loaded” term and considered 
substituting it for various other terms, such as “culture”, “life-behaviour” and 
“life-activities” but decided to keep the term because he believed it held 
theoretical value that was worth preserving (EN 361–62). David Hildebrand 
writes that in a draft of a new introduction for EN, some 26 years later, Dewey 
apparently wrote: “my growing realization that the historical obstacles which 
prevented understanding of my use of “experience” are, for all practical 
purposes, insurmountable”. Richard Rorty also argued that Dewey’s notion of 
experience was vague and in From Philosophy to Post-philosophy: Interview 
with Richard Rorty, said, “I regard [Dewey’s theory of experience] as the worst 
part of Dewey. I’d be glad if he had never written Experience and Nature. (2)  
 
Throughout his career, and because of these concerns, Dewey offers 
explanations of ‘experience’ frequently and in almost all his works. Perhaps 
one of the most comprehensive quotes on experience comes from Dewey’s 
“notorious” EN, where he writes, 
 
Experience includes what men do and suffer, what they strive 
for, love, believe, and endure, and how men act and are acted 
upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, 
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see, believe, imagine – in short, processes in experiencing. 
‘Experience’ denotes the planted field, the sowed seeds, the 
reaped harvests, the changes of night and day, spring and 
autumn, wet and dry, heat and cold, that are observed, feared, 
longed for; it also denotes the one who plants and reaps, who 
works and rejoices, hopes, fears, plans, invokes magic or 
chemistry to aid him, who is downcast or triumphant. It is 
‘double-barrelled’ in that it recognizes in its primary integrity no 
division between act and material, subject and object, but 
contains them both in an unanalysed totality. (8) 
 
This is a beautiful and rousing passage, but again, it is difficult to appreciate 
exactly what experience is if it is all these things. Dewey seems to suggest that 
experience is every process and every person who undergoes or engages in 
these processes. Perhaps what Dewey is striving to show here by this quote is 
that experience is deeply rooted in everything that we do – if we relate it back 
to the earlier quotation above we might understand Dewey to be trying to 
communicate that every experience is affected by all the factors that play a 
part in that experience, whether they are actions, people, objects and so on – 
the experience itself, past experiences that informed this current experience, 
the outcomes of this experience and those past, the people involved and each 
of their perspectives which in turn are based on their own experiences and 
values (which in turn are shaped by experience), the physical environment and 
so on. Again, I think there is something of value in this for learning, but I am 
less certain that it helps us understand experience itself as it is so widely 
encompassing that there are too many unanswered questions. For example, 
questions about how each of these aspects are necessary, how they operate, 
how they combine in their operations and transact with one another to 
produce an experience. 
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Perhaps what we could draw from this quote on experience is wisdom about 
how we might best inspire people to learn and to see learning as something 
deeply meaningful. Rather than prioritising memorising facts and model essay 
answers, could we take what Dewey describes about experience and use it 
instead to describe an ideal way to think about learning – seeing learning as 
being related to one’s awareness of and interaction with one’s environment, 
where the environment is a combination of the physical context within which 
one lives, the relationships one has with others, one’s society, one’s beliefs, 
the tasks and activities one is involved in, the hopes one has, one’s past and 
even one’s imagination. This environment is ever-changing and as one 
interacts with it and becomes more aware of it, that is aware of both the 
material objects and non-material thoughts and feelings that one is engaged 
with or in, these dynamic engagements contribute to one’s perception of how 
the past, present and future of one’s unique circumstances are interrelated 
and shape how one then continues to find and make meaning.  
 
Although unclear at times, Dewey’s perspective on experience is a unique one 
and it is not surprising that it gained so much attention. Unlike traditional 
notions of experience which view experience as relating distinctly to the past 
or present, or which define experience as something entirely confined to the 
private inner-state or mental-space of an individual, Dewey’s notion of 
experience takes into account a flow between the past, present and future and 
a constant interaction with the world outside ourselves. This idea is applicable 
to learning because learning, if engaged with meaningfully, will often involve 
referencing past knowledge and experiences and require us to engage with 
the world around us as well as our own future aims and intentions. It therefore 
starts to become quite clear why Dewey values the role of experience in 
education so greatly and draws strong links between the correct 
understanding of experience and good education. Even before publication of 
the famous DE, Dewey was steadfast in his ideas about the role of experience. 
In 1897, Dewey presented a short manifesto called My Pedagogic Creed. The 
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creed was essentially inspired by Dewey’s apprehensions about traditional 
education. It had five articles. These were, “What Education Is” (Article 1), 
“What the School Is” (Article 2), “The Subject Matter Of Education” (Article 3), 
“The Nature of Method” (Article 4) and  “The School and Social Progress” 
(Article 5). Across these five articles, his sentiments about the traditional 
education process are made very evident as are his own views on how 
important experience is to education. In Article 3, he writes, “… education 
must be conceived as a continuing reconstruction of experience...”. He also 
says in Article 2, “(The School) is a psychological necessity, because it is the 
only way of securing continuity in the child's growth, the only way of giving a 
background of past experience to the new ideas given in school”. Again in 
Article 3, he writes about subject matter,  
 
In reality, science is of value because it gives the ability to 
interpret and control the experience already had. It should be 
introduced, not as so much new subject- matter, but as showing 
the factors already involved in previous experience and as 
furnishing tools by which that experience can be more easily 
and effectively regulated.  
 
As we can see, the value of experience is undeniable for Dewey because it is 
what gives context and meaning to the new material that is being taught to 
students. Again from this quote we see that the link between experience and 
learning is explicit for Dewey. So, yet again I suggest that some of these 
learning-related outcomes that Dewey discusses in light of his theory of 
experience could be considered very beneficial as advice for how best to 
teach and learn, if we apply a simplified but clearer understanding that 
learning happens best when we can reference, or help our students reference, 
their past experiences and contexts, as well as keep in mind their future goals. 
I think this is a plausible way to draw something useful from Dewey’s 
descriptions of experience without necessarily “buying into” Dewey’s whole 
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conception of experience itself.  We can helpfully look to Dewey’s work for 
insight not into what experience itself is, but rather, how we should be thinking 
about curriculum, teaching, and sustaining long-term interest in learning in 
relation to our personal histories and hopes for the future.  
 
It is clear that Dewey prizes deep learning approaches as fundamental to 
learning. If we look back to the start of the thesis and to discussions about 
deep and surface learning, we see that some of the crucial characteristics of 
deep learning are that it is an interpretive process aimed at understanding the 
world we live in, and that it facilitates our transformation over time. The 
fundamental role of experience in Dewey’s philosophy is to aid our 
transformation as people and enable us to become active members of society, 
by helping us to reshape and re-form what we learn through our past 
experiences, present contexts and future hopes and goals. The ability to do 
this requires that we take a deeper approach to learning; one that encourages 
the development of cognitive control over superficial methods of knowledge 
acquisition.  
 
Like Rousseau’s Émile who learns about property by first growing and tending 
his own patch of garden, Dewey’s student will best make sense of what she is 
being taught because it coincides with her experiences. An additional 
advantage of drawing connections between past experiences and present 
learning is that what is newly learned can clarify and refine our understanding 
of past experiences just as much as past experiences can illuminate new 
learning. The making of these sorts of connections are very much in line with 
Dewey’s thinking and with contemporary deep learning approaches.28 
	
28 We will also see how this sort of learning is aligned with cognitive control. 
Dewey clearly prizes “know how” over “knowing that” something is the case, 
and this is a distinction I elaborate on in the chapter on cognitive control. It is 
also worth noting that clarifying and refining our understanding is also most 
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One of the most persistent reasons for early school-leaving and for the 
pervasive problem of boredom in the classroom is the fact that students 
perennially complain that what they study in school has little value in real life. 
Dewey was very aware of this and sought desperately to correct it by 
emphasising the importance of interlinking what is learned in school with what 
students are likely to experience outside of school. David Hansen writes, 
 
This problem is exacerbated when the student cannot ascertain 
the relationship between what takes place in school and what is 
meaningful and important for the student outside the school (a 
point often made in Democracy and Education, and in most 
other of Dewey’s writings on education). Unable to make a clear 
connection between experiences in and out of school, the 
student constructs, if you will, a separate mental “space” for 
schoolwork. That is, what takes place at school, at least in many 
academic subjects, may be so discontinuous with other aspects 
of the student’s life that he or she cannot usefully employ 
inside-the-school experience to explore, corroborate, falsify, 
extend, or illuminate outside the-school experience. Given such 
discontinuities, the student quickly comes to understand that it 
is better to “wall off ” the academic world of school, learning its 
language, rules, and customs as a separate undertaking. (103) 
 
The problem that Hansen refers to in the first line is that of teachers believing 
that they are equipping students with necessary and functional skills to extend 
learning beyond the classroom when in fact students perceive of their teachers 
as equipping them to score high marks and achieve the various “accolades” 
	
successful we are vulnerable or “open” in our learning and willing to have our 
existing views challenged. 
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that the educational system seems to prize over the actual empowerment of 
students to learn confidently and independently. This incongruence between 
teachers’ beliefs and students’ perceptions is not a problem if the ultimate test 
is passing exams with flying colours, but that is not often the case. The use of 
the phrase “the outside world” suggests that the “world of the school” is 
separate and perhaps even “interior” and this strikes me as characteristic of 
discussions about the transference of skills beyond the schooling years. This is 
one of the reasons that I think Hansen’s description here of the way that the 
school environment is thought of – as a “separate mental “space” for 
schoolwork”- is very astute. The ingrained perception of the divide between 
the school environment and the “outside” world perpetuates the belief that 
what is learned in school is confined to the school environment and for the 
purposes of fulfilling expectations, such as tests and exams, within that 
environment. Employing purely surface approaches to learning reinforce these 
unnecessary divisions by supporting the idea that one can only be successful 
in school-based learning if one excels in surface approaches such as 
memorization and fact-regurgitation. 
 
As we have seen, Dewey rejected learning as a solely school-based, school-
environment led process characterised by surface approaches to learning such 
as objectively collecting facts for regurgitation, or blindly absorbing historical 
signs, symbols and patterns without active engagement and agency, much like 
a machine being programmed. Essentially, Dewey rebuffed the prioritising of 
surface-learning approaches that were designed to encourage and support 
the stockpiling of information. Instead he emphasized the importance of 
deeper approaches to learning that foregrounded inquiry and critical thinking. 
The latter, he believed, encouraged participation in society, and prompted 




As Dewey often pointed out, what takes place in the classroom 
is, or ought to be, continuous with life outside it. Questions 
regarding curriculum, techniques of instruction, and so on must 
not be approached as if the mind of the student were an 
ahistorical mechanism of some kind, a computer to be 
programmed or a producer-consumer in training. Nor should 
the question of development be approached in quasi-objective 
fashion, apart from phenomenological description of our lived 
experience. The transition that education brings about is a rising 
up to humanity, a cultivation of the self as an intellectual agent 
and active participant in the life of its society. It does not merely 
prepare the young for later life but transforms their perspective 
on the world and puts them in the role of questioners, inquirers, 
and participants in dialogue. (8) 
 
It is clear from this that Dewey saw learning as a developmental process, a 
constant progression towards active and intelligent agency and participation 
in wider life and society. Unsurprisingly, Dewey was highly critical of what he 
referred to as “traditional education”, which essentially prized surface-learning 
approaches over deeper learning ones. This was where teachers would 
transmit knowledge to their students without any awareness or attentiveness 
to the students’ interests, their experiences or individual contexts.  
 
Agency and the roles of the Active and Passive 
 
Dewey was very precise that learning should make all learners dynamic 
thinking and questioning members of society. Students should understand 
subject matter in terms of their surroundings and personal contexts and use it 
to navigate and participate in their environments in ways that facilitate 
personal development and positive contributions to society. The way to 
achieve this was not to “force feed” facts but to acknowledge the learner’s 
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experiences. Acknowledging the learner’s experiences recognizes another 
very crucial aspect of the learner – her agency.   
 
Agency for Dewey is not just a rational faculty, it is linked crucially with the 
capacity to act and with activity itself – in both the cognitive and physical 
sense. Cognitive activity would involve thinking, and, in particular, thinking in 
response to something and critically assessing and reflecting on ideas. Physical 
activity would involve the acts of doing, changing and making which involve 
physical engagement with the subject matter of learning. This broader 
definition of agency, which takes into account cognitive and physical activity, is 
crucial because it serves the purpose of highlighting that Dewey was very 
much against the sort of learning that involved sitting in the classroom, inert 
and absorbing copious amounts of information.  
 
He writes in Article 4 of My Pedagogical Creed,  
 
I believe that the active side precedes the passive in the 
development of the child nature… that conscious states tend to 
project themselves in action. I believe that the neglect of this 
principle is the cause of a large part of the waste of time and 
strength in schoolwork. The child is thrown into a passive, 
receptive or absorbing attitude. The conditions are such that he 
is not permitted to follow the law of his nature; the result is 
friction and waste.  
 
By “active side precedes the passive”, I think what Dewey means is that 
children are active in an embodied sense, that is, they function in a more 
bodily and physical way before they are receptive to simply acquiring 
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knowledge.29 I think Dewey wants to emphasise this because he wants to alert 
us to the fact that traditional classroom learning ignores a child’s inclinations 
to be physically active. Believing that the active side of the child is her first 
nature, Dewey believes that the prioritising of passive modes of teaching and 
learning are counter-intuitive. The result of being denied the natural inclination 
to be active in the classroom, a place where many children spend a great deal 
of time, leads to “friction” or frustration and “waste”, in the sense that the 
child’s potential is wasted. As such Dewey argued that learning must be 
engaged and not solely impassive or inert. For him, learning is a dynamic 
activity and being inertly receptive is not dynamic. In DE, Dewey further 
discusses the nature of the active and passive. The active aspect is linked with 
“experimenting”, and involves action, such as doing, making or changing. The 
passive aspect refers to receiving or having something “done to” one. This is 
not to say there is no role for passivity, but for Dewey, the ideal of passive 
receptiveness is in response to the active “doing”, and not just inert absorbing 
of facts being fed to one. He writes in DE, 
 
We do something to the thing and then it does something to us in 
return: such is the peculiar combination. The connection of these 




29 In DE, an entire chapter, “Experience and Thinking”, is devoted to this. He 
discusses how schools often see the body as an “interference”, an 
impediment that comes in the way of education. He also points out that the 
dualistic way in which “the mind or consciousness” and “the physical organs 
of activity” (146) are discussed highlights the problematic fact that the mind 
and body are seen as separate entities, when in fact both are equally 
important for successful learning.  
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Here we see that both the active and passive are equally valuable and it is in 
the witnessing and understanding of the potency of their connections, that is, 
to understand the relationship between what is done and what occurs as a 
result of what is done, that true learning occurs. Dewey writes,  
 
Two important conclusions for education follow. (1) Experience 
is primarily an active-passive affair; it is not primarily cognitive. 
But (2) the measure of the value of an experience lies in the 
perception of relationships or continuities to which it leads up. 
(DE, 146) 
 
It is evident by the use of the term “measure” that Dewey appraises the value 
of experiences in learning according to the extent to which one sees the 
interrelatedness between the active and the passive components. By asserting 
that experience is not “primarily cognitive” Dewey indicates that experience is 
not purely intellectual in nature but rather a relationship between action and 
consequences that result from engaging with one’s environment. Of course 
cognitive processes are crucial to recognising that actions and reactions are 
linked and cognitive processes play a significant part in understanding how 
they are related. But Dewey’s point here is to emphasise the error in 
underpinning our understanding of the role of experience in learning as 
predominately cognitive. By failing to acknowledge experience as a unit of 
action, perception and cognition, teachers bolster the negative impression of 
school-based learning as something that is overtly intellectual and disengaged 
from the real world.  
 
“The passive, receptive or absorbing attitude” that a child is “thrown into” by 
an education system that fails to see how the active and passive aspects are 
connected and how the active precedes the passive is a system that over-
emphasises what Dewey calls “symbols”. Richard Pring writes that Dewey felt 
that traditional education “treated knowledge as something …organised in 
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textbooks, “stuck on” without connections to existing ways of understanding” 
(273). This kind of knowledge, the outcome of purely surface learning methods 
like funnelling facts into student’s heads or encouraging them along rote 
learning paths such as memorisation often unhelpfully replaces true 
understanding. These overtly formal, textbook-based approaches leave 
students with words they can string together or numbers they can add and 
subtract but they are unable to reason or make judgements based on genuine 
understanding, or transfer of what they have learned to practical, manual life. 
This immediately diminishes the value of learning, and as we noted earlier 
from surveys conducted even in the last decade, rote learning leads to 
students not seeing the correlations between school-based learning and real 
life, so they feel that what they learn in school is effectively useless in terms of 
practical, manual life. Echoing Dewey’s contrasts between the active and 
passive components of the experience of learning, Pring writes, “’Knowing 
how” is as demanding as “knowing that”, and the former might be said to 
logically precede the latter” (273). There are interesting contemporary 
debates between scholars about the differences between knowing-how and 
knowing-that which I consider in greater detail in the next section – the 
conclusion I come to is very similar to Pring’s and Dewey’s, which is that 
fundamentally, knowing-how, which is facilitated by deep learning 
approaches, is crucial to understanding and therefore, to learning. This is 
principally why I think Alison Hills’ account of understanding as a type of 
“know-how” called cognitive control is especially relevant to this discussion, 
which we have seen has its roots in the work of Plato, Rousseau and now 
Dewey too. 
 
Dewey writes in Chapter 18 of DE, “How shall the individual be rendered 
executive in his intelligence instead of at the cost of his intelligence?” (DE, 
256). The implication here is that traditional models of education were 
effectively diminishing the individual’s capacity for learning and intelligence by 
depriving them of opportunities for exercising their agency; that is, their ability 
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to make choices and play a role in directing their own learning was being 
hampered. The cost of this ends up being precisely what one hopes education 
will achieve, increased intelligence. While Dewey does not spell out what is 
meant by intelligence, we can perhaps fairly deduce that intelligence is not the 
ability to repeat or mimic facts but the ability, for example, to use facts 
appropriately and effectively when making a point or solving a problem. 
Encouraging learners to passively absorb facts therefore does not contribute 
effectively to the development of intelligence. 
 
Furthermore in DE Dewey writes: 
 
In the strict sense, nothing can be forced upon them or into 
them. To overlook this fact means to distort and pervert human 
nature. To take into account the contributions made by the 
existing instincts and habits of those directed is to direct them 
economically and wisely. . . (30) 
 
The idea of “force-feeding” learners with information is a futile undertaking 
according to Dewey because this goes against human nature. Presumably 
what Dewey is referring to here is the idea that human beings are curious and 
interested by nature. They are active in making choices and are naturally 
inclined to exercising agency; they are not blank slates or empty vessels that 
take well to being forcibly filled. To ignore or wilfully mislead ourselves about 
the human instinct to be an active participant in discovery is ultimately to 
pervert human nature. Taking into due consideration this human instinct to be 
an active agent in one’s own life, and paying heed to one’s “habits”, which in 
the context of Dewey’s theories is likely to mean one’s past experiences, 
personal histories and beliefs, would be the best way to guide learning.  
 
In the same vein, he emphasises in a later chapter of DE, 
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All education forms character, mental and moral, but formation 
consists in the selection and coordination of native activities so 
that they may utilize the subject matter of the social 
environment. Moreover, the formation is not only formation of 
native activities, but it takes place through them. It is a process 
of reconstruction, reorganization. (76) 
 
It is clear that Dewey wishes to highlight the fact that learners should be 
encouraged to exercise their agency. In this second quote, the point about 
agency is made when Dewey indicates that education is “a process of 
reconstruction, reorganization”. This re-forming of what one has learned is an 
active endeavour that requires the learner to take charge of what they have 
learned, to make choices about how their learning applies to their lives and to 
make meaning from it by relating it to their past histories, previous learning 
and lived experiences.30  
 
While the point about activity and agency is clear, the rest of the passage is 
rather ambiguous. It is problematically unclear what Dewey means by “native 
activities”.31 He could mean three things: a) the natural, as in physiological and 
	
30 We will see some these skills being named as significant ones for cognitive 
control in the next chapter.  
 
31	I was unable to find a precise definition for ‘native activities’ but I was able 
to find in Hoy the claim that “natural activities mean native activities” but no 
explanation of “natural activities”. However, on the same page and as part of 
the same discussion there are references made to “native structures” and 
“native powers” which are linked to the “body, organs and their functional 
activities” (63) so it might be plausible that Dewey is referring to the activities 
of the brain when he says native activities. 
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functional activities related to learning such as the use of the brain b) mental 
and moral character as he begins by saying “all education forms character, 
mental and moral” and then follows by saying “the formation is not only the 
formation of native activities” – the “the” could be referencing the formation 
of mental and moral character’ he discusses prior or c) activities that are 
intrinsic and especially meaningful to a person because of their personal 
histories, experiences and attitudes. It’s difficult to know which Dewey means 
as all three could potentially fit this passage. I think it is perhaps most likely 
that Dewey means (b) or (c) rather than (a) because firstly, he sees learning as 
more than a functional process or brain activity. Also the use of the word 
“formation” suggests it cannot be (a) because the brain and any other organs 
that he might have believed were related to learning are already ‘formed’. 
Also the phrase, “through them” suggests that Dewey is discussing something 
that is re-shaped and re-structured via the natural activities, and we already 
know that the re-structuring of experience for Dewey happens on the basis of 
his idea of experience; that it is something that is continuous and extended, as 
opposed to temporally limited: as such it is unlikely that he is referring to 
something that the natural organs do. “Through them” is also rather vague. I 
think Dewey means that the environmental “output” and a student’s 
experiences are transformed in the moment that the student experiences them 
because the student brings to them her own context, past experiences and 
future hopes. The “material” that the student encounters is therefore possibly 
something that is re-shaped by her and ‘through’ her interaction with it.  
 
Vagueness of some of the terms aside, I still think it is possible to take from 
this quote the useful idea that learning can contribute to shaping our mental 
and moral characters best when the learning references the sorts of things that 
are uniquely pleasurable, important and meaningful to each of us. We will see 
in Chapters 5 and 7 when we discuss pleasure and then wholeheartedness 
respectively that these are important factors in facilitating pleasure in learning 
as well as in encouraging wholeheartedness about learning. These things are 
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uniquely personal and part of our personal histories, and while these might be 
established within our psyche, what we learn can take on fresh meaning and fit 
in differently within our structures of knowledge and understanding if we learn 
by actively referencing them. It is also clear from these quotes that it is agency 
that facilitates this Deweyan sort of deeper learning, because restructuring and 
reorganizing one’s knowledge and understanding on the basis of both past as 
well as fresh and present encounters with learning requires deep reflection, 
questioning and thinking critically – all of which are active pursuits that require 
one to meaningfully engage, make choices, form intentions, identify 
possibilities and purpose.  
 
Further explication of Dewey’s views on agency can be found in the article 
“Dewey’s Conception of Growth Reconsidered,” by Daniel Pekarsky, who 
writes,  
 
…the ideal of growth is an ideal of human agency. That is, it 
characterizes the life of human beings insofar as they are 
engaged in making sense of their situation, deliberating, acting, 
and then using the results of their actions to confirm, expand, or 
refine the understandings, dispositions, and skills that guide 
their intellectual and practical lives. (291) 
 
What this indicates is that the agent’s, or in this context, the learner’s ability to 
deliberately and actively synthesise their knowledge and experiences, to fine-
tune these in relation to their understanding of the situation at hand and then 
to intelligently adapt and transform these to provide the solutions or know-
how for that situation, their problems and tasks, is what is key. These features 
of an active agent are very much in line with the activities involved in deep 
approaches to learning, and to cognitive control as well, as I will show in the 
next chapter. To ignore the role of active agency would result in a situations 
where one might have access to a copious amount of information stored in 
	 84	
one’s memory, but struggle, for example, to select and integrate appropriate 
pieces of that information to fit the context and/or fail to understand nuances 
or ways in which the information one has stored might be adapted and 
applied because one has prized the passive, receptive modes of learning such 
as memorisation. 
 
Further evidence of the importance of agency and active engagement in 
learning comes from the significance Dewey places on the idea of inquiry in 
learning. To think critically and to question are deep learning approaches that 
require one to consider the information one is acquiring, to relate it to what 
one already knows and has experience of, to consider the function and value 
of this information, to interpret, question and challenge. It is clear to see how 
Deweyan “experience”, active engagement and inquiry are interrelated, and 
why Dewey would hold all these in important regard for his pedagogical 
philosophy. Describing the Deweyan relationship between inquiry and 
experience, Richard Pring writes, 
 
One makes a choice (formulates a hypothesis) and takes a 
particular route (tests the hypothesis). If that reaches a dead end 
(if the hypothesis is falsified), then one tries another route 
(having reformulated the hypothesis). And so on ad infinitum. 
Therefore, as is argued in Experience and education (1938, p. 
25), there is ‘an organic connection between education and 
personal experience’. Education is part of that ‘search for 
meaning – that ‘trying to make sense’ as one seeks to solve a 
problem through inquiry. (276)32 
 
	
32 Deweyan ‘experience’ makes an appearance here again, but the point here 
is not compromised by confusions in the meaning of ‘experience’, so this 
quote is worth considering for the insight it offers about activity and agency. 
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Pring is suggesting that Dewey believes we can learn from the mistakes and 
successes of past experiences. These experiences and what we learn from 
them are “organic” because the interactions are different each time, and 
depend on the specific set of circumstances of each situation. There is no fixed 
formula for what or how much one might learn. Whatever one learns will have 
some effect on the next experience of learning. This process is what helps us 
work through problems and find solutions and both the searching for 
solutions, which is what Dewey calls the process of inquiring, and the solutions 
themselves, when we find them, make meaning of our learning and our lives.  
 
I think this makes a lot of sense but could be explicated more in terms of 
agency. Inquiring is an active process that involves making choices and acting 
on those choices so as to ascertain the outcomes and their suitability for 
whatever our purposes are. Learning from past mistakes and successes when 
we make choices is a process that requires active engagement with what we 
have learned. We need to reflect on our choices, on the paths we chose and 
how and why these were successful or unsuccessful. This reflecting, critical 
awareness and analysis are active engagements that require us to act with 
agency, and this activity and agency are what make a process of inquiry 
possible. It is only through doing this kind of thinking and activity that we 
create the connection between learning and experience.   
     
Paul Fairfield writes about thinking, 
 
It is a process that never loses connection with experience, 
arising from a doubtful situation within it and ultimately 
returning to it with an enhanced knowledge of the connections 




It is interesting to note that in both these quotes from Pring and Fairfield, 
thinking and learning stem from identifying a problem or a “doubtful 
situation”. Learning is the process, and sometimes a long process, of 
eliminating doubt and solving problems. Learning presented in this way 
immediately highlights its active and agential aspects. Solving is very much a 
process of active engagement, that requires assessing, questioning, thinking 
and experimenting, skills very much aligned with those of cognitive control, as 
we will soon see. 
 
We know already that for Dewey, learning is as an exercise in reshaping and 
reconstructing. So, when faced with doubts or a problem in our present 
experience, by engaging with this problem or doubt through the processes of 
observation, critical questioning and relating back to previous knowledge and 
past encounters with learning and experimenting, we return to the present 
problem or doubt with improved knowledge of the links between what baffles 
us now in our current situation and what we already know with confidence 
from past experiences, and this offers us new possibilities for acting in our 
current situation. This in turn means that the education system would need to 
facilitate occasions for students to exercise their agency by creating 
opportunities for them to encounter doubts and problems in their learning, 
and encourage them to seek answers to these through inquiry and critical 
thinking, drawing from their past learning experiences and experiments and 
actively trying out various possibilities instead of being spoon-fed the answers 
by their teachers.33 
 
	
33 Rousseau suggests something similar when he talks about teachers 
orchestrating learning scenarios for their students. Orchestrating these 
scenarios could be a useful teaching tool if teachers are mindful of the fact 
that their students are vulnerable and take this into careful consideration. I say 
more about vulnerability in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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Traditional models of education, according to Dewey, do not offer these 
opportunities for exercising agency. My own experiences as a teacher and 
student indicate this to be true as well. Extensive volumes of curricula, limited 
time, old-fashioned methods of training teachers, and the assessment system, 
are just some reasons why creating opportunities to actively solve problems 
through experimentation continue to be a pipe dream. In “The Psychological 
Aspect of the School Curriculum”, Dewey writes, 
 
The humble pedagogue stands with his mouth and his hands 
wide open, waiting to receive from the abstract scientific writers 
the complete system which the latter, after centuries of 
experience and toilsome reflection, have elaborated. Receiving 
in this trustful way the ready-made ‘subject’, he proceeds to 
hand it over in an equally readymade way to the pupil. The 
intervening medium of communication is simply certain external 
attachments in the way of devices and tricks called ‘method’, 
and certain sugar-coatings in the way of extrinsic inducements 
termed ‘arousing of interest’. (76) 
 
Rather scathingly, Dewey points out that traditional learning resembles a staid 
cycle of teachers accepting information unquestioningly from scientists and 
then “spoon-feeding” this to their students, in the most efficient methods they 
can manufacture, with copious information that is divorced from their students’ 
realities. These methods are referred to as “tricks”, “devices”, “sugar-
coatings” and “extrinsic inducements” because the methods trade on artificial 
“carrots” such as teacher’s approval, good-grades and being the top student, 
and “sticks” such as disapproval from parents and teachers and threats and 
fear-mongering about their future. According to Dewey, the interests 
“aroused” by these incentives are not genuine ones: genuine interest should 
be aroused by the student’s motivation to learn. This motivation comes from 
encountering problems that the students are motivated to explore and solve 
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by referencing their experiences and trying out different options, which in turn 
inform their next attempts and so on. This kind of active learning is what 
empowers students with true understanding and the ability to use what they 
learn independently; this in turn further activates their sense of agency, giving 
them the confidence that what they have learned is useful and meaningfully 
connected to their lives.34  
 
If further evidence is required for the concerns Dewey has about passive 
learning or “cold-storage” ideals of knowledge (that is, collecting facts and 
storing them for future use) and the import he gives to deep learning, we 
might consider what he says in EE:	 
 
There is, I think, considerable danger that this phase of social 
study will get submerged in a great flood of miscellaneous 
social study. When the subject was first introduced, I think there 
was a good deal of evidence of faith in the truly miraculous 
power of information. If the students would only learn their 
federal and state Constitutions, the names and duties of all the 
officers and all the rest of the anatomy of the government, they 
would be prepared to be good citizens. And many of them – 
many of us, I fear – having learned these facts went out into 
	
34 While I agree with Dewey that teachers should not rely solely on these 
extrinsic- reward-led methods to motivate their students to learn, and they 
should not encourage their students to be interested in learning exclusively 
because of the chance of good grades and approval, it seems plausible to me 
that a student may genuinely be interested in learning because of extrinsic 
motivations such as good grades, awards and approval. So these inducements 
could in fact be arousing genuine interest in learning. As such, there is no 
need for Dewey’s insinuation that this is not really the case. 
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adult life and became the easy prey of skilful politicians and the 
political machines; the victims of political misrepresentation, 
say, on the part of the newspapers we happened to read. (12) 
 
Accumulating facts, gorging on content that is then passively and mindlessly 
absorbed as opposed to actively thinking and questioning, is being blamed 
here for the fact that supposedly “educated” people, even in their adulthood, 
have been trained to thoughtlessly accept what they are told so long as it is 
presented as facts. Dewey is rightly concerned here about cunning politicians 
who hide behind a façade of meaningless information and data for the 
purposes of confusing and deceiving the general public, many of whom 
probably think themselves to be educated and intelligent because they have 
been successful within a school system that has rewarded surface learning. 
People such as those in this example believe themselves to be exercising 
agency when in fact they have been brainwashed by a system that equates 
mindless acquiring of information with intelligence. 
 
 
Problems with Dewey’s conception of activity and agency 
 
One of the criticisms levelled against Dewey is that in presenting his views on 
active engagement and agency in learning he relies too heavily on the model 
of the scientific method. Pring’s quote which references the process of 
learning in terms of testing hypotheses certainly draws from Dewey’s 
preference for modelling the scientific method in discussing learning 
experiences. Paul Fairfield also discusses this: 
 
For Dewey, the paradigm of thought is scientific 
experimentation in the sense that here we find the same 
method of inquiry that is properly followed in any field of study 
in an explicit and ‘intensified form’. While he would never 
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embrace any form of positivism, nor maintain that procedures 
proper to the natural sciences can be simply transferred to the 
social sciences and humanities, Dewey did hold a decidedly 
optimistic view of science and of what the scientific method 
might accomplish in refashioning thought in general. One finds 
throughout his writings not any simplistic or naive adulation of 
science – although there are passages that do approach this – 
but a somewhat more measured optimism that ‘the scientific 
habit of mind’ is generally applicable to human affairs. (107) 
 
Fairfield is pointing out that one of Dewey’s aims in using the scientific 
method as a model was to highlight the significance of inquiry and its 
relationship to experience. Given that Dewey felt the important need to 
remind educators that activity, agency and experience are crucial to learning, 
it is evident why he paid attention to the ideas of inquiry and experimentation. 
As Fairfield says, it is in science more than other fields of study that the 
concepts of inquiry and experimentation are given the most attention.  
 
For critics however, one of the problems of such heavy reliance on the 
scientific method is the fact that it potentially diminishes the value of the arts 
and humanities and the methods of inquiry unique to them. A stronger worry 
is that Dewey is essentially suggesting that the arts be eradicated in favour of 
scientific method. RS Peters for example points out that the emphasis on the 
scientific method could potentially lead to a lack of arts and literature in the 
curriculum and the use of the scientific method as the sole approach for 
eliminating doubts, solving problems and engaging with the world (106).  
 
Emily Robertson writes: 
 
Dewey did not argue that "the scientific method" as used in the 
natural sciences should be applied directly to human affairs, but 
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that "intelligence" or the "scientific attitude" should become 
part of human life. The scientific attitude involves a willingness 
to suspend action in the face of a problematic situation and an 
inclination to engage in inquiry in trying to decide how to 
resolve the problem. (339) 
 
Critics of Dewey might not agree with Robertson’s “softer” reading of 
Dewey’s preference for the scientific method of inquiry as being essentially a 
tool for educational inquiry in general. One of the problems with the scientific 
method informing educational inquiry in general is the conflation of “scientific 
temper” and “scientific technique”, which are two rather different attitudes. 
Inspired by Bertrand Russell, JW Garrison draws a distinction between 
"scientific temper" and "scientific technique". Russell is cited in Garrison as 
saying, 
 
The scientific temper is cautious, tentative, and piecemeal; it 
does not imagine that it knows the whole truth, or even at its 
best knowledge is wholly true. It knows that every doctrine 
needs emendation sooner or later, and that the necessary 
emendation requires freedom of investigation and freedom of 
discussion. (490)  
 
The worry is that "scientific technique” represents “a temper full of a sense of 
limitless power, of arrogant certainty, and of pleasure in manipulation of even 
human material" (qtd. in Garrison 490). Scientific temper, according to 
Garrison would then be crushed under the oppressive powers of scientific 
technique, which favours and devotes itself to the authority of scientific 
products over scientific process.  
 
Given that Deweyan educational philosophy is aimed ultimately at democratic 
social reform, this is not an insignificant concern. If students are encouraged to 
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apply scientific methods to inquiry in all areas of learning, and if this process of 
inquiry in turn encourages an attitude of “arrogant certainty” where certainty 
is not truly possible then this would contradict the democratic education that 
Dewey had hoped for. RS Peters also worried that Dewey was encouraging the 
rise of “technological man”, whose ascent would encourage the view that 
nature was under man’s control and could simply be exploited to serve man’s 
purposes (120). 
 
However I think there is enough in Dewey’s educational writings to suggest 
that this criticism is unfairly harsh. For Dewey, an approach informed by the 
scientific method is ideal for inquiring and critical thinking not because he 
believes them to accord certainty, but because they are the sorts of learning 
dispositions that Dewey holds to be ideal as they present opportunities for 
exercising agency and actively engaging with further inquiry and experiences, 
which in turn aid the student’s overall growth.  
 
In explaining why the scientific method, Dewey writes in EE:  
 
By science is meant . . . that knowledge which is the outcome of 
methods of observation, reflection, and testing which are 
deliberately adopted to secure a settled, assured subject 
matter. It involves an intelligent and persistent endeavour to 
revise current beliefs so as to weed out what is erroneous, to 
add to their accuracy, and, above all, to give them such shape 
that the dependencies of the various facts upon one another 
may be as obvious as possible. It is, like all knowledge, an 
outcome of activity bringing about certain changes in the 
environment. (27) 
 
Dewey acknowledges here that science is meant as a metaphor for certain 
ways of thinking and engaging in learning – a methodological process 
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requiring active engagement by the inquirer with the object of inquiry and 
aimed at persistently drawing from past experiences to refine one’s 
hypothesis. He also declares that science is “like all knowledge” in that it is the 
result of actively creating change in the environment. As such, it does not 
appear that Dewey thinks science should replace the arts and humanities, nor 
does it suggest that he thinks science and technology are superior. What he 
does seem to consistently value as superior in learning is active thinking and 
engagement with the subject matter. In his essay “Why Reflective Thinking 
must be an Educational Aim”, Dewey writes: 
 
The great reward of exercising the power of thinking is that 
there are no limits to the possibility of carrying over into objects 
and events of life, meanings originally acquired by thoughtful 
examination, and hence no limit to the continual growth of 
meaning in human life. (128) 
 
Thinking is therefore what makes it possible for our lives to have limitless 
meaning and possibilities, and is therefore a vital part of a person’s education, 
if we understand education to be a process that equips and prepares us to be 
active social agents who are committed to growing and flourishing. To 
perceive learning as continuity, to expand one’s horizons and see endless 
possibilities and opportunities to find meaning and value in life’s learning 
experiences, is characteristic of Dewey’s educational philosophy and what he 
perceived to be genuine growth; and this is why agency, activity and inquiry 
play crucial roles in Deweyan philosophy. The suggestion of a method similar 
to the scientific one therefore strikes me more as a call to adopt an inquiring 
nature similar to Russell’s “scientific temper”. Perhaps here, Dewey is simply 
guilty of over-enthusing about the scientific method and being too vague in 




Another concern, already touched on briefly elsewhere, is that Dewey’s 
emphasis on the learner’s agency made his philosophy too student or child-
centric. Dewey sanctioned teaching methods that took the focus away from 
authoritarian instruction and encouraged teachers to guide students based on 
their interests and an awareness of their experiences, personal histories, and 
context. As we saw earlier, a similar criticism was rather unfairly levelled 
against Rousseau. Critics argued that such a shift promoted “permissiveness” 
and mayhem in the classroom because teachers would no longer have 
authority and lessons would be disorganised and lack substantial, tangible 
objectives. In “Anti-Intellectualism in American Life”, Richard Hofstadter offers 
the example of teachers failing to offer direction and guidance under the 
misled belief that they would be imposing their authority on the students and 
compromising their agency. His main concern was that educational 
environments would no longer serve the purpose they were meant to (374). 
Hofstadter blames Dewey’s unclear and open-ended accounts of experience 
among other Deweyan concepts for this sort of possible confusion.  
  
It is apparent from Dewey’s own writings that he is not advocating for the 
instincts or agency of young learners to be allowed to wantonly burgeon like 
weeds. Views that suggest that Dewey believed that students should not at all 
be influenced or moulded in some way are rather unjust. He wrote in EE, 
 
Since freedom resides in the operations of intelligent 
observation and judgment by which a purpose is developed, 
guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupils’ 
intelligence is an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it. (46) 
 
Dewey held that teachers have a crucial role to play in shaping mental and 
moral character, and guidance and structure have an important function in the 
learning process. As the quote shows, he would have believed that 
appropriate guidance would have aided agency as opposed to hampering it. 
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Contrary to the cut-and-dry perspective that influencing and shaping would be 
at odds with a learner’s nature, it is possible to appreciate that shaping a 
learner’s character can be done with attention to, and respect for, that 
learner’s personal nature and circumstances. We see a similar line of thinking 
in Rousseau too. Martin Jay writes, 
 
Many people— including many educators— misunderstood 
Dewey to mean that instead of a traditionally institution -
centred aim, education should become child -centred. Although 
this interpretation served the purposes of teachers in a 
democratic society, Dewey insisted that education be society -
centred, for children are destined to become not isolated 
individuals but members and citizens of society. (199) 
 
For learning to be engaged, students need to be kept interested and 
involved. Helping them achieve this and become active social agents requires 
a teacher to be skilled at understanding her student, her student’s context and 
experiences. The teacher must be sensitive and committed, desiring to build a 
trusting relationship of support and guidance, so that her student allows her 
access to her experiences. Dewey writes in Article 4 of The Creed: 
 
…only through the continual and sympathetic observation of 
childhood's interests can the adult enter into the child's life and 
see what it is ready for, and upon what material it could work 
most readily and fruitfully.  
 
Again we return to the fact that teachers and educators working 
independently of their students, crafting a one-size fits all curriculum are not 
going to be effective at knowing what their students are ready for and what 
they would engage in with interest and productivity.  
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A good teacher would help shape her student’s mental and moral character by 
using her student’s past learning experiences, her personal history and 
context, and her aims and goals as a vehicle for teaching – and then by 
facilitating the student to exercise her agency in actively adapting and 
applying her learning in ways that best fit her needs and her personal, unique 
development. This process is not as vague or “airy-fairy” as some might 
contend. This is because the end goal is a practical and substantial one: to be 
an independent thinker and questioner, to be active and involved in one’s own 
personal growth, and for that personal growth to contribute to the growth of 
society.  
 
Dewey’s contributions to “deep approaches” stem from his revolutionary work 
that suggests learning should involve an active engagement with past learning 
experiences, personal histories and future goals and aims. In spite of the 
vagueness and open-ended nature of some of his concepts, Dewey highlights 
the fact that the world has an effect on our learning and that choosing to 
actively consider that effect in our experiences of learning will imbue our 
learning with greater meaning and relevance and by virtue of this facilitate 
problem-solving, sustain our interest in learning and empower us to make 
decisions about how learning can transform our lives 
 
3.4 Summary  
 
I suggested earlier in this chapter that work in both educational psychology as 
well as educational philosophy prizes deep learning approaches over surface 
learning approaches because genuine understanding cannot occur if all 
learning involves merely surface approaches. I have considered the 
contributions made by Plato, Rousseau and, Dewey to this philosophical canon 
of work on deep learning approaches. None of these philosophers referred to 
their ideas about educational methods and approaches as “deep” or 
“surface” approaches, but all of them highlighted the utmost value of 
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characteristics such as abstracting meaning, reflecting on experience, critically 
thinking about, questioning and interpreting information - all of which are 
contemporarily referred to as deep approaches to learning – so that this 
information can be used independently, relevantly, usefully and creatively to 
ultimately help us become wiser, more capable and efficient, and more 
engaged and involved members of society. In the next chapter we will see 
how these skills and characteristics are similar to those of someone who 









To cultivate and encourage a love of learning, experts tell us we need to pay 
close attention to deep learning, which, as we have seen, and will continue to 
see, is characterised strongly by understanding.35 Yet, much of the literature 
on deep learning does not dedicate concentrated discussion around what 
understanding actually entails; what are its features and why it is uniquely 
valuable. As such, a convincing account of understanding is a crucial starting 
point as it is required in order for us to better understand what deep learning 
entails and what it can offer us that is more valuable that other kinds of 
learning. In fact, I hope to show that a robust account of understanding is 
sufficient as an account of deep learning because all the requirements of deep 
learning can be fulfilled if a learner understands what they are learning. 
 
An equally important reason to give time to developing a robust theory of 
understanding is owed to the fact that I believe that understanding is an 
important condition for fostering and perpetuating a love of learning. This is 
because understanding has uniquely valuable features that can help learners 
	
35 Surface learning, such as acquiring content knowledge, be it simple content 
or more sophisticated content knowledge, can also be enjoyable, motivating, 
inspiring and useful. However, as we have seen in the last chapter, generations 
of philosophers, as well as recent data have shown us that it is not the 
acquiring of more and more facts that sustains our interest in learning and 
staying in school, or pursuing further education or engaging in lifelong 
learning, but the special value we find in understanding.  
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to sustain an interest in learning in school and throughout their lives, 
contribute to their independence and ability to navigate in the world, and give 
them a sense of satisfaction and achievement, amongst other advantages. 
 
As such, the primary focus of this chapter is the concept of understanding. 
(1) My main aim for this chapter is to make the case that understanding is 
about having cognitive control, and particularly, cognitive control of the sort 
that Alison Hills discusses in her paper, “Understanding Why” (2016). My 
intention is to show that it is understanding that helps to achieve deep 
learning by allowing the learner to exercise cognitive control. I then go on to 
show that cognitive control is a crucial contributing factor to fostering a love of 
learning.  
(2) I also dedicate a section to drawing a distinction between knowledge and 
understanding. Why is this relevant? A common objection to projects like mine 
is that an account of understanding is pointless because it is no different from 
an account of knowledge (some contenders may also specify that it is no 
different from more sophisticated knowledge). I want to suggest that an 
account of understanding is valuable because understanding has unique 
features that offer us value, value that knowledge, even “more sophisticated 
knowledge” alone cannot offer. Making this distinction also has the more 
practical benefit of helping educators see the difference in both these 
concepts, so they do not conflate them and as a result, believe they are 
supporting genuine learning by focusing on, or prioritising content knowledge 
transfer through surface learning approaches. Ultimately, as I have stated, I 
hope to show that understanding is valuable because it has a unique role to 
play in encouraging a love of learning.  
 
In presenting reasons for why understanding is different (and as such has 
different value) from knowledge, I consider the role of testimony, firstly as it is 
especially relevant to teaching and learning, and secondly, testimony is a 
characteristic of knowledge that is not a characteristic of understanding. This is 
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important because it highlights one of the most crucial differences between 
the two: that understanding cannot be passed on to others in the same way 
that knowledge can, and this is one of the fundamental things that makes 
understanding both distinctive and valuable.  
 
(3) I also consider the specific value of understanding defined as cognitive 
control. Here I show that understanding has unique instrumental and intrinsic 
value and that these values can support the cultivation and encouragement of 
the love for learning.  
 
4.2 Defining Understanding as Cognitive Control 
 
There is a wide range of theories about what understanding entails and how it 
can be best explained. One such method of explication is by paraphrasing 
understanding. That is, explaining understanding as “getting it” or “having a 
grip” or “having a grasp”. Such metaphors are meant to hint at the meaning 
of understanding and are often useful, at least as a way of developing intuitive 
ideas we might have about what understanding is. In order to go beyond just 
this intuitive awareness of what understanding involves, many philosophers 
aim to explain what it actually means to “grasp” or “to get it”. Their opinions 
here are varied too. For example, efforts to define understanding as grasping 
have led to various attempts to define exactly what the nature of grasping is. 
An often-quoted explanation of grasping is one offered by Linda Zagzebski in 
“Recovering Understanding”. According to Zagzebski, the connections 
between things or how things hang together are internal; they are visible to 
our “mental view”; she says, “Understanding is a state in which I am directly 
aware of the object of my understanding, and conscious transparency is a 
criterion for understanding” (247) and also “Understanding…not only has 
internally accessible criteria, but is a state that is constituted by a state of 
conscious transparency…” (246). The idea here seems to be that grasping p 
means “seeing”, both consciously and internally, how various parts of p come 
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together to make p. Suggestions that grasping involves “seeing” how 
connections hang together has raised criticisms about what “seeing” actually 
involves and therefore has not resulted in an especially robust account.  
 
The notion of grasping as presented by most philosophers has encountered 
similar problems and furthermore, non- ability-based accounts of grasping 
have been offered by a number of philosophers, again with little consensus 
being agreed upon amongst them, which makes it difficult to account for 
understanding as simply “grasping”. For example, Kareem Khalifa claims that 
the grasping involved in genuinely understanding a phenomenon is simply 
having true, justified beliefs about the true or best available explanation about 
that phenomenon (6), while Schurz and Lambert say that grasping simply 
involves becoming aware of how certain informational units fit into relevant 
domains of one’s already existing system of thought (65-120). 
Another theory on what understanding entails suggests that an account of 
understanding can be provided by first considering the objects of 
understanding, and, through this exercise, ascertaining something about what 
understanding is.  One of the problems with this is that the objects of 
understanding are potentially limitless, making it difficult, practically 
impossible, to defend any one coherent account of understanding. 
Furthermore, attempts to categorise objects of understanding into groups of 
similar types result in concerns about whether these categories are accurate. 
 
Another ability or know-how based theory is centred on the idea of cognitive 
control. And this is the theory that I base my own views on. The case 
presented by Alison Hills, though it references “grasping”, circumvents some 
of the usual problems by virtue of the fact that it is abstract and broad enough 
to encompass a range of characteristics of understanding while not 
succumbing too readily to criticisms levelled against it. By virtue of that, Hills’ 
theory is a strong theory to consider in its own right.  
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In addition to this, Hills’ theory has the value of fitting in very well with the 
educational theory and psychology-based literature on deep learning that I 
presented earlier. Therefore it offers this thesis a strong account of 
understanding in-and-of-itself (understanding as we have seen is a 
fundamental characteristic of deep learning) as well as an account that has the 
added benefit of cohering with and improving on widely accepted research in 
other non-philosophical disciplines that study education.  
 
I begin with a brief description of Hills theory on cognitive control, and 
consider it in relation to the Entwistles’ theory on deep learning (which is the 
theory we looked at in Chapter 2). Both theories offer us a good foundation 
for exploring what understanding might look like – the Entwistles’ theory offers 
us an inspirational starting point for thinking about the sorts of abilities that 
are involved in understanding and Hills theory adds philosophical robustness, 
clarity and breadth to the Entwistles’. I find that most of the Entwistles’ 
account can actually be subsumed under cognitive control and I will explain 
how so later on. As such, I conclude that cognitive control is the better 
contender for a theory of understanding. 
 
Hills’ theory argues that understanding why refers to a special kind of 
“intellectual know-how” that is different from knowledge that p and 
knowledge how p (663). She explains this know-how using the familiar 
metaphor of “grasping” but her argument stands out amongst other 
descriptions of “grasping” because she goes on to give a fuller and more 
convincing explanation of what exactly is involved in “grasping”. She writes, 
  
When you grasp a relationship between two propositions, you 
have the relationship under your control. You can manipulate it. 
You have a set of abilities or know-how relevant to it, which you 
can exercise if you choose (663).  
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“Grasping” here is described not just as “seeing” connections 
but also as the broader ability to control and direct those 
connections. She then goes on to list six abilities that one will 
have if one is indeed able to understand why p and calls these 
abilities cognitive control.36 Here are the six abilities she 
provides (663) 
 
(i) Follow some explanation of why p given by someone else. 
(ii) Explain why p in your own words. 
(iii) Draw the conclusion that p (or probably that p) from the information that q. 
(iv) Draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably p’) from the information that 
q’ (where p’ and q’ are similar to but not identical to p and q) 
(v) Given the information that p, give the right explanation, q. 
(vi) Given the information that p’, give the right explanation, q’. 
 
Let us now revisit the list we had earlier that laid out the characteristics of 
deep learning as provided by the Entwistles. The list offered by them captures 
the phenomenon of deep learning in a useful and intuitively accurate way. 
However, as I suggested earlier, their supporting literature has not quite 
“nailed down” the phenomenon of understanding as robustly as one might 
like. For instance, the concept of “understanding” in the first characteristic 
“understanding material for oneself” is not explained fully or satisfactorily, so 
one is unclear as to what it actually means to “understand” and when one 
might be certain that one has actually “understood” something. So to begin 




36 Hills clarifies that she would not rule out the possibility of further abilities not 
mentioned here (667). 
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(1) understanding material for oneself 
(2) being able to engage vigorously and critically with material 
(3) relating ideas to one’s previous knowledge and experience 
(4) discovering and using organising principles to integrate ideas  
(5) relating evidence to conclusions 
(6) examining the logic and plausibility of the content or arguments 
 
It is fair to say that most of us have a working sense of what “understanding” 
refers to but for the purposes of building as strong a theory as possible on 
what it means to learn, it would be useful to carefully spell out the more 
fundamental terms and explain what they mean. Additionally, 
“understanding”, as we can see from the list, appears to be presented as one 
of the six characteristics. However, it would seem that understanding is not 
just one of the characteristics of deep learning but rather a certain amount of 
understanding needs to be in place to fulfil (2)-(6) on the list. All the abilities (i) 
to (vi) on Hills’ list (HL) demonstrate the ability to understand material for 
oneself, which is (1) on the Entwistles’ list (EL). Hills describes her six abilities as 
cognitive control and says that these abilities are those that a person will have 
if they are able to understand why p (663). So we see that Hills is able to offer 
us a much more detailed account of what it is to understand material for 
oneself by explaining understanding via the list of abilities linked to cognitive 
control.  
 
This leads us to one of the main problems of EL: that we are unable to tell 
from the list precisely how one would demonstrate that one is engaged in 
deep learning. For example, how does one know that someone has engaged 
vigorously and critically with material? We would need to see some 
demonstrable evidence of this to ensure that deep learning has taken place. 
Where EL does not suggest how (2) is demonstrable, HL does. We can 
reasonably assume that someone has engaged vigorously and critically with 
material if they are able to at least do (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) as described on HL. 
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We can also reasonably assume someone is able to relate evidence to 
conclusions (5) on EL) if they are able to do (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi). We might be 
able to tell that someone is relating ideas to previous knowledge and 
experience if they are able to demonstrate (i)-(vi). We would also be able to 
tell if someone has the ability to do (6) on EL if they are able to do at least (iii) 
and (iv) on HL, given that drawing the right conclusions would suggest the 
content or argument makes sense. If one is not able to draw the right 
conclusions it might mean that one has not understood some relevant 
information, process or relationship or that the content or argument is not 
logical. One could then return to steps (i) and (ii) and check one’s 
understanding. 
 
The ability to do (4) on EL could manifest itself more concretely in being able 
to do (ii) to (vi) on HL. For example, one would use organising principles to 
categorise and draw links between pieces of information we already have and 
new information we receive, or if we were using language, then use these 
principles to help us paraphrase with words and concepts we already have, 
accurately, in order to explain why p in one’s own words. Organising principles 
would also likely be required to draw conclusions about p or apply what we 
know about p to similar situations.  
 
Then there is the additional issue of characteristics of deep learning that are 
not on EL. For example, HL lists the abilities of “drawing conclusions that p 
from the information that q” (iii) and “drawing conclusions that p’ from the 
information that q’”(iv). While EL offers the characteristic of “relating evidence 
to conclusions” (5), Entwistle’s characteristic (5) does not clearly state whether 
relating evidence to conclusions includes drawing conclusions from the 
information and being able to draw conclusions from different but similar 
information. Being able to draw conclusions suggests the ability to deduce 
from information as opposed to matching information to conclusions. Both 
deduction and matching in these cases cannot usually be achieved through 
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surface learning approaches such as memorisation, but rather involve being 
able to see how pieces of information relate to each other. However, 
deduction suggests the additional ability to infer from information something 
that may not be immediately apparent. So it would seem that HL covers an 
additional characteristic of deep learning, the ability to make plausible 
inferences. 
 
Another possible characteristic of deep learning not on EL is the ability to gain 
greater understanding about the self and other. For example, by having the 
ability to follow explanations and draw the right conclusions and give the right 
explanations for why p, learners could also practice and develop empathy, 
humility, care and so on. For example, I might be better able to empathise 
with someone if I could truly understand their reasons for behaving in a 
particular way, that is, follow their explanation about why they behaved in that 
way and draw a plausible conclusion about them or their motivations from 
what they have explained about why they behaved that way. In being able to 
understand why this person behaved in this way, I might even get better 
insight into why I do or do not behave in particular ways given similar 
circumstances.  
 
So HL is able to offers us a broader and more abstract account of 
understanding via cognitive control that can account for characteristics that we 
might reasonably consider to be those of deep learning, that are not on EL. In 
light of this, it would seem that although EL has offered a useful and inspiring 
starting point for a philosopher like me to think about the concept of deep 
learning, HL offers us an account that is a more robust candidate for 
describing deep learning. As such, I use HL going forward. 
 
As we will be using HL as the basis for the following discussion, it might be 
worth considering the definitions of some of the terms Hills uses. Most of the 
terms used by Hills in her list and in her explanations are straightforward but it 
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would be useful to clarify what she means by “explanation”. We will also clarify 
what Hills means by being able to “manipulate” the relationship between p 
and q, as she refers to this ability when she writes, “if you understand why p 
(and q is why p) then you have cognitive control over p and q and thus you 
can (in the right circumstances) manipulate the relationship between p and q.” 
(663). 
 
Here is Hills’ account of “explanation”: 
 
An explanation is an answer to the question: why p? It’s 
possible to answer that question in a more or less full and 
detailed way, using more or less fundamental terms… There 
may be— perhaps usually there is—more than one adequate 
answer to the question “why p” and hence more than one 
explanation why p. Different kinds of explanation are to be 
expected from different subject matters, for instance, many 
scientific explanations are likely to be causal explanations, but 
explanations in mathematics and morality will not be causal, or 
not typically causal in any case. (664) 
 
The literature on explanation is varied and incredibly dense. This is one of the 
reasons I believe Hills does not go into much detail here other than to point 
out that essentially, an explanation would be the answer to the question “why 
p?” It would be sufficient for the purposes of understanding Hills’ list here to 
take “follow some explanation” to mean be able to keep on track with reasons 
that are being offered for why p, where the reasons may be causal or 
otherwise, depending on the context. For example, I would not be able to 
follow the explanation for why the green colouring of plants is crucial to the 
wider ecological food chain if I had lost track of the explanation at the point 
where someone was discussing the function of chlorophyll, the substance 
which makes leaves green (and thereby contributes to their nourishment, 
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which in turn contributes to the nourishment of animals that consume plants 
and which then feeds the predators that consume the animals that eat plants). 
Explaining why p “in your own words” is the ability to express the reasons, via 
paraphrasing, as to why the green colouring of plants is crucial to the wider 
ecological food chain. Why is paraphrasing important? Paraphrasing is a way 
of using different words and phrasing to present the same ideas. Substituting 
the words and phrases in an explanation for other words and phrases that 
communicate the same ideas show that it is more likely that one has not just 
memorized the reasons and that one is not simply regurgitating them with 
little idea what they mean or how they are relevant.37  
 
Hills explains “manipulate” like this: 
 
“I understand cognitive control to require that you have a grasp 
that can manipulate the relationship between p and q, and I 
take that to mean that if you have formed a true belief that q′, 
	
37 Explaining why p in your own words may not always indicate that you have 
truly understood why p, or understood it fully, but it will go some way in 
indicating that you have not simply learned the reasons by heart with little or 
no sense about how the relationships between propositions come to be. The 
ability to offer explanations in one’s own words is important in the school 
context because this is often one clear way in which one can identify if the 
learner has simply memorised the words used by the teacher in a lecture or 
found in a textbook. Such memorisation may indicate that the learner does not 
understand why p and only knows that p is the case. In light of that, in order to 
ensure that deep learning is taking place, it would be important to include in 
any account of deep learning, the requirement of the learner to explain what 




you can correctly draw the right conclusion p′ and similarly, if 
you have formed a true belief that p′, you can give the right 
explanation, q′.” (674) 
 
Manipulate, then, seems to mean the ability to exercise control over the 
relationship between p and q. If we were to think about what is involved in 
manipulating an object, we might think it involves handling it, maneuvering 
and directing it. We could “pull an object apart” and see its components and 
how they fit together, we can use the object for unique and novel purposes by 
perhaps re-shaping it or re-constructing its parts in ways that serve our 
purposes, for example. In the case of intellectual “know-how”, this 
manipulation might involve seeing how propositions relate to each other and 
fit together, which would result in being able to work out reasons, 
connections, conclusions and challenges for yourself if you encounter similar 
relationships. 
 
Hills’ account, while promising, is not safe from objections. The main objection 
that arises from including explanation in the list is that explanation requires 
linguistic abilities that some people may not adequately possess or possess 
adequately enough to show that they understand why p, even though they 
may understand why p fully well. Especially problematic is perhaps the use of 
“own words” in the listing “Explain why p in your own words” in her list of 
abilities of cognitive control. Hills offers two responses to this by saying firstly 
that she concedes that this objection may hold some weight and so in light of 
that, she distinguishes between explicit and implicit understanding. She states 
that the understanding she outlines is “explicit” understanding but that when 
one implicitly understands, one correctly believes that q and on that basis 
draws the correct conclusion p, without having to represent q as the 
foundations for p (667). By represent here, I think Hills is referring to the ability 
to articulate the relationship between p and q in one’s own words. If this is 
correct, then in instances of implicit understanding, the abilities on her list 
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requiring explanation would be void. This distinction might answer the 
objection in cases where there is no need for someone to know if someone 
else has understood.  
 
However, in the teaching-learning context, understanding would necessarily 
have to be of the explicit kind because teachers need an indication, through 
the learner’s ability to explain p in their own words, if they have correctly 
understood p. One way to get around this objection of linguistic ability is to 
use non-linguistic or non-verbal methods of explanation alongside verbal 
ones. Some educational institutions allow students to use visuals to aid their 
verbal explanations (common examples of this are graphs, charts, tables and 
other images) or offer non-verbal reasoning tests alongside other more 
mainstream types of assessment.38 These are intended to take into account the 
fact that there might be some learners who are limited in their linguistic 
abilities or have specific learning disabilities.  
 
Hills second response to the objection is perhaps more aligned with the 
educational context. She suggests that cognitive control comes in degrees. In 
this case, one can be better or worse at any of the listed abilities, including 
explanation (665). This then does not eliminate the explanation abilities from 
her list but rather makes room for the fact that a learner simply does not have 
full cognitive control if they cannot articulately explain p in their own words. In 
the school context, learners are sometimes given partial marks if they answer a 
comprehension question by “lifting” the answer from the passage instead of 
putting it into their own words. The reasoning is that the student has not fully 
understood the question or the relevant part of the text but perhaps has 
understood enough of the question and the text to find the “correct” answer. 
	
38 The University of Kent, for example, uses non-verbal reasoning to test 
understanding on the basis that verbal explanations disadvantage non-native 
speakers or those with particular learning difficulties. 
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Therefore, while not eligible for the full mark, the student is given at least 
some marks to indicate their level of understanding. This also suggests that 
understanding comes in degrees. One can have more or less of it, that is, 
satisfy the abilities in Hills list to a greater or lesser extent, and what is 
minimally required to count as understanding might be determined by 
particular circumstances and contexts.  
 
So far, in this section, I have considered what understanding might entail and 
paid specific attention to Hills’ account of understanding as cognitive control. I 
have shown that this is a strong account on the basis that it is clear and able to 
withstand some of the criticisms leveled at it. I have also shown that it offers a 
better account of deep learning than the Entwistles’ account, and as such 
should form the basis for our understanding of deep learning going forward. 
By way of this I have also shown that philosophy can make some significant 
contributions to educational theory. However, there is still more work to be 
done. Hills’ theory about understanding being a matter of cognitive control 
rests on the belief that understanding is not reducible to knowledge. So in the 
following section, I present a case, following Hills, for why understanding is not 
reducible to knowledge.  
 
4.3 The distinction between knowledge and understanding: the role of 
testimony 
 
In the current philosophical literature, there is significant debate as to whether 
knowledge and understanding are two different states or whether they are 
reducible to one state – namely that of knowledge. 
 
The standard philosophical conception of knowledge has a list of specific and 
defining characteristics. Most philosophers will agree that for something to 
count as knowledge: it needs to be factive; it needs to be inconsistent with 
certain types of “luck”; it cannot be based on defeated evidence; and can be 
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transmitted by testimony (Hills 662).39 I consider mainly the testimony 
characteristic here, as it is most relevant to teaching and learning. 
   
Earlier in this thesis, I said that my aim is to advocate for instilling in students 
an understanding that effectively amounts to cognitive control. This broadly 
involves being able to explain information in their own words, see how pieces 
of information connect, how the information fits into a “bigger picture” and 
draw applicable conclusions as well as apply the information in similar cases.40 
I also stated that one of the likely objections I might face is one that argues 
that understanding, and in the case of this particular thesis, cognitive control, 
is reducible to knowledge, so knowledge is sufficient for deep learning. To 
successfully maintain my claim that understanding in the form of cognitive 
control is unlike knowledge and therefore has uniquely valuable features, I 
need to explain why cognitive control cannot be reduced to knowledge. My 
main point of defence here is that cognitive control cannot be reduced to 
knowledge because unlike knowledge, cognitive control cannot be transferred 
via testimony. 
 
That knowledge can be acquired via testimony is not a particularly contentious 
claim and as such I will not be making a case here for why we should accept 
this claim.41 In evidence of the above, Hills writes, 
 
	
39 Again there is debate on whether the standard conception of knowledge is 
right, but for this paper, I assume it is. 
40 Teachers may not always aim to satisfy all these criteria and it may not 
always be possible to do so in a classroom setting due to limited resources. 
The point remains though that this, as opposed to cramming information, 
should be their intention. 
41 Philosophers who have explored the justifications for knowledge acquisition 
via testimony include Jennifer Lackey and Peter Graham.  
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And though there is a lively debate about exactly how 
knowledge can be passed on by testimony, it is very widely 
recognized that it can. Knowledge has a very important social 
epistemic role: much of our knowledge comes “second hand” 
and testimony is a very common way of sharing the knowledge 
that we have. (662) 
The “social epistemic” aspect that Hills mentions here refers to the fact that 
knowledge can be passed on to us by other people; there is a social 
dimension to it and testimony is a significant way in which this social 
dimension is recognised.  While it is generally accepted that testimony has an 
important and valuable role to play in acquiring knowledge, I will argue that 
understanding in the form of cognitive control cannot be acquired solely via 
testimony, and therefore cannot be reduced to knowledge.42 This view has 
been held by many philosophers, most famously, Gilbert Ryle, but also 
Zagzebski and Hills.  For example, in On Epistemology, Zagzebski writes, 
 
Knowledge can be acquired by testimony, whereas 
understanding cannot be. A conscientious believer can obtain a 
true belief on the testimony of another, and given the right 
conditions, can thereby acquire knowledge . . . Understanding 
cannot be transmitted in that way. (145–146) 
 
Yet, our personal experiences of understanding suggest that someone else 
who has more insight on a subject can help us to understand something by 
clarifying it or explaining it – in clarifying and explaining, “second hand” 
	
42 In the classroom setting, an obvious source of testimony is the teacher who 
shares knowledge and information with her students. Other sources of 
testimony used in classrooms are textbooks, journals and news reports. 
Educators who encourage surface approaches and learners who learn 
superficially most often rely solely on testimony.  
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knowledge would be passed down, and this could count as testimony. While 
testimony may not help one acquire understanding, it would be fair to say that 
testimony can facilitate understanding or help to foster it. So it would be fair 
to concede that testimony can aid understanding, but it would be inaccurate 
to suggest that understanding can be acquired solely via testimony, thereby 
making it unlikely that understanding is reducible to knowledge. Like Hills and 
Zagzebski, I hold that testimony alone, however good, is normally not enough 
to ensure understanding is taking place. It is therefore the case that in order 
for understanding, and thereby deep learning, to be taking place, testimony 
alone is not enough.  
 
Let’s begin by looking at Hills’ argument and then at some of the objections 
levelled against her and how these may be addressed. Hills argues that 
understanding is different from the standard philosophical conception of 
knowledge because it cannot be (easily) transmitted by testimony. Knowledge, 
by this standard account, can be transmitted by testimony (Hills 662). This is 
because one can know why something is the case by having relevant 
propositional knowledge, which can be transmitted via testimony.  
 
Following Hills, my claim is that understanding requires something other than 
only propositional knowledge. It requires the agent’s ability to grasp, or 
cognitively control what the agent knows, and as Hills says this cannot be 
easily transmitted via testimony. She says that you cannot normally pass on the 
ability to draw conclusions or give explanations about similar cases simply by 
telling someone that q is why p (or even telling them that, plus that q’ is why 
p’ and so on). Cognitive control is something that typically comes with 
reflection and practice. Hills writes, 
 
Hardly anyone learns how to swim or ride a bike by reading a 
textbook or listening to an explanation of how to do so. 
Guidance from an expert can certainly help, but that help does 
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not necessarily take the form of assertions passing on standard 
propositional knowledge; or even if it does, that only works if it 
is combined with practice. Testimony alone is not normally 
enough. (670)43 
 
These examples would seem intuitively correct to most of us. If my uncle, who 
taught me how to ride a bike, had done so by thrusting a manual at me, I 
suspect I would have landed up in the drain by the corner of my street many 
more times than I did. Learning how to ride a bike by reading a book or sitting 
across the table from someone who describes riding a bike to you, regardless 
of how clear the descriptions and instructions might be, is not the best way to 
learn to ride a bike. I suspect this claim would not be a controversial one. If 
gaining cognitive control requires practice then cognitive control involves 
characteristically, some sort of know-how. Thinking of other examples of know-
how, it is plausible to assume we cannot learn them by testimony, which leads 
to the assumption that we cannot gain the know-how for cognitive control 
through testimony. And given that we gain knowledge on testimony, we can 
conclude that understanding why cannot be fully reduced to knowledge. 
However, proponents of the view that understanding is reducible to 
knowledge argue that even in examples such as those above, understanding 
can be achieved solely via testimony.   
 
	
43 Some of these examples are about more manual learning, but what is 
involved in terms of the learning in these examples is not dissimilar to what 
goes on during the more intellectually based cognitive control. As swimming, 
cooking and riding a bike are very commonly shared experiences of learning, 
they act as a good way of explaining why cognitive control cannot be passed 
on via testimony.  
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Federica Malfatti argues that the reason why we find examples such as riding 
bikes and learning swimming by testimony alone to be problematic is because 
the examples themselves are of the wrong kind. She writes, “The reason why 
most of us are reluctant to give it up, I suggest, is that it draws once more on 
the wrong kind of examples”(14). Malfatti does not explain here what she 
means by “wrong kind of examples” but I think what she means is examples of 
skills that are particularly difficult or complicated. I suspect that she means that 
using these examples makes it much easier for us to accept that 
understanding, at least in so far as understanding results in “know how” or 
ability, cannot be achieved via testimony alone. So, she suggests another type 
of example: 
 
I recently texted an Israeli friend to ask how to make the great 
shakshuka I had tried at her place. Here is what she texted back: 
 
Cook the tomatoes and the onions until tender, add salt, 
pepper and cumin, then break the eggs above, do not stir, put 
on low heat and wait until the eggs are cooked. 
 
Have I gained know-how (to make a shakshuka) on the basis of 
my friend’s testimony? The shakshuka turned out all right (you 
will have to take my word for it, but in case you do not, follow 
the instructions yourself!), so I tend to say that I did. If I am right, 
contrary to what we might initially think, we gain abilities and 
know-how all the time in our everyday testimonial interactions. 
(14) 
  
In citing this example, Malfatti wants to show that testimony, by way of a text 
message from her friend, was sufficient to gain the ability to or know-how to 
make shakshuka. I think this claim is problematic because the ability to make 
the shakshuka was arguably based on more than testimony. (1) Malfatti had 
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tasted a correctly prepared shakshuka before she attempted making it; she 
had also seen how a shakshuka that has been cooked correctly should look 
and how it should feel (since texture is an important component of cooking). 
These would surely have contributed to her ability to follow her friend’s 
instructions to some degree of success. Neither of these experiences would be 
considered testimony as they are her own first hand experiences of seeing, 
tasting and feeling the shakshuka which would have contributed to her 
following the instructions given by her friend. (2) Relatedly, I am not sure I 
could successfully follow Malfatti’s friend’s instructions, meaning that some 
prior knowledge that Malfatti is in possession of has helped her follow these 
instructions. For example, had I seen this recipe in a cookbook, I would have 
been confused by the instruction to “wait until the eggs are cooked” because, 
from what I know, the yolks in shakshukas should not be fully cooked. So, does 
the instruction mean the whole egg, including the yolks are cooked? 
Presumably this instruction did not confuse Malfatti because either she already 
knew the yolks should not be cooked or she had seen and eaten the 
shakshuka her friend cooked and gathered that “wait until the eggs are 
cooked” meant that she should wait only until the whites are cooked. Again, 
this shows that it is not only testimony that is involved here. 
 
Let us say, to really test the merits of this defence, and to really test cognitive 
control as an account of understanding, that Malfatti’s friend had not sent her 
a text message, but instead sent her a copy of the page of the recipe book, 
complete with a high definition image of a perfect shakshuka, which shows the 
ideal texture of the dish as well as that the egg yolks should be runny. There 
is, also included, as good as humanly possible, a written description of the 
ideal taste of the shakshuka. Let us also say that there are detailed reasons 
given for why each step of the recipe has to be the way it is, that is, an 
explanation is given for each step. So we still have testimony, this time from 
the author of the recipe book. But this time, because of the photo of the 
shakshuka, Malfatti need not have seen the shakshuka in person to follow the 
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instructions correctly because the photo would suffice. Essentially, Malfatti 
would need no personal experience of the shakshuka and would be relying 
entirely on the testimony in the recipe. Would testimony then be sufficient for 
the know-how required to make the shakshuka?   
 
To answer this, why don’t we see if the making of the shakshuka via testimony 
(by virtue of the cookbook recipe and photo) alone stacks up against Hills’ 
requirements for cognitive control? After all, there is room for intellectual 
know-how in this example in so far as understanding the recipe requires 
cognitive work.  
 
Here is the list Hills provides again (663): 
 
(i) Follow some explanation of why p given by someone else. 
(ii) Explain why p in your own words. 
(iii) Draw the conclusion that p (or probably that p) from the information that q. 
(iv) Draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably p’) from the information that 
q’ (where p’ and q’ are similar to but not identical to p and q) 
(v) Given the information that p, give the right explanation, q. 
(vi) Given the information that p’, give the right explanation, q’. 
 
Based on the testimony in the copy of the recipe, Malfatti could do (i) in terms 
of following the instructions in the copy of the recipe. She could do (ii) as well 
– if she followed the explanation in the recipe well, she could use her own 
words to explain it. She could also potentially also do (iii) and (v) if the recipe 
was thorough in offering details and explanations and her ability to follow of 
all these details and explanations was very good. However, the main problem 
with relying on testimony for acquiring know-how, even in the second case 
when there is a more detailed recipe, explanations and photographs is that 
there is no guarantee that she could do (iv) and (vi). If now asked to make the 
shakshuka with some missing ingredients that she would have to substitute, 
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could she do it? Could she give the right explanations for why she was using 
these ingredients and for the steps she was changing or omitting? As Hills 
writes, “You cannot normally pass on the ability to draw conclusions or give 
explanations about similar cases simply by telling someone that q is why p (or 
even telling them that, plus that q′ is why p′ and so on)” (670). For know-how 
in these similar cases, one would likely need personal experience, practice and 
reflection, which are not in the domain of testimony. 
Granted, it is true that Malfatti can make the shakshuka in the recipe, following 
the testimony in the recipe. We might be hard-pressed to argue that 
testimony cannot result in know-how, at least in the second case where the 
recipe comes with photos and details. However, it is still the case that 
testimony alone cannot fulfil the requirements of cognitive control. So, even 
the more generous version of the Malfatti example falls apart when 
understanding, or know how, is characterised by cognitive control. And 
cognitive control provides us with a fuller account of understanding than the 
other versions of grasping or know how we have put forward because it covers 
something we would normally expect understanding to be able to help us do: 
that is, use or manipulate what we have understood to help us respond 
independently in other similar situations.  
There is further criticism of Hills’ account of testimony in Paulina Sliwa’s paper 
“Understanding and Knowing”, where Sliwa argues that “all instances of 
understanding why, what and how ultimately bottom out in propositional 
knowledge” (67). Again, if this were true, it would render a non-reductionist 
account like Hills’ as unnecessary because all that is required for 
understanding is propositional knowledge and nothing more. It is Sliwa’s view 
that cognitive control is just an acquiring of more propositional knowledge. 
She says,  
 
Recall that according to the non-reductionist, when two agents 
differ in whether they understand why p this is because they 
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differ in the cognitive attitude that they bear towards the answer 
to the question why p. The understanding agent ‘grasps’ the 
answer, while the merely knowing agent ‘assents’ to it. In 
contrast, the reductionist maintains that agents differ in what 
they understand in virtue of differing in what they know…Better 
understanding is simply a matter of more knowledge…(it) is a 
difference in the content of what is known. (69) 
 
This is an objection about cognitive control. On Sliwa’s account, cognitive 
control is just an expansion of propositional knowledge. In other words, 
intellectual “know-how” is ultimately reducible to propositional knowledge. 
The point of this sort of claim is to suggest that understanding why p is really 
just a matter of having extra knowledge such as, for example, in order to 
understand why p, all one has to do really is know that q is why p and so on. 
According to Sliwa, it may seem that one person has more of a “grasp” on 
some subject matter but really this is not the said person understanding it, but 
simply having more knowledge about it.  
 
One problem with Sliwa’s claim is again, that no amount of propositional 
knowledge can guarantee that the person with the propositional knowledge 
would know exactly when and how to use that propositional knowledge in the 
right way in every context, particularly one which they have not experienced 
before. The question comes down to whether, or to what extent, propositional 
knowledge ensures the ability to make a suitable decision about when and 
how to use which pieces of knowledge one has. The ability to helpfully and 
appropriately judge what pieces of knowledge to use and how to use them 
cannot always come from propositional knowledge, especially if the context is 
completely new, different to anything one has experienced before or is 
unpredictable. Note that this objection does not discount the value of more 
propositional knowledge in aiding understanding. It would seem reasonable 
to suggest that understanding could be improved if indeed one had more 
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propositional knowledge, but it seems incorrect to suggest that simply 
acquiring more and more propositional knowledge, even of the relevant kind, 
is sufficient to count as understanding why. The reason for this is that 
understanding, if we accept that it is a matter of cognitive control, requires 
certain abilities which acquiring propositional knowledge, even relevant 
knowledge, cannot fulfil. For instance, without an awareness of how pieces of 
knowledge relate to each other, how cause and effect work in the right order, 
and without being able to, or at least having the awareness that one would be 
able to, “disassemble” and “reassemble” pieces of knowledge in appropriate 
ways, given particular and perhaps unique observations and conclusions that 
we might draw in unique contexts, one cannot say that one understands, let 
alone that one’s understanding is of any quality. This renders Sliwa’s claim that 
know-how or understanding is ultimately a question of more and more 
propositional knowledge questionable.  
 
One famous argument against the claim that know-how is reducible to 
propositional knowledge comes from Gilbert Ryle. Ryle wants to show at least 
that know-how does not always consist of propositional knowledge. This 
famous argument is known as the “regress argument”. It goes: 
 
The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the 
execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more 
stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a 
prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and 
performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for 
anyone ever to break into the circle. (31) 
 
The argument is that if we want to perform some act of know-how intelligently, 
this needs to be preceded by a prior, intelligent consideration of a 
proposition. The consideration of a proposition is also a (mental) act and 
therefore needs to be something we know how to do, and so if intelligently 
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executed, will also count as know-how. If Sliwa and others who hold her view 
are right, then this too needs to be preceded by another intelligent 
consideration of a proposition, which will be again, an exercise of know-how. 
And so, if we hold that know-how is just a matter of having more propositional 
knowledge then we will have an infinite regress.  
 
Ryle’s argument faces objections particularly on the basis that knowing-how 
can be a matter of having propositional knowledge even if they are not 
preceded by acts of mental consideration. Stanley and Williamson are 
famously known for challenging Ryle’s argument. They want to show that 
know-how does always consist of propositional knowledge. For example, they 
argue that digesting food is not an action that one knows how to do or that is 
preceded by an act of mental consideration (414). Here is their representation 
of Ryle’s argument: 
 
(1) If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F 
(2) If one employs knowledge that p, one contemplates the proposition that 
p.” …Ryle's argument is intended to show that, if premise (1) and premise (2) 
are true, then, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, doing 
anything would require contemplating an infinite number of propositions of 
ever-increasing complexity. (413-414) 
 
So according to Stanley and Williamson (1) is falsified by the example of 
digestion because a person does not know how to digest food. For (2), it is 
also possible that one may act without contemplating any proposition. John 
Williams gives the example of someone manifesting and employing her 
knowledge that the phone is ringing by automatically and unreflectively 
picking it up (112). 
 
Further interpretations of Ryle, for example by Stephen Hetherington, 
suggests that Stanley and Williamson have misinterpreted Ryle and that the 
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regress argument stands against their rebuttals if one reads Ryle to mean that 
that one’s know-how-in-action always involves putting one’s knowing-how to 
apply propositional knowledge to action, into action. Ryle writes:  
 
According to the legend, whenever an agent does anything 
intelligently, his act is preceded and steered by another internal 
act of considering a regulative proposition appropriate to his 
practical problem… Next, supposing still that to act reasonably I 
must first perpend the reason for so acting, how am I led to 
make a suitable application of the reason to the particular 
situation which my action is to meet? . . . [T]he absurd 
assumption made by the intellectualist legend is this, that a 
performance of any sort inherits all its title to intelligence from 
some anterior internal operation of planning what to do. (31) 
 
Hetherington explains that what Ryle means here can be reconstructed along 
the lines that one’s know-how-in-action always involves putting one’s knowing-
how to apply propositional knowledge to action, into action. Ryle’s regress can 
be explained in Hetherington’s reading like this: if one already knows a 
particular way in which to execute an act, and one knows how to apply this 
knowledge in order to execute that act, and one then does apply this 
knowledge in order to execute that act, then this would be a new instance of 
executing an act while knowing how to do so and so on ad infinitum (74). On 
this reading, it would seem that Ryle’s regress problem is still salient.  
 
Yet another common rebuttal by reductionists takes this form: A dancer loses 
both her legs in a heartrending car accident but still knows how to do a 
pirouette even though she does not have the ability to. Stanley and 
Williamson cite similar example of a master pianist who has lost both her arms 
but still knows how to play the piano (416). In these cases, there is know-how 
without ability, so the claim that know-how requires ability is dubious. I do not 
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think this necessarily poses a problem for my account because to varying 
degrees, the ability to follow and give applicable explanations in one’s own 
words, and to draw suitable conclusions from the information available, would 
already be sufficient to indicate cognitive control. If the dancer is able to 
exercise cognitive control, even if she herself is unable to now dance, she can 
be said to possess intellectual know-how or understanding. It might also be 
argued that the question of ability is relevant only in circumstances when that 
ability is a possibility. The dancer would have had the ability to do a pirouette, 
as well as the know-how when she had not lost her legs in a car accident. 
 
I have argued so far that understanding is akin to intellectual know-how in the 
form of cognitive control, which rests on the ability to consciously and 
explicitly grasp and manipulate the relationship between propositions and 
pieces of knowledge in order to explain and draw the right conclusions. I have 
argued that such abilities cannot be passed on easily via testimony and as 
such, the claim that understanding is reducible to knowledge cannot stand. 
There is therefore something other than propositional knowledge that 
accounts for deep learning, and this something other is understanding in the 
form of cognitive control. This makes it possible for me to make the important 
claim that love of learning needs to be grounded in cognitive control and not 
in the acquiring of propositional knowledge, because the two are different, 
and because cognitive control has value that contributes uniquely to 
cultivating a love of learning.  
 
I return now to the classroom environment to look briefly at the relevance of 
the discussion on cognitive control and testimony to the classroom setting. 
Testimony is of special relevance to our discussion because a lot of learning, 
as it currently stands, still relies on testimony. In classroom situations, teachers 
often simply pass on information to their students. A lot of information is 
learned in this way through the testimony of teachers and also through 
textbooks by experts in the subject, who often pass on not just propositional 
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knowledge but also interpretations and opinions. Good providers of testimony 
also do more than state information. They attempt to explain how pieces of 
information are connected to each other and even how we can use or apply 
this information, perhaps to predict something or to make something. 
Excellent providers of testimony may even explain or “model” how we can 
acquire and hone the skills required to make sense of connections, spot errors 
in arguments and spot instances where we can apply what we have learned. 
Good educators however are not satisfied with simply providing testimony, 
even if it is testimony that involves teaching, as best as they possibly can, 
methods one might use to hone cognitive control. Instead good educators 
want to ensure that their students are able to do something more with this 
testimony: that is, that the students are able to use the testimony to improve 
their cognitive control and fulfil the sorts of abilities that Hills lists. However, as 
we have seen, cognitive control is not something a teacher or a textbook can 
easily pass on to a learner. What the teacher can give her students is 
“knowledge”, and then perhaps advice or tips on how one might then take 
these pieces of knowledge and interact with them so as to create 
understanding, but they will not often be able to pass understanding in the 
form of cognitive control on to their students via pure testimony. 
 
It is also often the case that students who resort only to testimonial knowledge 
tend to be more superficial learners. They are often unable, when that 
testimony has not predicted certain circumstances, to explain why and/or to 
apply what they know in these different circumstances. There seems to be no 
way of knowing conclusively all the ways in which you might be expected to 
use the information you have at various times in the future. What prepares one 
for this, more than just testimony, is often intelligent deductions, informed trial 
and error, practice, and then reflection on what worked and what did not and 
why. This is also why surface learners, who rely almost solely on testimony for 
their rote learning, are less likely to be able to achieve the abilities and 
outcomes set out by cognitive control. When educators are able to 
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acknowledge that education should stop focusing solely or primarily on 
knowledge transfer and instead consider methods that help facilitate the 
development of understanding, or, more accurately, cognitive control, they 
will have a better chance of producing less “machine-like” learners who are 
instead equipped to deal with unpredictability and change.  
 
Earlier, and again in this chapter, I said that experiences of learning consist at 
different times of different permutations of surface and deep learning and that 
both are important components of learning. Surface learning and surface 
learning methods often focus on knowledge acquisition because they are 
usually geared towards information reproduction. I want to reiterate that this 
does not make surface learning, or knowledge acquisition, inferior.44 In fact, 
knowledge acquisition is vital to learning and I think it is fairly uncontroversial 
to say that in both instances of surface and deep learning, or whichever 
combination of the two one might be engaged in, one usually needs to 
acquire some knowledge.45 Even if this was not the case, the point I wish to 
make here is about what one does when one acquires knowledge. If one were 
learning in a more surface way, one would probably memorise the information 
and store that information in order to reproduce it, as it is, at a later time. A 
classic example of this would be sitting in your mathematics classroom, being 
taught that a2 + b2 = c2 is the Pythagoras theorem, and that this can be used 
for determining the length of the sides of a right-angled triangle given the 
measurements of the other two sides, and then memorising the formula, so 
	
44 My “issue” is not with knowledge acquisition but with the methods 
employed in this acquisition, which, as data has shown, tends very often to 
feature surface-learning methods. 
45 Hills, Kvanig and Pritchard more controversially make the claim that 
knowledge is not required for understanding why. Though very interesting, 
this claim is not something I consider in this thesis as it is not relevant to the 
claims I’m making. 
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that in a test where you had to give the answer for one of the sides, you could 
recall the memorised formula and use it. In this case there is no attempt to 
understand why this formula is as such, or how this theorem might apply to 
any other information you might have or be useful in a situation outside the 
maths class or the test, which would be some of the things you might 
consider, and attempt to do, if you were learning more deeply. This suggests 
that when one is learning “more” deeply, one at least intends and attempts to 
exercise cognitive control over the information and ideally one is prepared to 
apply this knowledge that has been obtained as and when it may come in 
useful. 
 
I began this chapter by saying that my intention was to show that it is 
understanding that helps to achieve deep learning by allowing the learner to 
exercise cognitive control. One of my contributions to this area of research has 
hopefully been to develop a more thorough account of deep learning by 
bringing together the philosophical research, especially in cognitive control, 
and the educational and psychological research on deep learning. In the 
following section I discuss the value of cognitive control. 
 
 
4.4 The Value of Cognitive Control 
 
In this section I set out to show that if cognitive control is valuable then 
understanding is valuable. Cognitive control, I argued, depends on the ability 
to consciously and explicitly grasp and manipulate the relationship between 
propositions and pieces of knowledge in order to explain and draw the right 
conclusions both in a particular case and in similar cases. In this section, I will 
consider both the instrumental and intrinsic values of cognitive control.46 
	





Instrumental Value of Cognitive Control 
 
The instrumental value of cognitive control can be readily witnessed in cases 
where one is presented with a new question or a new problem. Earlier I 
referenced the use of the Pythagoras theorem in real life situations, where the 
abstract mathematical concept, if understood well, could be used to solve a 
practical, real life question, for example, what size computer I should buy to fit 
into the space that I have. One might argue that more knowledge could do 
the same, that is, more or more sophisticated knowledge might help one 
successfully answer new questions or solve new problems. This is a concern I 
discussed earlier; it is not often the case that propositional knowledge alone 
can guarantee this. Relatedly, cognitive control can be exercised 
independently, meaning that if one is faced with a problem or novel situation 
and there is no access to further knowledge or information, then someone can 
potentially rely on their cognitive ability to draw reasonable conclusions by 
knowing how to piece together relevant components from previous 
knowledge and experience, in order to arrive at correct explanations and draw 
the right conclusions.  
 
Why are these outcomes valuable? They are so because they reduce our 
reliance on knowledge only, knowledge which often requires testimony of 
some form, or sensory perception; this is of value because the former may not 
always be readily available, and the latter, not always possible or helpful. 
Exercising cognitive control could mean that we are more likely to be able to 
solve or deal with more new and different circumstances and problems, even 
those we encounter in settings where we are unable to acquire new 
knowledge, making us more self-sufficient. 
 
	 129	
The ability to exercise cognitive control, that is, to use the abilities of cognitive 
control, also equips one with the capacity to check whether arguments, claims 
and conclusions being made by others are accurate, and one can do this for 
oneself. Alison Hills also points out that being able to exercise one’s 
understanding is what allows one to “make judgements, including forming the 
beliefs that are part of understanding why p” (678).  
 
It is of course not always the case that one has to exercise cognitive control to 
verify information; one could simply ask an expert, if one had one handy. 
However, in an era when false news is widespread and more and more 
seemingly trustworthy sources are discovered to have their own agendas, 
being able to draw one’s own conclusions and matching these with 
“supposed” conclusions can be a very useful skill to have - so that one can 
verify information, and is not “hoodwinked”. Here is a very timely anecdote: I 
am writing this thesis at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic – the virus 
spreads very quickly from an infected person via droplets when they cough, 
sneeze or talk. One of the ways to prevent catching the virus is to practice 
personal hygiene in the form of cleaning your hands regularly. Alcohol-based 
hand sanitisers and hand washes are deemed effective at killing the virus. So 
as one would imagine, within hours of Covid-19 cases being reported, these 
were sold out in many places, leaving people who did not plan ahead or 
stockpile, extremely anxious about what they could do. At the time of this 
panic, people were being told that normal soap, the kind our grandmothers 
used, would be just as effective. At the same time, I received an article via 
social media stating that oil-based, ordinary soap was not effective in killing 
viruses and that only alcohol-based soaps and sanitisers would work. I had a 
moment of blind panic (as I did not have these items) and then I began to 
wonder how accurate this article was. So I exercised cognitive control, like this:  
 
I knew from previously learning in chemistry that viruses consist of three key 
“building blocks”: ribonucleic acid (RNA), proteins and lipids. A virus-infected 
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cell creates many of these building blocks. These blocks then spontaneously 
self-assemble to produce the virus. Most importantly for us to note is that 
these units are not held together by strong covalent bonds. Because the 
bonds are strong, it is not usually the case that you need strong chemicals to 
then break the bonds. I was also taught at a soap making class that soap 
contains fat-like substances known as amphiphiles, which compete with other 
similar lipids and “loosen” and “dissolve” the other lipids – this is how soap is 
able to clean our hands.  
 
From both these pieces of information, which I already had, as a result of 
testimony and then memory, I drew the conclusion that it would be unlikely 
that harsh alcohol-based soaps and sanitisers were the only products that 
could kill the virus because viruses do not normally require such harsh 
chemicals to break their bonds. Furthermore, a quick check on some reliable 
scientific sources online provided me the information that the lipids in viruses 
are very similar to amphiphiles, applying this information to what I had already 
worked out confirmed that it is very likely that grandma’s soap would work to 
loosen and dissolve the “building blocks” in the virus. I came to the conclusion 
that the article I received via social media that claimed that ordinary soap was 
ineffective was probably not true. I then ceased the desperate search for 
alcohol-based antibacterial hand wash that had already taken up most of my 
day and was beginning to cause me a lot of stress, and pulled out the bars of 
old-fashioned soap I had stashed under my bathroom sink.47 
	
47 Now, whether or not this exercise of cognitive control was, give or take, 
actually more valuable than typing into Google ‘does ordinary soap kill 
viruses?’ and then reading through a few generally trusted sources, is open to 
debate. Perhaps the time it took me to exercise cognitive control was much 
longer than simply looking for testimonial knowledge. This might have then 
made the exercise in cognitive control less efficient, thereby making it overall, 
less valuable. But arguably, it would only be less valuable for someone who 
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Another benefit of cognitive control is that having it entails the increased 
ability to predict and control the world around us (Woodward 7).48 Having 
cognitive control offers us the ability to manipulate information because 
cognitive control involves accurately piecing together information, or 
becoming aware of how information is pieced together, to draw the right 
conclusions. We can then identify that changes to these pieces of information 
are likely to cause changes to the conclusions. This can be practically applied 
to our understanding of how things in our world are connected and depend 
on one another, allowing us to manipulate these connections in ways that can 
benefit our environment and us.49  
 
Additionally, an understanding of how things in our world are connected can 
make it possible for one to come to appreciate the seemingly insignificant, 
hidden or oft-forgotten parts or components of bigger schemes or projects.  
Having cognitive control entails the awareness of unique and sometimes vital 
roles that various things play, but which may otherwise be ignored or veiled in 
the bigger scheme of things. This entails appreciating these parts in light of 
how they fit into, or function within, a bigger picture or scheme of things to 
	
deems efficiency to be of greater or utmost value. Either way, rebuttals like 
this tend not to get very far because time and effort expended is usually 
subjective. The question of whether value can come in degrees is something I 
discuss later in the section on achievement. 
48 Woodward’s focus is on the nature and value of explanations, but the 
benefits of manipulation are very similar in both the arguments Woodward 
proposes and in those presented here about cognitive control. 
49 Woodward writes, “Descriptive knowledge, by contrast, is knowledge that, 
although it may provide a basis for prediction, classification, or more or less 
unified representation or systemization, does not provide information 
potentially relevant to manipulation” (10). 
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make that bigger picture or scheme possible, better, or more interesting.50 It 
may seem odd at first to think of “appreciating” a small component of some 
larger system or grander scheme, since appreciation conjures up ideas of 
gratitude and esteem, but this may only seem strange because we may not 
realise how some seemingly insignificant things have important roles. We 
generally believe that appreciation is a positive thing because we believe that 
it is good not to take things for granted and to recognise (by drawing 
conclusions that lead us to see) how things come together successfully 
through various parts playing their important roles. This sort of understanding 
if nurtured and developed will also illuminate our roles and the parts we play. 
This in turn could serve to motivate and galvanise us to take more active roles 
in our communities, to bring about change, whether to our personal lives or to 
society. Understanding can equally make us aware that we are one small part 
of an enormous and complex world, reminding us to exercise humility and 
respect.51  
 
Yet another valuable outcome of cognitive control, or exercising it, is that it 
can give us enjoyment. A number of philosophers have explored this idea in a 
variety of ways  - some focus their discussion on “enjoyment”, while others talk 
about the same response as “pleasure”, and some refer to it as a feeling of 
“satisfaction”, but it would seem that the general view is similar; that 
	
50 And on the contrary, perhaps in some instances, seeing how things fit 
together as part of this bigger picture could help us identify those parts that 
fail to add any real value, or which are actually irrelevant, confuse or 
complicate our understanding. 
51 There are potentially interesting arguments to be made for how gratitude 
and humility could be additional candidates for the intrinsic value of cognitive 
control. However I do not have the space to explore these in the detail they 
would require. 
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exercising understanding is enjoyable.52 Many of us would identify with the 
feeling of enjoyment that comes from trying to make sense and piece 
information together to come to a coherent conclusion, or the challenge of 
applying information we have to answering new questions or solving 
problems. Of the same view, Hills writes, “We take pleasure in following 
arguments and drawing conclusions. This enjoyment is both a sign of and a 
contributor to the value of understanding” (678). This indicates that the very 
exercise of understanding brings about pleasure. Some may even attest to the 
claim that the harder something is to understand to begin with, the more 
reward and pleasure one gets when one finally grasps it. There is something to 
be said here about how this sense of reward and pleasure comes about from 
feeling well remunerated for the effort one puts into following an argument or 
a chain of thought, and for then being able to draw suitable and likely 
conclusions for oneself. I explore the role of pleasure in learning later on in this 
thesis and also present some thoughts on reward and remuneration in the 
following section on achievement. 
 
Further to this enjoyment, I think it is also the case that one’s ability to exercise 
cognitive control gives one self-confidence or perhaps more precisely, an 
intellectual confidence. This is the confidence that one is capable of following 
arguments, giving explanations and drawing conclusions. In turn, this 
confidence supports the extent to which one is willing to seek out further 
understanding (since we said earlier that understanding can come in degrees), 
to participate or venture into in new experiences or situations that are 
unfamiliar. Concerns that one will not be able to meet new challenges are 
frequently a reason for avoiding new or different situations, unfamiliar 
environments and fresh opportunities. Some of the consequences of this are 
	
52 For example Hills uses the terms “enjoyment” and “pleasure” in their 
description. In “Value of Understanding” Grimm uses the terms “enjoyment” 
and “satisfaction” (109), and Alison Gopnik refers to it as a mental “orgasm”.  
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that one’s opinions and judgements remain unchallenged, one’s world view 
can become limited causing one to succumb to dogmatism, and one’s 
contributions to work, family and society can become out-dated or irrelevant. 
If someone is assured that they can effectively use their understanding to 
relate ideas, relate evidence to conclusions, and examine the possibility and 
plausibility of content, arguments and solutions, then that person will be 
better disposed to venturing beyond what they already know and as a result, 
very likely encounter more learning.53  
 
Intrinsic Value of Cognitive Control 
(a) Truth and Mirroring 
 
I think it is also the case that cognitive control has intrinsic value; by this I 
mean it is valuable for its own sake. There are a number of views on this and 
one of them considers the intrinsic value of truth and how this relates to 
cognitive control. True beliefs are evidently instrumentally valuable; we do not 
need to make a case for this. But true beliefs are valuable in and of themselves 
too, because they give us a correct account of reality; they mirror or reflect 
reality. But how does truth or mirroring make a case for the intrinsic value of 
cognitive control? Some have argued that someone who exercises cognitive 
control has a mind that more deeply mirrors the world than someone who 
simply “accepts” a true proposition; the latter’s mind would still be mirroring 
reality, but the mirroring would be more superficial. Grimm suggests that deep 
mirroring is achieved when one is able to see how the various connections of 
some given state in reality actually piece together, as opposed to simply 
accepting facts about the given state (111). For example, being taught Boyle’s 
Law will certainly equip me with an accurate mirroring of reality; I will have 
accurate information about how gases work and function in the world. 
	
53 Again we see a link to vulnerability and being “open”, which I discuss in 
more detail in Chapter 6. 
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However, because I have only “assented” to this law, and not exercised 
cognitive control, the mirroring of reality is only superficial. 
 
Perhaps it might help to try to articulate this idea of depth and superficiality 
more, so as to show exactly why this depth of mirroring is more valuable. I 
think what philosophers like Grimm are getting at is the fact that the deep 
mirroring provides a match between the true proposition and one’s own 
“working out” of the way reality works. One way of articulating this might be 
to say that superficial mirroring, or the direct reflection of the way things are 
provides us with some knowledge but deep mirroring (which entails 
understanding how various parts of this reality come to be, connect with each 
other, and so on) is a sort of “knowledge-plus”, where the “plus” refers to 
having cognitive control; that is, the ability to make sense of the knowledge in 
a deeper way and to potentially use it or parts or pieces of it to make sense of 
similar situations or information. The argument by the likes of Grimm and 
Pritchard is that this adds an additional “weight” or “authority” to the 
knowledge that we get from just superficial mirroring. Therefore, being able to 
“mirror deeply” is epistemically better than not being able to. If we believe 
that more epistemic value is better than less epistemic value then cognitive 
control is able to offer something uniquely and intrinsically valuable here.  
 
However, as Grimm points out, there is a potential problem with this position. 
It is not, as he says, evident that an insignificant item of understanding always 
mirrors the world in a better way than a deeper item of propositional 
knowledge. He tries to defend against this by saying that some items of 
propositional knowledge appear to be deeper because of their potential to 
explain and that this then makes it “harder to judge its value solely as an 
instance of propositional knowledge” (111). I am not sure this defence is the 
best one because it gets into a rather muddled area of trying to work out just 
how much explanatory mileage an item of propositional knowledge must have 
before its value becomes difficult to judge solely as an instance of 
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propositional knowledge (and not as, say, an instance of understanding). 
Additionally complicating is that if it is not exactly an item of propositional 
knowledge, then what would it be – an item of understanding, or an item that 
is part propositional knowledge and part understanding? 
 
Perhaps a stronger response to the counterargument Grimm postulates comes 
from Hills, who manages to argue for the value of cognitive control with 
reference to truth and mirroring while avoiding the potentially problematic 
method of distinguishing between deep and superficial mirroring; hers is the 
view that I endorse. She does so by drawing a correlation between the 
dependence between two beliefs and the dependence between two facts in 
the world; cognitive control allows for the mirroring of the dependence 
between two beliefs and two facts, propositional knowledge does not. She 
writes: 
 
…a set of beliefs might also mirror the world in virtue of their 
form; by which I mean the similarities between the relationships 
between those beliefs and the relationships between the facts 
in the world: for instance a dependence between two beliefs 
might mirror a dependence between two facts…a mirroring— 
between your beliefs and the world, that cannot be explained 
fully in terms of the content of those beliefs alone, but also must 
refer to the relationship between them: one of your beliefs 
depends on the other, just as there is a dependence between 
the facts in the world. (Hills 679) 
 
Hills does not say much more than this but I think what she means by “form” 
can be understood by thinking of the relationship between a set of beliefs and 
the relationship between a set of corresponding facts in the world as having 
not just parallel subject matter but also parallel structures or configurations. 
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The type of relationship between one set correlates with the type of 
relationship of the other corresponding set.  
 
Hills’ argument shows that cognitive control makes both types of mirroring, 
the mirroring of facts and the mirroring of beliefs, accessible. She writes, “In 
addition, by exercising your understanding, you can mirror the structure of the 
world within the structure of your own thoughts as well as their content” (679). 
I think an added benefit to being able to mirror the structure of the world 
within the structure of one’s own thoughts and their content is that there is a 
higher chance that discrepancies between one’s thoughts and their contents, 
and the world, is more likely to become evident to the self. It is also possible 
that discrepancies between one’s various thoughts, their structure and content 
could also become more apparent since one’s mind is engaged in the activity 
of this sort of matching up; inconsistencies in our thoughts and beliefs are 
more likely to become apparent when we find that they do not “piece well 
together”. Therefore Hills’ account might actually offer us the additional 
advantage of potentially improving our reflective ability and the consistency 
we maintain across various beliefs. This suggests that the sort of mirroring that 
Hills accounts for is valuable in itself, if we assume that being rational, 
consistent and accurate in our beliefs is valuable, because it is more likely to 
“surface” inaccuracies, contradictions and inconsistencies. 
 
Hills’ account also circumvents rebuttals that claim that trivial items of 
understanding do not mirror the world better than deeper items of 
propositional knowledge. This is because there is no comparison between 
fixed categories of deep and superficial in the same way there is in Grimm’s 
account. Hills’s account also avoids confusion about whether items of 
propositional knowledge that have more “explanatory payoff” are indeed 
straightforward items of propositional knowledge because this concern does 
not arise with Hills account. Additionally, Hills’ account maintains the unique 
value of cognitive control. With propositional knowledge alone there is no 
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guarantee that one will be able to draw connections between various 
propositions. Cognitive control on the other hand facilitates drawing exactly 
these sorts of connections.  
 
(b) Achievement 
(1) Defining Achievement 
 
I also believe that the intrinsic value of cognitive control can be linked to 
achievement. Unlike truth however, the intrinsic value of “achievement” may 
not be immediately evident to some. As such, a case will need to be made first 
for why achievement is worth having for its own sake. Before I get to that, it 
would be useful to explain briefly what I mean by achievement, and what 
counts as an achievement, so that I can justify how cognitive control counts as 
one. 
 
As a basic stepping-stone, I think it is reasonable to claim that achievements 
are successes that come about as a result of ability.54 It would also seem then 
that achievements consist of a process that results in a product. So 
achievements have a process-product relationship.55 The way in which the 
process results in the product would be of important significance because 
abilities are represented in the process. So, in considering what is involved in 
achieving, we should consider what is involved in the process as well as the 
product.  
 
If achievement is about ability, then cognitive control, by virtue of the fact that 
it is characterized by a list of six abilities, is a good candidate to count as an 
achievement. But perhaps this is saying too little on the matter, so let us 
elaborate a bit more. Theories of achievement (in fact there are not very many) 
	
54 Pritchard offers the same basic definition throughout NVK.  
55 Bradford also holds this view in Achievement. 
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tend to claim that achievements are contingent on how difficult the related 
tasks are. 
 
Philosophers like Gwen Bradford and Duncan Pritchard, who have written 
about achievement, make distinctions between achievements that are 
“everyday” or “easy” and those that involve some difficulty or effort. 
Pritchard’s distinction in his section of The Nature and Value of Knowledge 
(NVK) is between what he calls the “Weak Achievement Thesis” and the 
“Strong Achievement Thesis”. He writes,  
 
(Weak Achievement Thesis) Achievements are successes that 
are because of ability. (Strong Achievement Thesis) 
Achievements are successes that are because of ability where 
the success in question either involves the overcoming of a 
significant obstacle or the exercise of a significant level of ability 
(70) 
 
Bradford also distinguishes between “mundane achievements” and “capital-A 
achievements”: 
 
We might put it this way: there is a sense of the word 
“achievement” in which every little thing we do, every aim we 
accomplish is an “achievement.” But there is another sense of 
the word “achievement,” which seems to be reserved for 
exceptional accomplishments… These specially significant 
achievements—achievements with a capital A, as it were—seem 
to be so much more valuable than mundane 
accomplishments… (4) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis the achievements that I am interested in have 
to involve something that requires some level of difficulty, or obstacles that 
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one has to overcome to succeed in the task, as such, I want to focus just on 
non-mundane or non-ordinary achievements. I prefer using non-mundane or 
non-ordinary instead of “capital A” achievements because Bradford restricts 
the use of this term to extraordinary achievements, like climbing Everest. On 
the converse, I do not think that achievements have to necessarily be 
extraordinary or tremendously awe-inspiring. A requirement like that does not 
match up with our intuitions either. We would not balk at the idea of saying 
someone has achieved something of significance if they do well in an exam. 
And many of us would very easily refer to someone inventing a cure for a 
disease as having accomplished an achievement too. In fact, we often hear 
people refer to achievements such as the latter as great achievements. So, I 
think that an achievement does not have to be reserved for “capital-A 
achievements” in the Bradford sense (which is exceptional or profoundly 
admirable or particularly noteworthy in some respect). Achievements of the 
not-ordinary kind can admit of a range, so long as the effort required to attain 
them extends beyond “ordinary” effort, where ordinary effort refers to the 
effort that someone, in normal circumstances, expends on tasks that are 
ordinary to them.56  
 
So, what do we mean when we say something needs to be difficult to be an 
achievement? I think effort is an important factor to consider because firstly, 
on an intuitive level, it is what comes to mind when we think about difficulty 
and also when we judge whether or not something is worthy of being called 
	
56 In her book Bradford has a very detailed account of how to calculate effort 
so that one can conclude what amount of effort is sufficient for something to 
count as an achievement. However, as this thesis is not about achievement per 
se, and because assessing cognitive control for effort in my thesis does not 
necessarily require a full account of how to calculate effort, additionally 
because there is simply no room here for such a detailed account, going into 
such detail is neither necessary nor possible for this thesis. 
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an achievement. Secondly, this connection is one that has been generally 
accepted in the existing literature. Bradford writes, “We often identify 
activities as difficult on the basis of features typical of things that require 
effort—for instance, activities with many complicated steps usually require 
effort” (28). And Pritchard writes in NVK  “…one gains understanding by 
undertaking an obstacle‐overcoming effort to piece together the relevant 
pieces of information” (82-83).  
 
I do not think effort needs to be explained; it is something we all experience 
to varying degrees and it is not philosophically contentious, so I will 
reasonably assume that when I refer to effort, we all know what I mean.57 There 
is no doubt that it takes effort to do most things, even in normal circumstances 
– getting out of bed, walking to the loo, brushing our teeth and so on. This 
sort of effort, in normal circumstances, would be “ordinary effort”. But as I 
have said, ordinary effort is not what I am focusing on here. 
 
It is also the case that most of us would have no qualms about referring to a 
person who has lost their arms in some tragic accident pouring themselves a 
glass of water as having achieved something significant, but we probably 
would not say the same of someone fully able-bodied, doing the same thing. 
Presumably this is because we realise how much effort it would take this 
person to do that task without arms, because the lack of arms is a significant 
obstacle to a task that usually relies on the use of one’s arms. We would 
probably also say that the effort it takes for a woman in Afghanistan to give 
	
57 There can be various “types” of effort of course, of which physical and 
mental effort come to mind instantly. Again, I think this claim is fairly self-
evident and does not require justification. In the case of cognitive control, the 
effort would be mostly mental, so perhaps if one wanted to be very specific, 
one could refer to this kind of achievement as a mental or cognitive 
achievement. 
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her personal opinion on something would be more than the effort it takes for 
one in the UK to do the same. This is an indication of how circumstances have 
an impact on what we deem to be not-ordinary effort, even if the task seems 
(somewhat) ordinary.58 This also indicates that there is an element of relativity 
here: that effort is established on a relative basis. Bradford describes this 
succinctly when she writes,  
 
Difficulty is always relativized. Even if the difficulty is relativized 
to the class of human beings, it is still relative. For whatever 
allegedly difficult simpliciter activities, we can imagine a race of 
alien beings for whom these activities are quite easy. So even if 
we say that there are indeed difficult simpliciter activities, they 
will only be difficult relative to our abilities as human beings. So 
there is no real way in which anything is difficult in an absolute 
sense. (27-28) 
 
Bradford’s point is that the difficulty of all activities can be judged on the basis 
of the related circumstances. The very same thing that is easy for one person 
might be difficult for another. I think this is true. Difficulty and effort are 
therefore relative and contingent on one’s circumstances. 
 
So far, then, we have two requirements for something to count as an 
achievement:  
 
1) It must be to some extent difficult. The sub-conditions for this are:  
a) something is more difficult if it requires more effort  
	
58 What is meant by “ordinary” is, to some extent, clear – if I say tasks like 
brushing your teeth, making a cup of tea and so on I think it would be 
reasonable to expect that most people can gauge what other tasks fit into this 
kind of category. 
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b) there are varying degrees of effort which are based on one’s circumstances  
c) there are varying degrees of achievement based on the varying degrees of 
effort that one expends 
  
These statements do not immediately stick out as being contentious, so we 
will assume it is fair to proceed (though I will consider some potential 
problems that may be identified later on).59 
 
2) There must be a process-product relationship  
Bradford writes: 
 
So it seems achievements have this particular structure: there is 
a process and a product, we might say. The process culminates 
in a product… The successfulness of an achievement, in a 
typical case, is the production of the product, such as the 
finished painting, or the completion of the dance performance 
(11) 
 
In terms of the process-product relationship in cognitive control, the product 
or the culmination of the process is having cognitive control itself and the 
process is acquiring the six abilities that together facilitate one being able to 
exercise cognitive control successfully. So, if one successfully acquires all the 
six abilities of cognitive control then one successfully ends up with the 
product, cognitive control. The exercise of cognitive control is then repeated 
over time, and each time it is exercised, there is a product of the exercise of 
that instance of cognitive control – so if one is trying to solve problem x, one 
exercises cognitive control as the process to acquiring the product, which is 
	
59 In so far as it is indeed accurate to use the terms “more” and “less” when it 
comes to effort and to prefix achievement with “great” if it is considered more 
of an achievement. 
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the solution to problem x. Given that cognitive control admits of degrees, we 
might say that there is a “foundational” level of cognitive control that is 
successfully achieved as the product of acquiring the six abilities to some basic 
level. These six abilities can then be honed over time, for example at 
opportunities when the challenge is a bit more considerable, so the exercise of 
cognitive control is always being honed, and at each time of exercising 
cognitive control correctly, one is also achieving the product of increased, or 
better cognitive control.  
 
Next, I think we need to establish how difficult cognitive control is. The answer 
lies in assessing how much effort goes into acquiring the six abilities.  
We have already established that in order to count as having cognitive control 
one must exhibit all six abilities on the list and also that cognitive control can 
come in varying degrees. So a possibility I would like to put forward is that any 
effort taken in the process of acquiring the six abilities, (to achieve any degree 
of cognitive control), would count as sufficiently difficult for cognitive control 
to count as an achievement.  
 
Even if one were to argue that in normal circumstances, following some 
explanation of why p given by someone else, explaining why p in your own 
words, drawing the conclusion that p from the information that q and given 
the information that p, give the right explanation q, all required no more than 
ordinary, mundane effort to acquire (for example they may say that many of us 
do this sort of thing frequently and p could be something as simple as a door 
slamming), one would be hard pressed to defend the view that drawing the 
conclusion p’ from the information q’ (where the two are similar but not 
identical) and given that p’, give the right explanation q’, requires ordinary 
effort to acquire. This is because, as we have already established, these 
abilities are application-based, problem-solving abilities that require us to 
independently piece together the right kinds of information in a new or tricky 
situation. These usually require good observation, practice, reflection, mental 
	 145	
sharpness and alertness, the ability to compare and contrast, sort and 
categorise and so on. These further sub-abilities also have to come together 
coherently and cohesively to match the situation at hand. Situations can of 
course vary in how complicated or difficult they are, but having cognitive 
control means acquiring all six of these abilities. So, for argument’s sake, if 
even one of these abilities is difficult to acquire, that is, requires more than 
ordinary effort, then cognitive control would have to count as an achievement.  
 
In fact, it is not far-fetched to argue that some of the “p-abilities” (as opposed 
to p’ ones) can also be difficult. For example, explaining why p in your own 
words can be a difficult skill to acquire. This requires other abilities, such as 
having a wide enough range of vocabulary and being able to paraphrase 
accurately, being sensitive to subtleties, nuances, tone and implications where 
relevant, when choosing the right words. It may also require grasping cause 
and effect relationships – as would most of the six abilities of cognitive control.  
 
In the two paragraphs above I discussed how acquiring the six abilities could 
be a difficult process that requires more than ordinary effort. As we said 
earlier, it is possible to possess these six abilities to varying degrees, so in 
some instances, one might be faced with more of a challenge when it comes 
to exercising cognitive control. In these cases, when one overcomes the 
challenge and better applies cognitive control to the situation or information, 
it might be said that one has attained a greater achievement. For example, 
there might be times when all the abilities might be especially difficult to 
exercise. Some instances where this might be the case could be: if p is a 
particularly difficult concept or situation; if p’ is a particularly tricky concept or 
situation; if the agent suffers from a learning disability or a language 
impediment; or more than one of these or other relevant complications. In 
these cases there are obstacles in the way of the successful exercise of 
cognitive control, so that exercise becomes more difficult. If the agent 
overcomes these then it would most likely be the case that they have taken 
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more effort than someone who has exercised cognitive control but without 
these obstacles. In which case, exercising cognitive control would have been a 
greater achievement than in cases where there were no obstacles or fewer 
obstacles (and it would also be the case that one would have more cognitive 
control if one has exercised the abilities on the list to a greater extent). 
 
(2) Is achievement intrinsically valuable? Is cognitive control intrinsically 
valuable by virtue of being an achievement? 
 
We have established that cognitive control can be considered an 
achievement. Now we move on to whether cognitive control has intrinsic value 
by virtue of being an achievement. This requires us to first justify why 
achievement is intrinsically valuable. 
 
One suggestion in the existing literature is that achievement is valuable if the 
product of the achievement is valuable. According to Bradford this is called 
the Simple Product View (84). It suggests that the entire value of an 
achievement is based on the intrinsic value of its product. According to this 
view, difficulty or any other factor would have no place in deciding the value, 
although these would decide if something was an achievement in the first 
place. This view then clearly takes as a basis the separation between the 
process and product in achievement. Applied to cognitive control, this would 
mean that having cognitive control is what gives value to the achievement. 
And as we have seen, cognitive control is potentially intrinsically valuable for 
its truth properties, so having cognitive control is an intrinsically valuable 
product at least for that one reason. This simple product view could then 
potentially work for us as a justification just on the basis that it has the intrinsic 
value of being true. As legitimate as this may be, I feel this is taking the easier 
way out; it is not getting to the heart of the intrinsic value of cognitive control 
in the most robust possible way because there is also something to be said for 
the value of acquiring the six abilities – that is the hard work and effort that 
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goes into the process of achieving the product. However, once we take the 
effort into account, we cannot subscribe to the simple product view, because 
this view discounts difficulty. Take the example of Mt Everest – most of us 
would agree that taking a helicopter up to the top would simply be less of an 
achievement than a solo ascent. This is because most of us would attach value 
to the exercise of climbing the mountain. So, at least intuitively, most of us 
would agree that the value must have also been coming from the process. 
Bradford writes that it is the difficulty; the effort, the obstacles, the 
perseverance: that is, it is the nature of the process that gives that value to 
achievement (91-92), and I think there is truth to this. As we saw, the more 
difficult, or more effort something requires, the higher the potential for greater 
and greater achievement. But why is this difficulty, this expense of effort, 
intrinsically valuable? Especially as we tend to think of difficulty as something 
to be avoided. I consider two reasons in the next section. 
 
Two possibilities to explain why there is intrinsic value to the difficulty of 
gaining cognitive control: (1) exercising the will and (2) intellectual 
perseverance 
 
As I discussed earlier, there is difficulty in acquiring cognitive control. I think 
there are at least two possibilities to explain why the difficulty in gaining 
cognitive control is intrinsically valuable. Tackling the difficulties encountered 
when acquiring and exercising cognitive control might be valuable because, in 
working your way through those difficulties you encounter, there is (1) an 
exercise of the will (this is something I draw from Bradford); and (2) the 
exercise of intellectual perseverance, which is valuable because it is a virtue 
and virtues are intrinsically valuable. Exercising both of these capacities is 
intrinsically valuable and as such doing difficult things, including attaining the 
achievement of having cognitive control, is intrinsically valuable.  
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Exercising the will is presented as intrinsically valuable according to the 
perfectionist view that Bradford advocates. It is not ordinarily contentious that 
most persons have a will and exert it.60 In fact most persons exert their will in 
most activities. Additionally, it seems worth having and developing, so the 
exercise of will seems a reasonable addition to the list of capacities that 
perfectionists should accept. Bradford writes,  
 
So it is my contention that the will should be included in an 
account of the relevant capacities for perfectionism. It clearly 
passes the epistemic guide of being a characteristic human 
capacity, and it is intuitively good to develop (119) 
 
Given that the will is exercised in most activities, it would be evident that it is 
exercised in difficult activities such as cognitive control. Bradford also 
references Nietzsche’s will to power as another justification for why the 
exercise of will is intrinsically valuable, however limitations of this thesis do not 
allow me to fully explore this second justification of hers; in a nutshell, she 
argues that will to power, which is essentially the exercise of will, or the drive 
to overcome resistance, is the fundamentally characteristic human feature and 
“what’s distinctive about this is that the will to power, then, to put it in my 
terminology, is the drive to be engaged in difficult activity” (120). Because the 
exercise of will is a, if not the, fundamental human feature, it goes without 
saying that on a perfectionist account, the excellent exercise of the will is 
	
60 Bradford uses the term human beings, but I prefer to use persons, because 
along with Frankfurt, who says in “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person”, I think it is possible to have “wanton” human beings that are led by 
their first-order desires more than their will (11). I discuss this in a later chapter 




intrinsically good. It is worth pursuing for the fact that it is what makes us 
persons. I offer a somewhat expanded account of the will in the section on 
wholeheartedness, making a stronger link there between cognitive control and 
the exercise of the will, but I think the claim that exercise of will is what makes 
us “persons” and is therefore valuable to exercise our wills is not a very 
contentious one.61 
 
In summary, difficulty is intrinsically valuable because it is the excellent 
exercise of will and the excellent exercise of the will is intrinsically valuable 
because it is a, if not the, fundamental human feature. Acquiring cognitive 
control via acquiring the six sub-abilities, as well as then exercising cognitive 
control when one has it is difficult, and requires the exercise of the will, so it 
must be intrinsically valuable. Exercising cognitive control, in contrast to 
simply possessing it, is valuable instrumentally because as I said earlier, it 
means one can learn, apply what one has learned, and solve problems 
independently. Exercising it is intrinsically valuable because, as I discussed 
earlier, the level of achievement associated with cognitive control increases as 
the exercise of it successfully yields the relevant products in more and more 
challenging situations – so the exertion of the will in successfully exercising 
cognitive control makes the exercising of cognitive control valuable (for the 
reasons above), and the more challenging the task is then the more the 
difficulty is involved – so the more the will needs to exercised, the greater the 
value.62  
 
The second consideration is intellectual perseverance. I am going to take it as 
a given that intellectual perseverance is a virtue and ask that you come along 
	
61 I explain this more in the chapter on wholeheartedness. 
62 Concerns about the value of things which are difficult but “evil” or 
“immoral” are addressed later in this chapter. 
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with me in doing so.63 Intellectual perseverance refers to perseverance but 
with specific respect to an intellectual activity, such as cognitive control. I’ll 
give a brief account of this sort of perseverance (as brevity is all there is space 
for here) and admit that it is not exhaustive in terms of descriptions that might 
be offered to defend such a position. 
 
Intellectual perseverance, if it is to be considered a virtue, should be 
considered in light of what we might suggest as the mean between its 
deficiency and its excess. Its deficiency would be the propensity to give up too 
early in the game. The excess would be the propensity to keep going even 
when it starts to become clear that progress is unlikely; giving up too late or 
not at all, and usually at the detriment of other aspects of the agent’s life. 
“Too early” and “too late” are rather subjective qualifiers, so how does one 
tell when is too early and when is too late? I think most of us can reasonably 
assess this, and we often use our observations and experiences of the world to 
decide based on context. In doing so, I think most of us, whether consciously 
or not, tend to base our assessment on time, likelihood of success and effort.  
 
For example, Nina has always wanted to learn to play chess; she has been 
saving up for seven years to take a course. She signs up for an 18-hour course 
using all the money she has saved and then within the first ten minutes of the 
first lesson, she decides that it is just not worth the effort to continue learning 
chess. I think most people would assess this to be giving up too early. This is 
because we expect that if someone was especially keen on acquiring a skill 
and had put effort into creating a situation for themselves to acquire that skill, 
	
63 Bradford does something similar. She suggests an “innovation” – something 
she asks us to go along with, without offering arguments to support it: “This, 
then, is the innovation I propose for perfectionism: to acknowledge the will as 
a characteristic human capacity” (120). 
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such as saving money over many years, they would be willing to put more time 
and effort into acquiring the skill, rather than giving up at the slightest 
indication of difficulty. Ten minutes is also a highly unlikely amount of time, 
given that it is an 18-hour course, within which one can reasonably assess 
whether learning to play chess is worth the effort. Likewise, persisting even 
after a decade of trying to convince a colleague who is a die-hard Kantian that 
utilitarianism is the best moral philosophy by sending her eloquently worded 
essays once every other day would, I think, be fairly construed as giving up too 
late (I should stress that this is a hypothetical scenario!) Firstly, we know this 
person to be adamant about, and extremely loyal to their views, so it is very 
unlikely they will change said views. Secondly, a decade is a long time to 
spend on a project that is unlikely to progress. And thirdly, even a rough 
assessment of the expense of effort into this pointless cause seems to indicate 
that one should have given up some time ago. 
 
Intellectual perseverance then is the median between its deficiency and 
excess. It should therefore involve spending an appropriate amount of time on 
one’s projects, assessing the likelihood of progress and success by considering 
the context and situation wisely and expending the adequate amount of effort 
by deciding when obstacles are worth overcoming and when they are not, and 
what effort is worth expending in the given context. Deciding how much time 
is appropriate would again depend on experience and observation but also on 
reflection. One might say that it would depend, as Aristotle suggested, on the 
excellent exercise of practical wisdom. 
 
I want to make an additional point about effort here because the ability to 
persist in spite of obstacles is a crucial component of intellectual perseverance 
and in particular, of cognitive control. The obstacles to intellectual 
perseverance could be any number; some examples include: the attempt to 
acquire or hone cognitive control when it comes to a particularly difficult, or 
complicated concept, as in the case of chess; hindrances and delays to one’s 
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intellectual projects, for example, illness or competing responsibilities; one’s 
abilities with respect to the challenges of the task; the temptation of 
procrastination; and so on. Intellectual perseverance is also relative to some 
extent. Certain obstacles may be harder for some people than others, 
depending, for example, on their abilities, context and time and effort they 
can afford.  
 
It is not difficult to see how intellectual perseverance relates to the exercise of 
cognitive control. Intellectual perseverance would be necessary to acquire the 
six abilities necessary in order to have cognitive control. As mentioned, an 
explanation might be especially difficult to follow and one may need to go 
over it multiple times. One might find it difficult to communicate what one has 
grasped, and may need multiple attempts to successfully do this, and it would 
surely be the case that in trying to answer new questions or solve problems in 
new situations that intellectual perseverance would be required to work out 
the appropriate answer or solution. 
 
In light of this, I want to suggest that achievement with reference to cognitive 
control is intrinsically valuable because achievement is an exercise of will, 
which is necessary, in differing degrees, when it comes to acquiring and 
honing cognitive control and acquiring and honing cognitive control requires 
intellectual perseverance – and both of these features, as I have discussed, are 
intrinsically valuable. 
 
4.5 Potential problems for the value of understanding 
 
There are of course rebuttals to address. I will consider two of the most 
persistent ones that come up in the literature for this topic. The first rebuttal is: 
to whom does the achievement belong in cases where someone comes to 
have cognitive control as a result of the “work” put in by someone else, i.e. - 
the person who gives them the explanation. This comes up as a 
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counterargument to Pritchard’s account of the value of understanding in 
“Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value”. Pritchard also maintains 
the view that achievements are finally valuable for their own sake, and 
understanding is a type of achievement, so understanding will be finally 
valuable for its own sake too. His argument rests on the claim that knowledge 
can be passed on to one through trustworthy testimony but understanding 
requires one to engage in one’s own cognitive work. It is an agent’s own 
abilities rather than anyone else’s that result in their understanding. In 
response to Pritchard, Grimm offers the following example as a way showing 
that there are some cases of understanding that are not a cognitive 
achievement:  
 
Suppose that I arrive home to find my house in cinders, and I 
ask the fire chief on the scene why it burned down. He then tells 
me (on the basis of his careful investigation) that the fire was 
due to faulty wiring, so that I come to share his understanding 
of why the house burned down (111) 
 
Grimm argues that in this example the bulk of the credit should be the chief’s 
because the only reason Grimm comes to grasp the cause of the fire is due to 
the chief’s fruitful investigation of the scene and not as a result of his own 
abilities. 
 
The interpretation of understanding as cognitive control however could solve 
this problem and account for this example as one where Grimm can be said to 
have achieved something. If Grimm was able to follow some explanation of 
why the fire occurred, explain this in his own words, draw relevant conclusions 
from this information and be able to apply what he learned to a similar 
situation, then according to the cognitive control account, he would be 
exercising understanding. He may not be exercising it to as remarkable a 
degree as the chief, given that the chief was the one who painstakingly 
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combed the scene and came up with the conclusion, but he has still achieved 
something. Let us also not forget that in order to count as having cognitive 
control, one must possess all six abilities. So if Grimm can then apply what he 
has understood about this fire to some similar situation, and do that well, then 
we could even give him “extra” credit for undertaking a more difficult task 
successfully, and therefore having attained a greater achievement. Since the 
cognitive control account also makes room for the possibility that cognitive 
control, (and thereby understanding) comes in varying degrees, as we saw in 
the previous section, this example by Grimm may not pose as much of a 
problem because it is entirely possible to say that achievement and the value 
also varies in degrees.  
 
To be fair, Grimm later admits, “a successful grasp is itself a kind of cognitive 
achievement” (112). He references the chief’s understanding and his own as 
belonging to two different “areas” (112), but offers no explanation as to what 
he means by “areas” or how exactly they fall into two different “areas”. I think 
the cognitive control account offers a stronger rationale on the basis that it 
allows for a more accurate way of identifying the chief’s and Grimm’s 
understanding as being of two differing degrees of understanding as opposed 
to two differing “areas”. This also allows both the chief’s and Grimm’s degrees 
of understanding to more fairly correspond not simply to achievement, but to 
more specific and varying degrees of achievement.  
 
Grimm shares a further concern: that where there is in-depth teaching or 
guidance involved, it is possible to think that “the main reason why anything 
was grasped at all” has more to do with the teacher than the learner (112). It is 
unclear what extent of grasping Grimm is referring to here. If something was 
grasped, then surely by Grimm’s own admission, the grasping deserves some 
credit. Especially as there is no indication by Grimm that any particular level of 
grasping would need to be reached before any credit was due. What seems to 
be of more importance in establishing a greater sense of achievement and 
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therefore value is not so much a question of the extent of guidance offered by 
the teacher but the subsequent extent of cognitive control the learner is able 
to acquire or exercise on the basis of what they have learned. 
 
The second rebuttal takes this form: what if someone uses his or her cognitive 
control to plot and carry out the murder of a dozen innocent people? If this 
murder was a difficult one to carry out and required a lot of effort, which it 
probably would have, given that a dozen people were involved, and it was 
committed successfully, would it count as an achievement? We would normally 
think of achievements as being positive or having positive value, so most of us 
would not consider a successful mass murder an achievement, even if a 
terrorist might consider it one. However, we also said earlier that for 
something to count as an achievement we essentially require there to have 
been more than ordinary effort - and since someone could insistently argue 
that that would be the case in the mass murder, we could also do with a 
response that does not ask us to rely solely on our intuitions or commonly 
shared opinion. 
 
I think the solution to this lies in considering achievements as constituent of 
both the process and the product.64 This requires us to consider the process 
involved in the potential achievement and the product of the potential 
achievement. Why is this important? Because as we said before, we can think 
of cases where for example, a person has no intention of achieving something, 
puts in none of the required work, but accidentally achieves something. In this 
case you have the positive value of the product but not of the achievement. 
Or imagine a person who puts hours of effort and hard work into setting up a 
soup kitchen for the homeless, and then without realising and by a cruel twist 
of fate, serves them soup that ends up giving the homeless people who come 
in for their lunch upset stomachs – here you have the positive value of the 
	
64 Bradford offers a very thorough account of this in Achievement. 
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process but negative value in terms of the product. This explains why to most 
of us, it would feel strange calling these achievements on the whole.  
 
A person who plots a mass murder, one that is extremely difficult to carry out, 
and requires a great deal of effort, needing the murderer to overcome a 
number challenging obstacles along the way, has undoubtedly passed (with 
flying colours!) the test for difficulty and effort in what is involved in the 
process of achieving something. However the product is of tragically negative 
value. It is probably also the case that we can argue that elements of the 
process are of negative value too: for example, a misguided view of the world 
or an irrational belief that the murder will solve some problem and so on. In 
fact, if we think about evil “achievements” with reference to cognitive control 
in particular, I think we might see another reason why many of these cases may 
not be counted as achievements.  
 
Most likely, evil deeds are committed because there has been no exercise, or 
a flawed exercise, of cognitive control. Cognitive control, if exercised with 
competence and exercised well, will most likely reveal, particularly in the 
processes aimed at drawing accurate and likely conclusions and providing 
accurate explanations, that evil deeds are very often the result of drawing 
inaccurate conclusions or providing inaccurate explanations. If accurate and 
deep understanding is achieved, then an agent will realise that most evil acts 
ultimately fail to achieve what the agent sets out to achieve – if not in the short 
term then in the long run or as part of the wider picture. This suggests, for 
example, that a mass murderer is potentially putting in a lot of effort to 
execute a task that will likely not achieve the ultimate aims he thinks they 
might achieve –because his exercise of cognitive control has been poor or 
non-existent, he may have failed to see the ultimate ineffectiveness of his 
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efforts.65 So cognitive control, if exercised well, is more likely to result in 
outcomes that have neutral or positive value than ones that have negative 
value.  
  
4.6 A quick word about the knowledge-comparison 
 
The question as to whether knowledge can achieve these same outcomes has 
already been mostly answered in the last section by the distinction between 
knowing and what it means to exercise “cognitive control”. The value of 
knowledge is not something I’m actively seeking to problematise. Knowledge 
and understanding can both, depending on the situation and requirements, 
be equally valuable. If we accept that understanding is a different state from 
knowing, then it would make sense that both will serve at least some different 
purposes and lead to some different outcomes. Knowledge may be quicker 
and easier to attain and as such serve us better when we need quick answers 
or solutions. If for example I was going to participate in a quiz show and need 
to, over a short period of time, learn as much information as possible, then it 
would be a better idea to “pore over” an encyclopedia or ask experts to give 
me the facts than trying to work them out for myself. In this case, knowledge 
better serves my purposes and for that reason is, at least in these 
circumstances, potentially more valuable. 
 
In light of this, a balanced approach – that is, one that holds that both 
understanding and knowledge can be valuable depending on the 
circumstances – is more defensible. We have come to see that understanding, 
or cognitive control presents one with the ability to usefully and successfully 
	
65 I will have to concede that it is possible to imagine rare situations where a 
mass murderer has absolutely no reasons for committing murder, they are just 
exceedingly destructive, and as such the question of long-term ineffectiveness 
in achieving some wider goal or outcome is not relevant in those cases.  
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apply information, especially in new and unfamiliar contexts, and to genuinely 
and more fully appreciate the value of our objects of understanding and their 
unique and important roles. Consequently, cognitive control can also reward 
us with a meaningful sense of achievement which can be both valuable in itself 
and also act as a vital tool for motivating learners to continue learning and 
honing their cognitive control.  
 
I have shown thus far that in order to help someone come to love learning, we 
must first choose the right sort of learning. This ultimately boils down to 
helping students acquire and exercise cognitive control. Cognitive control 
contributes to facilitating love for learning by providing the right sort of basis 
for facilitating greater pleasure in learning because ultimately, having and 
exercising cognitive control is pleasurable. Genuine lovers of learning will 
most often engage in cognitive control (as opposed to just superficial 
learning), find this sort of learning pleasurable, which will in turn be rewarded 
with higher degrees of cognitive control and ultimately, more pleasure. In the 
next chapter I argue that along with developing cognitive control, we must 








In 2003, the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) in England published 
a strategy for educating children and learners that foregrounded enjoyment as 
a crucial component of educational policy for schools. In its executive 
summary, the government states: “Our goal is for every primary school to 
combine excellence in teaching with enjoyment in learning”. In its foreword, 
the same strategy document states, “Children learn better when they are 
excited and engaged . . . When there is joy in what they are doing, they learn 
to love learning”. Over the course of the following years, the significance of 
enjoyment in educational strategy has remained robust with the renamed 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) stating in 2008, in 
Twenty-first century schools” a world class education for every child that a key 
objective for achieving their vision was to ensure children “enjoy their 
learning” (3.4). If we needed any more evidence than common sense that 
pleasure is a crucial component in encouraging and facilitating love for 
learning, this quote provides it from the standpoint of educational policy 
experts.66 
 
The philosophical literature, as well as educational theories, on pleasure 
constitute a vast range and cannot be exhaustively surveyed here. It also 
seems inefficient to entirely “re-invent the wheel” when so much research has 
been done into establishing what learners find pleasurable in learning – both 
in philosophy and in educational theory. As such, I suggest a theory of 
	
66 For the purposes of this thesis, I take enjoyment to mean the same thing as 
pleasure and choose to use the term “pleasure” as it is more widely used in 
philosophy.  
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pleasure that is inspired largely by the work of Aristotle, focusing on the value 
he places on contemplation and understanding as well as his arguments 
centred on unimpeded activity. I also take into account a contemporary 
psychology theory called “flow theory”, which gained acclaim through the 
work of social psychologist Mikhail Csikszentmihalyi. This theory has been 
inspired by Aristotle’s work on unimpeded activity and the role of unimpeded 
activity in achieving eudaimonia.  
 
Let me offer a summary of how I intend to link these two theories. In a 
nutshell, Aristotle held that the highest of pleasures is to be found in the 
highest of intellectual or cognitive activity, namely contemplation, which I liken 
to cognitive control. Finding great pleasure in any activity requires that the 
activity be unimpeded – this means that there are no factors that hinder or 
compete with the activity that one is engaged in, thus allowing one to be 
immersed in the activity. This feature of Aristotelian pleasure is what has 
influenced contemporary flow theory, so this is where I draw from the literature 
on flow theory (which has been more directly linked to contemporary 
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educational practices and pedagogies than Aristotle’s work).67 Let us now turn 
to the conditions I believe might contribute to greater pleasure in learning.68 
	
67 Additionally, Aristotle argues that pleasure should not be the aim of 
activities, but instead something that is achieved “by the way” and that acts as 
the “cherry on top” if one really puts care and effort into the activity and does 
it well – Aristotle includes this predominantly to differentiate his theory from 
hedonistic ones and to avoid the misconception that enjoying pleasure is 
necessarily morally dubious. I think this attitude (that pleasure should not be 
the ultimate focus of our activities) could be additionally helpful as concerning 
ourselves too much on whether or not, or how much pleasure we are enjoying 
while carrying out the activity could potentially distract us from the pleasure 
we might get by being “in the moment”. 
 
68 To clarify, when I say that learning must be pleasurable I do not mean that 
the learner must always find all experiences of learning pleasurable. There will 
certainly be times when it feels like an uphill task, when they have to 
encounter failure or situations that expose their vulnerabilities; learners, even 
when they love to learn, can get bored or distracted or encounter teachers or 
classmates who put them off learning something. However, if the learner is 
able to say that learning is, all things considered, pleasurable for them, then 
they are more likely candidates for being lovers of learning. Perhaps offering a 
contrast between what I think someone who loves learning and someone 
hates learning may look like could be helpful. I think that in order for someone 
to actually hate learning, it is the case that they have not quite figured out how 
to learn “properly” or to learn “well” – they see learning as automatized, rote-
based, they see learning having little or no relevant links to their lives and do 
not see it as something that gives them independence and empowers them. 
Essentially, those who do not know how learning works, tend also to be those 
who do not love it. Someone who has worked out how to learn “properly” – 
that is, acquiring cognitive control – will, conversely, gain pleasure from 
	 162	
I believe that the presence of certain conditions in learning help to facilitate 
the experience of pleasure in learning. These conditions increase the 
opportunities for, and the amounts of pleasure the learner can potentially 
experience. The conditions for maximising pleasure in learning are that:  
 
1) There are opportunities to develop and/or exercise cognitive control (to an 
appropriate level depending on the learner’s abilities).  
 
2) There is “flow”. I believe that finding and creating opportunities for flow in 
learning are likely to bring about pleasure for the learner; the more flow one 
experiences, the more pleasure one feels and the more pleasure one feels, the 
more flow one experiences.  
 
3) Learners feel safe and supported in being appropriately vulnerable. I 
explore this in greater detail in the chapter on vulnerability.69  
	
learning and in most cases, come to love learning too. Empirical evidence 
seems to suggest that what is “loved” in learning is essentially those skills that 
equip the learner with cognitive control and what is hated is rote, automatized 
learning. This is also a good juncture at which to acknowledge that some 
learners may receive more pleasure from rote learning than they might from 
acquiring and/or exercising cognitive control. Quotes from empirical evidence 
that I presented in the earlier part of this section hold that those who enjoy 
this method of learning are in the minority compared to those who find deep 
approaches to learning more interesting and enjoyable. This justifies us 
thinking about how we might want learning, as we commonly see it especially 
in school settings, a little differently – we do this by encouraging cognitive 
control. I think this will then lead to a virtuous circle. 
 
69 Other conditions such as encouraging a sense of wonder and curiosity, 
adequate and appropriate praise and reward, could also potentially be useful 
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I begin by drawing the links between cognitive control, contemplation and 
pleasure. To do this, I will make reference to Aristotle’s views on intellectual, 
or cognitive activity (which includes as the highest aim, contemplation) and 
pleasure. As mentioned earlier, lovers of learning find pleasure in some or all 
of the various “stages” of learning. They may find pleasure in discovering new 
things to learn and in the process of learning itself, that is, the process of 
coming to understand things. They often also find pleasure in having 
successfully understood something, that is, in the successful “completion” of 
that particular process of learning. James Warren writes that Aristotle implies 
that:  
 
…the process of first having a capacity to know, then acquiring some 
knowledge, and then actively contemplating that knowledge is a teleological 
process; each step is part of a process of perfecting the nature of the human 
knower (56). 
 
We see that for Aristotle learning is a journey where the final destination is 
where one becomes the perfect “human knower”. We will see as we explore 
more of Aristotle’s ideas in this chapter that this “perfection” is achieved when 
one achieves the ability to “contemplate”, by which Aristotle means the ability 
to actually use and “direct” the knowledge we have acquired to come into a 
full awareness of oneself, as opposed to simply procuring information. 
	
conditions for maximising pleasure in learning (in fact Aristotle discusses 
wonder and curiosity in his work), but I am unable to explore these and other 
possible conditions due to the space limitations of this thesis. The importance 
of offering appropriate praise and rewards in learning, and how they 
contribute to the learner’s enjoyment, have already been researched 
extensively and their value is now largely considered unarguable, so I do not 
consider this in my thesis.  
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Pleasure can also be experienced in the applying of what one has learned to 
other contexts and in the awareness that one has cognitive control sufficient to 
apply what one has learned. While I believe that pleasure need not always be 
experienced in every instance of learning and throughout all the stages and it 
need not be experienced at a constant and/or consistent degree (one could 
experience more, less or no pleasure at various stages), it is more likely than 
not that lovers of learning are likely to experience greater pleasure, more 
frequently during their learning experiences and across the various stages or 
“steps“ of learning than non-lovers of learning. In this chapter, I draw parallels 
between aspects of Aristotle’s function argument, namely the various stages of 
intellectual activity, especially contemplation and cognitive control. My aim is 
to show that cognitive control is similar to contemplation. If, as Aristotle 
argues, contemplation is pleasurable, and cognitive control is similar to 
contemplation then cognitive control would be pleasurable too. 
 
5.1 The link between contemplation, cognitive control and pleasure 
 
Aristotelians differ on the exact nature of contemplation, but broadly agree 
that it refers to the uniquely human function of reasoning. In Book 10 of The 
Nicomachean Ethics (EN) he argues that contemplation is the function of man 
as well as the most divine quality of man. He writes: 
 
If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life 
according to it is divine in comparison with human life . . . 
reason more than anything else is man (1177b25-1178a8). 
 
The relationship between contemplation and cognitive control therefore 
becomes immediately apparent – if contemplation has to do with reasoning 
and cognitive control essentially consists of six abilities that we can quite easily 
see are abilities of reasoning, then cognitive control and contemplation have a 
lot in common.  
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To begin with, Aristotle holds that there are different stages of 
learning/knowing. And it is the final stage of “knowing” that equips one with 
the ability to use the knowledge one has acquired, as opposed to simply 
having that knowledge. Being this sort of knower is what is crucial to 
contemplation, which, as we have seen, is the highest stage of intellectual 
activity and one that humans should aspire to. My position is that cognitive 
control is a good parallel to this stage because it has a similar purpose, to 
equip the learner with the ability to reason – to independently “control”, 
use/apply knowledge in such ways that they have gained, as Aristotle might 
suggest, ultimate understanding. For Aristotle, reaching this stage involves 
various other stages of coming to know things – some stages are founded on 
sensory experience and others on intellectual activity. I think this makes sense 
in terms of our own experiences of learning as well – we begin learning 
simpler concepts and then progress to ones that are more complex and 
require us to think more critically and deeply. We also saw something similar 
with Rousseau, where he discusses the various developmental stages of a 
learner, beginning with those linking learning directly to the experience of our 
senses and then progressing to involve reasoning. 
 
In De Anima 2.5 Aristotle makes distinctions between different kinds of 
“knowers”. He writes: 
 
1) “For there are knowers in that we should speak of a man as a knower 
because man is one of those who can be knowers and have knowledge;” 
(417a22-24) 
 
What Aristotle means here is that all and any human being can be called a 
“knower,” or the kind of being that knows and can acquire knowledge. 
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2) “then there are knowers in that we speak straightaway of the man who has 
knowledge of grammar as a knower.” (417a24-25) 
 
Here, Aristotle is referring to a “knower” in terms of someone who has 
acquired knowledge of a certain type, for example grammar. This “knower” 
according to Warren: 
 
…has the capacity in the sense that, provided that nothing external prevents 
him, he can exercise his capacity to contemplate some knowledge that he 
possesses (55). 
 
So the second “knower” is able to reason about some of the knowledge he 
possesses (since contemplation refers to the ability to reason). 
  
3) “There is thirdly the one who is already contemplating, the knower who is in 
actuality, and in the controlling sense knowing this particular A.” (417a28-29) 
 
This third sense of “knower” refers to someone who is able to contemplate 
some particular piece of knowledge in the fullest, most “complete” knowing, 
that is, in the sense of being able to “control” this knowledge. As Warren 
writes: 
 
The person in (3) is a knower because he is in fulfilment and 
knows in the proper sense this particular thing…He stands as 
the end-point or goal of intellectual achievement to which the 
other two should be compared and related. (55) 
 
The term “knows” as is used in the case of the second and third “knower” 
does not describe one who knows in the sense of having information or facts, 
or items of knowledge. It refers to, as Warren explains, 
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…a specific form of understanding that is the best kind of 
knowledge for humans, is involved in the kind of activity that 
ought to be recognised as the goal of a human life and is, in 
that sense, something that all humans desire just as all humans 
desire to live well. In other words, there is a special kind of 
knowing that is to be identified as the fulfilment of our human 
nature: this is the best thing we can do and is the activity of the 
very best part of us. (52) 
 
Of significance in this quote is the phrase “specific form of understanding”, 
which is differentiated from knowledge that presumably does not involve this 
sort of understanding. This “specific form” that the third type of “knower” 
possesses is understanding in the most complete sense, which makes them 
closest to the ideal in terms of fulfilling intellectual activity and the unique 
activities of human nature – as Warren says he “stands at the end point or goal 
of intellectual achievement”, meaning he has complete mastery. The second 
type of “knower” is “on the way” to this ideal and possesses “understanding” 
but not the perfect, complete understanding that the third “knower” holds. 
 
I think these two types of knower are similar to the learners who possess 
cognitive control. The second “knower” is different from the first “knower” 
because they have the ability to reason, or contemplate some knowledge 
while the first “knower” only has the yet-to-be realised potential to do so. The 
third “knower” is different from the second “knower” because the knower 
goes from having some understanding and ability to reason to having 
understanding of that specific item of knowledge in the fullest sense. In other 
words, the steps are: one goes from someone who has the potential to reason 
to someone who acquires and then actively uses that knowledge by reasoning 
(that is, exercises cognitive control) to a basic degree, to someone who finally 
possesses full cognitive control. Warren adds that actively using a piece of 
knowledge in contemplation is “indeed the fulfilment of the knower as such – 
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it brings the knower to his fulfilled state…” (56). This makes it clear that 
cognitive control has a crucial part to play in Aristotle’s theory, and since 
cognitive control admits of degrees, we can see how it matches up with the 
“knower” two and “knower” three, who also contemplate to varying degrees. 
The possession of the highest levels of cognitive control and the exercise of 
this cognitive control to the highest abilities would then be tantamount to 
having the complete and perfect reasoning abilities that Aristotle calls 
contemplation.70 
 
Now let us move on to discussing how contemplation is linked to pleasure in 
Aristotle. I hope to show that if contemplation is pleasurable then cognitive 
control is also pleasurable and that learning that involves mostly cognitive 
control is therefore pleasurable. The pleasure may vary depending on the 
extent of cognitive control one has and is able to exercise, but it is 
nonetheless pleasurable. If we agree that cognitive control is pleasurable, this 
encourages us to ensure that learning compromises of as much cognitive 
control as possible and if learning is pleasurable then that contributes to us 
becoming lovers of learning. 
 
Aristotle held that all humans have a natural desire for knowledge and this 
desire is signified by pleasure. He writes in Metaphysics I, “All humans desire 
to know. An indication of this is the joy they take in perceiving” (980a21-2). 
This quote seems to suggest that all humans desire, and would choose to 
engage in “knowing” for its own sake. Although Aristotle refers specifically to 
	
70 Unlike Aristotle my own position does not centre on the notion of an 
ultimate human “function” as such – I do not adopt this view in my thesis. 
However, due to how pervasively it appears in his work, I cannot always avoid 
referencing it in the Aristotelian quotes I select. So, when it does appear, I 
attempt to extract only the relevant ideas and explain how they apply to my 
position. 
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perception in this quote, it is clear, as the opening passages of Metaphysics 
continue that perception is the foundation of a range of cognitive activities, 
which include memory, experience, skill and understanding, and which, we will 
come to see, fall into a sort of hierarchy of abilities.  
 
Aristotle believed that eudaimonia and as such pleasure can only be achieved 
when human beings act in accordance with their natural functions. Paramount 
of these functions, as we have seen, is the intellectual one of reasoning. CCW 
Taylor writes on Aristotle’s motivations for considering pleasure:  
 
…his primary concern is to give pleasure its proper place in his 
account of the best form of human life, and it is because that 
concern requires a proper understanding of what pleasure is 
that the account of its nature engages his attention. (240) 
 
Pleasure is particularly important to Aristotle’s wider moral aims because he 
holds that individuals will be naturally drawn to those actions that give us 
pleasure and avoid those that bring us pain. As such, he essentially hopes that 
individuals can be socialized into finding pleasure and pain in appropriate 
actions (EN 1152b1-8). Aristotle also holds the view that pleasure and pain 
signify the extent to which a living being is successfully, or unsuccessfully, 
engaging in its proper natural activity. Pleasure is to be found in each living 
being pursuing its own proper natural activity. In EN he writes “a horse’s 
pleasure is different from that of a dog or a human; so Heraclitus was right to 
say that donkeys prefer rubbish to gold” (1176a5-8) . Humans natural activity, 
according to Aristotle is the engagement in cognitive and rational activities, so 
it follows that pleasure accompanies cognitive and rational activities. Once 
one reaches the final goal in one’s ability to fulfil the ultimate human function, 
contemplation, then eudaimonia is achieved.  
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In EN, Aristotle makes the connection between pleasure and activity. 
Reasoning is an activity, as is cognitive control. He does so by first considering 
seeing and perception and highlights the importance of noting how “seeing” 
is a “complete” or “perfect” activity. Seeing and perception are lower on the 
hierarchy of cognitive abilities, but the principles of “completeness” and 
“perfection” are applied to all stages of cognitive ability, from those lower in 
the hierarchy to those at the top. The “completeness” and “perfectness” of an 
activity are something we need to note with importance because they play a 
crucial role in producing pleasure. So what do these two terms mean? As 
Warren suggests, 
 
This notion of ‘completeness’ or ‘fulfilment’ works in two ways 
throughout the argument. It has a chronological sense and a 
teleological sense . . . At any moment in an act of seeing, the 
seeing is complete . . . Seeing is also perfect in the sense that 
seeing does not have a goal or end-point (telos) as, for 
example, shipbuilding does . . . And in this respect pleasure 
seems to be like seeing. (10.4 II74a16-17) (61) 
 
For Aristotle, all perception involves activity and in each case when the activity 
is most complete or perfect, it is also the most pleasant. Aristotle gives a 
variety of examples to elucidate this point – those of the flautist, sculptor, 
carpenter, tanner and even our various body parts (EN 97b26–27). The extent 
to which we can ascertain the “good” and “the well” of a craftsperson or 
artist, or our eyes and hands for that matter, is based on how well, or how 
excellently they perform their roles/activities, be it playing a flute for the 
flautist or “seeing” for our eyes. To see how the same principles hold for all 
activities, beginning with perception but also covering the intellect, consider 
this quote, again from EN: 
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In each sense, the activity is best when it belongs to something 
disposed in the best way and in relation to what is the most 
powerful of those things that fall in its remit. The same activity 
would be the most complete/perfect and the most pleasant. For 
all perception is pleasant, as are both thinking and 
contemplating, but what is most pleasant is what is most 
complete/perfect and what is most complete/perfect is what 
belongs to something in a good state and with relation to the 
best of the things in its remit. Pleasure completes/perfects the 
activity. (1174b18-23) 
 
Here Aristotle is referring to cognitive activities other than perception (though 
as we saw earlier, the same principles apply to perception) and explains that 
these intellectual activities will be most complete/perfect when the knower is 
fulfilling the best of this process, fulfilling it in the best way and with reference 
to the best “objects” for that activity. By best “objects” it would seem that 
Aristotle means the most excellent objects of engagement for our cognitive 
activities; those that are best suited for the specific type of cognitive activity.71 
Warren explains that according to Aristotle: 
 
	
71 The term ‘beauty’ is often used in EN to refer these ‘best’ objects but in this 
quote, Aristotle uses the terms ‘kratiston’ (strongest) and ‘spoudaiotaton’ 
(quickest) instead, to account for intellectual activities that are related not just 
to perception but to other more intellectually engaged activities such as 
contemplation (Warren 63). Interestingly, beauty, as it is used by Aristotle, also 
need not be taken in the most literal sense but as Warren suggests could refer 
also to order and magnitude, as well as potentially the arrangement and order 
of one’s life (Warren 73).  
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…pleasures of thought (dianoia) differ from all of these and 
different intellectual pleasures differ from one another (10.5 
1175b36–1176a3). So intellectual activities – and therefore their 
pleasures – are as a kind superior to perceptual activities and 
their pleasures . . .(64) 
 
The phrase, “different intellectual pleasures differing from one another” 
indicates that there are a variety of intellectual pleasures. This serves to further 
justify the claim that there is pleasure to be found in basic cognitive control as 
well as in the highest levels of cognitive control. Warren also writes: 
 
Often the sense of ‘learning’ involved seems to be of a rather 
low-level kind not much more elevated than a mere 
‘recognition’ that such-and-such is the case. But this shows that 
Aristotle accepts that all forms of intellectual achievement are 
pleasant in a way, even if they fall short of the exquisite and 
divine pleasures of contemplation . . .(67) 
 
Aristotle does not diminish the value of the earlier stages of cognitive activity 
(that is, those that come before perfect contemplation) and holds firm that 
each of these bring pleasures worthy of our attention and desire. Perhaps he 
does so because each stage potentially brings the learner closer to achieving 
the perfect stage of contemplation, which is the highest and therefore most 
pleasurable stage of learning. This is very similar to my belief that both surface 
and deep approaches to learning are important, can be enjoyable and are 
valuable, but the deeper approach, being that which prioritises cognitive 
control, is more likely to yield greater pleasure.  
 
Referring back to cognitive control, we can see how having cognitive control 
to some extent could yield pleasure of the sort related to being able to make 
sense of something, being able to apply what one has learned independently 
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to solve a problem and so on. The more cognitive control one has, the more 
pleasure one gets from exercising it. 
 
Aristotle also says that pleasure arises when activity is unimpeded. Robert 
Scott Stewart writes about Aristotle’s account of pleasure: 
 
On this account of pleasure, then, it is maintained that what we 
actually enjoy is not a process to a natural state but the activity 
of the natural state itself. Thus, activities such as quenching 
one's thirst or recovering from sickness-things taken as 
paradigmatic pleasures on the alternative account—are, in 
Aristotle's theory, taken as being only incidentally or derivatively 
pleasurable. 'Real' or 'unmixed' pleasures are to be identified 
with the unimpeded activity of the natural state. Since thirst or 
sickness can impede such activity, the alleviation of them is 
(incidentally) pleasurable since it allows for the possibility of true 
'unmixed' pleasures. (101) 
 
Natural state might then refer to human beings being able to perform their 
natural functions and those functions they enjoy in conditions that ensure that 
human beings’ natural states – that is, the health of body, mind and soul – are 
present. In Book 7 of EN, Aristotle raises the issue of natural states and 
processes as a rebuttal to conceptions of pleasure that argue that it is a 
perceptible processes that leads one to a natural state; a natural state that 
needs to be achieved due to some lack that needs to be restored. This, he 
felt, reduced pleasures to having an instrumental value as opposed to being a 
chief good. We know that Aristotle wants pleasure to have a more meaningful 
role as he wishes for it to play a significant role in guiding people to engage in 
virtue and live a eudaimonic life. So on this account of pleasure what we enjoy 
is not a process to a natural state but the activity of the natural state itself. For 
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humans, as Aristotle carefully distinguishes, “natural state” involves engaging 
in intellectual activity, culminating in contemplation. 
 
To be in one’s natural state it is also necessary that one does not face any 
impediments. In EN, Aristotle writes, “no activity is complete when impeded” 
(1153b16-8). Again, here we are required to consider what these impediments 
refer to. Aristotle could be referring to the absence of sufficient external 
resources such as good fortune, and potentially the provision of other suitable 
conditions that do not render a person poverty-stricken, without a safe roof 
over their heads, and so on. Aristotle writes:  
 
. . .so that the happy man requires in addition the goods of the 
body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his 
activity may not be impeded through lack of them. (1153b17–
19)72  
 
Unimpeded also refers to the impediments caused by “foreign” or “alien” 
pleasures. Stewart explains it like this: 
	
72 Situational impediments such as poverty, various forms of discrimination and 
so on have the potential to restrict or challenge one’s ability to be in one’s 
“natural state” and to reach a stage where one’s activities are “complete” or 
“perfect” in the Aristotelian sense. I think it is important to acknowledge this, 
particularly in the context of school-based learning which does not always 
successfully take into consideration such impediments and how they might 
affect the ability to engage fully and vigorously in learning, at least in how 
learning is “set up” in most educational institutions. In noting this, I also want 
to clarify that my thesis considers learning more generally, where these 
situational impediments are not especially extreme or especially concerning. 
As such I do not challenge what might be considered by some as Aristotle 
taking a rather privileged, and exclusive starting point for his position. 
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Imagine someone occupied in the activity of geometry. 
Suppose, however, that someone is playing a violin in the next 
room. Further, suppose that we enjoy violin playing; much more 
so than we enjoy doing geometry. In such a case as this, 
Aristotle tells us, it is extremely unlikely that we could keep 
concentrating on geometry rather than the violin playing. Thus 
this foreign pleasure, i.e., the pleasure, in this case, of listening 
to the violin, impedes the activity of geometry. In this, Aristotle 
says, "alien pleasures do pretty much what proper pains do, 
since activities are destroyed by their proper pains” (II75b16) 
(106) 
 
One is less likely to succumb to impediments if one takes pleasure in what one 
is doing. People are therefore more likely to do what they find pleasurable, 
and pleasure in turn makes them more focused and engaged in their activity. 
One is also less likely to succumb to impediments if one chooses the “proper” 
activity. Warren explains what Aristotle means by this: 
 
. . . (Aristotle) then specifies that the best activity will be the 
intellectual activity of a person’s nous. This is the most divine 
thing in us, the best aspect of us, and also that which is 
superlatively human; indeed, Aristotle is even tempted to say 
that each person should be identified with this ruling element 
(1177a13–17, 1177b26–1178a8). The best activity of this divine 
part is identified as ‘contemplative’ activity (theōrētikē, 
1177a17–18).” (65) 
 
Choosing the proper activity is therefore most likely to prevent impediments 
from disrupting the activity, thereby allowing one to most successfully, or 
excellently, fulfil that activity. It is in such fulfilment that one finds pleasure. 
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This is relevant to my position on the importance of focusing on the right kind 
of learning – deep learning or learning that prioritises the development of, and 
opportunity to exercise cognitive control. Choosing the proper “activity” 
(cognitive control) means that students are more likely to achieve a state 
where they can engage in the activity without obstructions. I say more about 
this in the section on “flow”. 
 
So what exactly is the relationship between activity of this unimpeded kind, 
and pleasure? Aristotle says in EN that pleasure is "involved in the activity" 
(1175a1) and “accompanies activity” (1175a5) in that it "completes the 
activity" (1174b32, 1175a15, 1175a28) “as an end which supervenes as the 
bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age” (1174b32-33).  
 
In EN Aristotle states that pleasure completes an activity, as a supervenient 
end, which means that it is not an end we aim at but one which comes as a 
consequence of the aimed-at end if we perform the activity well. Aristotle 
writes: 
 
But the pleasure perfects the activity, not as the fixed 
disposition does, by being already present in the agent, but as 
a supervening perfection, like the bloom of health in the young 
and vigorous (1174b32).  
 
An activity is complete if it fulfils its function perfectly and it is directed at the 
best possible end it could be (1174b14-16). With learning, the best possible 
end is possessing and exercising cognitive control to the highest possible 
degree. Aristotle also says that pleasure accompanies activities and helps to 
bring them into completion. Importantly, pleasure is to be understood as 
something that complements and perfects the activity that it accompanies. If 
we return to the quote about pleasure perfecting the bloom of youth we see 
that what Aristotle means is not that the bloom of youth is imperfect and that 
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pleasure perfects it or fills some sort of lack, but rather that pleasure 
complements it. The pleasure derived is something we get “by-the way” and 
not something we should seek out in itself.73 Aristotle writes in EN: 
 
It might be held that all men seek to obtain pleasure, because 
all men desire life. Life is a form of activity, and each man 
exercises his activity upon those objects and with those faculties 
which he likes the most: for example, the musician exercises his 
sense of hearing upon musical tunes, the student his intellect 
upon problems of philosophy, and so on. And the pleasure of 
these activities perfects the activities, and therefore perfects life, 
which all men seek (1175a). 
 
Here we see that Aristotle includes “those faculties which he likes the most” in 
his description of pleasure and human activities. This suggests that virtuous 
actions are in themselves pleasurable and as such, life lived in this way is 
intrinsically pleasurable. But it also suggests that virtuous and pleasurable 
actions are not just morally virtuous activities per se, but also activities that are 
the excellent exercise of our capacities as well as capacities that an individual 
specifically finds pleasure in.74  
	
73 Pleasure is not necessarily found in every activity, of course; it is a by-
product of activities that meet the criteria stated in these two claims – it is 
unimpeded and supervenient.  
 
74 To circumvent the problem of a good life including humans performing 
immoral activities excellently, it is important to note that for Aristotle, 
rationality (or excellent functioning) is possible only if the human being in 
question is morally excellent or virtuous in character. He writes, “Virtue then is 
twofold, of thought and of character” (EN 1103a 11-15). Both these aspects 
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For Aristotle, the notion of excellence here and elsewhere is tied in with the 
awareness and fulfilment of specifically human functions, which for Aristotle 
refers to intellectual activity. Again, I think it is entirely possible to draw from 
this view the notion that fulfilling one’s capacities for cognitive control in the 
most excellent way, that is, to the best of one’s abilities and where the object 
and objective of the cognitive control is morally sound (i.e.: we are not seeking 
to use cognitive control to do harm) is something that will bring us great 
pleasure without having to buy into the Aristotelian idea that the pleasure 
comes from fulfilling what is a “unique” or “ultimate” human function. It can 
bring us pleasure in realising our capacities, whether these capacities are our 
ultimate function or not. 
 
5.2 Criticisms of Aristotle’s views 
 
Aristotle’s theory of pleasure is, of course, not without contention. One 
problem arises from confusion about the exact definition of pleasure – more 
specifically, what sort of activity it is. If Aristotle’s account of pleasure is not 
robust, then my using it as inspiration for my own account would of course be 
problematic. So I need to allay this concern about confusing definitions. RS 
Stewart writes: 
 
Aristotle provides two extended discussions on the subject of 
pleasure within the Nicomachean Ethics. The first, which 
comprises the last four chapters of Book 7, produces a 
definition of pleasure in which pleasure is identified with activity 
(energeia). But in the second discussion of pleasure—provided 
in the first five chapters of Book 10-this position is characterized 
	
need to work in tandem in order for a person to be deemed virtuous (EN 
1144b14–17). 
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as "strange" or "absurd" (1175b 35). Instead of an identification 
between the two, pleasure is now said to "supervene" upon 
activity "as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of 
their youth". (1174b 33) (97) 
 
So the question is, is pleasure an energeia-type activity or is it something that 
is a process? Energeia type activities are meant to be “complete” in 
themselves (as opposed to kinesis-type activities, which are the other type of 
activity we find in Aristotle’s work). Hiroshi Miura explains that: 
 
…while the energeia simpliciter in which the end is present is 
complete in each moment, kinesis, being a kind of energeia, is 
incomplete. In short, the principle of the distinction is the 
contrast between completeness of energeia and 
incompleteness of kinesis (72).  
 
This distinction essentially arises from Aristotle’s concerns that pleasure was 
seen to be something that addresses a lack. Aristotle wants to make sure that 
pleasures cannot simply be about restoring bodies to their natural states 
because he believes this is not a comprehensive enough account of pleasure.  
He says: 
 
Therefore pleasure is not a process of replenishment, though 
while replenishment takes place, a feeling of pleasure may 
accompany it, just as a feeling of pain may accompany a 
surgical operation. (EN 1173b 9-15) 
  
So pleasure, according to Aristotle, is not to be seen as a process to a natural 
state. Instead it is to be seen as the unimpeded activity of the natural state 
itself – so not kinesis but energeia. However, he later says that pleasure 
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“supervenes” upon activity – which seems rather confusing given that we are 
told earlier that pleasure is the unimpeded activity itself. 
 
A strong and often cited response to this problem is that there is actually no 
contradiction, simply that Aristotle was asking and attempting to answer two 
different questions about pleasure in Books 7 and X of EN. In Book 7, the 
claim is that he is analyzing what it is that we find pleasurable and in Book 10 
he considers what pleasure itself is. RS Stewart, GEL Owen and CCW Taylor all 
hold this view. For example, CCW Taylor writes: 
 
But Aristotle’s question is itself ambiguous between ‘What do 
we enjoy?’ and ‘What is enjoyment?’ and my suggestion is that 
the discussion of book X shows some indication, absent from 
book VII, that Aristotle had moved towards separating those 
questions. (264)  
 
The justification for this claim lies in a close reading of books 7 and 10 that 
seem to indicate that Aristotle is indeed grappling with two different 
questions. Here is an oft-cited passage from Aristotle that indicates that he 
wishes to respond to two different questions: 
 
If then pleasure is the replenishment with that which is 
according to nature, that which feels pleasure will be that in 
which the replenishment takes place, I.e., the body; but this is 
not thought to be the case... (EN 1173b 9-11) 
 
The idea of “replenishment” suggests the lack of something in the body. If 
this were true, then the replenishing would render the body as that which is 
pleased. Stewart writes:  
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But, as Aristotle says, "this is not thought to be the case" even 
though "one would be pleased when replenishment was taking 
place, just as one would be pained if one was being operated 
on" (1173b 12). It would seem then that Aristotle is here 
distinguishing between two questions-roughly, "What is 
enjoyable?" and "What is the nature of enjoyment?" (102) 
 
Aristotle believes that “this is not thought to be case” because he holds that 
not all pleasures fit the anti-hedonist model of “replenishment”. This response 
come on the back of his desire to challenge the preconception that pleasure is 
necessarily hedonistic. He wants to relay the idea that pleasure is worth having 
but not for the reasons that hedonists believe. He also believes that the anti-
hedonists have gotten their response to hedonists all wrong by taking the 
“replenishment” route. Certain pleasures, such as those that involve the 
exercise of faculties like perception or thought for example, do not fit this 
pattern of replenishment, he argues –so this cannot be a suitable response. 
One of his aims is then to correct this mistake and offer the right idea about 
why pleasure is a self-contained good - an energeia and not a process aimed 
at replenishing. 
 
I think that what we have to concede here is that Aristotle fails to offer clear 
“sign-posting” about which question - what we find pleasurable or what is the 
nature of pleasure itself – he is answering. The conclusion, I think, is not that 
he is guilty of inconsistency so much as perhaps the failure to be clear about 
which question he is answering when. While it would of course have been 
helpful had Aristotle done this work, it would seem reasonable and in fact 
sensible to separate the two definitions for our reading now. They are answers 
to two different questions, and, in fact, one may not necessarily have any 
effect on the other.  
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This clarification is important because it allays concerns that Aristotle offers 
confusing and contradictory accounts of pleasure that then make his theory an 
unsuitable one to base my own views upon. This clarification also supports the 
idea that pleasure is to be found in the unimpeded intellectual activity of 
reasoning, which then gives us further grounds to suggest that flow theory, 
which draws from this Aristotelian notion of unimpeded activity is a very 
appropriate theory to apply to the sort of learning which is focused on 
cognitive control (reasoning).  
 
The clarification that it is the nature of pleasure that it accompanies the activity 
of contemplation rather than “adding to it” is also important because 
contemplation at its fullest is energeia – it is complete in itself, so pleasure is 
not something that can “add to it” – if something can be added to 
contemplation then it would not be “complete”. The account that pleasure 
supervenes rather than “adds to” also supports, as I mentioned earlier, the 
position that pleasure is not to be taken as the goal of intellectual activity, but 
rather something that is an opportune “by-product” of engaging in 
contemplation. 
 
Another problem arises from the fact that according to Aristotle all men desire 
to know, so presumably everyone pursues the goal of ideal contemplation and 
everyone finds contemplation pleasurable. This is plainly not true. So how can 
we explain this? By pointing out that the pleasure to be found in 
contemplation is conditional. Where the conditions are not met, real pleasure 
will not follow. In “The Place of Pleasure in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Amelie Rorty 
offers a good response along those lines. She writes: 
 
Pleasures are a subclass of energeiai: those that involve the 
unimpeded exercise of a natural hexis, kata phusin hexeos. The 
correct description of an action type not only determines 
whether it is an energeia; it also identifies the natural hexeis 
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which are exercised. Only when the appropriate hexeis are 
exercised rightly, on the right objects, with the organs in the 
right condition, is the activity properly pleasurable. It is under 
such conditions that the action description passes the 
grammatical-intentionality test as the energeia it is, because the 
description reveals the natural hexeis which are exercised. 
Someone who has not really got the hang of contemplation, 
who isn't suited to it, but does it desiring the fame it may bring, 
doesn't really find contemplation pleasurable, except perhaps 
incidentally. The description of his contemplating will reveal that 
what he does is either not self-contained, or that it is the 
exercise of natural hexeis which are incidental, rather than 
intrinsic, to contemplation (491). 
 
Hexis usually translates to mean “state” and according to Owen and others, in 
Aristotle’s work means more specifically, “any settled condition or propensity 
of the agent that is exhibited in characteristic performances” (Owen 139). Kata 
phusin hexeos refers to “unimpeded activity of the natural state”. Rorty is 
explaining here that the right categorization of energeia and kinesis activities 
contributes to recognizing the natural states, or the propensities, which are 
being exercised. This is important because Aristotle, as I explained earlier, 
says that activities tend to be more pleasurable when they are activities that fit 
or suit an individual or their interests well (hence Owen’s use of the terms 
“propensity” and “characteristic”) – this is when the individual is less likely to 
face certain types of impediments; they are able to focus on them and not be 
easily distracted. It is also when they are more likely, all other conditions being 
met, to truly find pleasure in them. The other conditions are essentially those 
that suggest that there are no other impediments - that the states are 
exercised in the right way, the body is healthy and its parts are able to fulfill 
their functions well and the states or propensities are exerted on the right sort 
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of object. The intentionality test that Rorty refers to here is also a very useful 
way of helping to categorise energeia and kinesis activities – it involves: 
 
. . .focusing on the difference between what is contained within 
the description of the action-type (what constitutes the action), 
and what is a consequence of its being performed . . . We 
'psychologize' the intentionality of actions when we start 
looking for motives that lie beyond those already imbedded in 
the standard description of the actions. (Place of Pleasure 488) 
 
Rorty’s point here is that in instances where it is especially difficult to identify 
the category of the activity (whether it is energeia or kinesis), some 
consideration into the consequences of the action in line with the potential 
category of the action may be useful in helping us assess whether indeed the 
action belongs to that category or the other. Rorty also suggests that this 
method is to be used sparingly and with as minimal psychologising as possible 
because these would have “an un-Aristotelian ring” (Place of Pleasure 488). In 
the quote above where she talks about pleasures being a sub-class of 
energeia, she offers the example of contemplation, explaining how the lack of 
the right conditions, and the description of the contemplation together with 
the consequences, in certain cases of contemplation, leads us to realise that 
the right propensities are not at play; this then suggests that the action is not 
self-contained and therefore unlikely to be energeia as Aristotle intends for 
energeia to be. In such cases, pleasure is either not, or only accidentally, being 
experienced. This would explain why it is not especially fair to suggest that 
Aristotle necessarily expects everyone to find contemplation pleasurable. 
 
What this further suggests is that not everyone will find learning pleasurable, 
whether it consists predominantly of cognitive control or not. I think this also 
rings true when we think about how different people are – to expect that every 
person would find a particular thing pleasurable just seems to sit at odds with 
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what we know from interacting with others. While I think it is true that in 
normal cases people have the capacity for cognitive control, not everyone with 
this capacity will then find cognitive control (or any type of learning for that 
matter), pleasurable. However, I do think that more often than not, this comes 
to down to one’s learning experiences. So the more we are able to make 
these learning experiences align with the sorts of features we know are more 
likely than not to enable pleasure, the more likely we will be to “turn around” 
some of the negative opinions students have formed about learning. 
 
One such way to enable optimal pleasure in learning is to create opportunities 
for “flow”. Let us see how elements of flow theory are linked to cognitive 
control, and how they complement Aristotle’s views on “unimpeded activity” 
and ultimately “pleasure”.   
 
5.3 Flow Theory 
 
“Flow” is a theory put forward by social psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. 
At the heart of the theory is the desire to direct people to the belief that 
happiness is not to be found in external factors and conditions, but is 
something that comes from within oneself, and from one’s own abilities. In 
Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (FPOE), Csikszentmihalyi quotes 
Marcus Aurelius: “If you are pained by external things it is not they that disturb 
you, but your own judgment of them. And it is in your power to wipe out that 
power now” (20). 
 
In this case, wiping out the power involves directing our energies and 
attention on a goal that has been consciously chosen, where all our energies 
“flow” towards that goal at that time and we are not caught up in other 
distractions. This sort of focused activity ultimately creates “harmony” within 
the consciousness. Csikszentmihalyi cites research that has shown that as a 
result of the brain only being able to process a certain amount of information 
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at any one time, we are making constant trade-offs about what we focus on. 
However, while in “flow” all the brain’s available resources are directed 
towards the one chosen activity or goal. As a result of the brain being so 
focused on this activity or goal, distractions go unnoticed. According to 
Csikszentmihalyi this sort of optimal “flow” experience can come about in any 
situation where there is an on-going activity. The activity need not be an 
intellectual one, though that is the sort of activity I will discuss in detail here. 
Flow is described by Bonaiuto et al rather succinctly in the article “Optimal 
Experience and Personal Growth: Flow and the Consolidation of Place 
Identity”, like this: 
 
. . . it depicts the psychological mental state of a person who is 
immersed in an activity with energized concentration, optimal 
enjoyment, full involvement, and intrinsic interests, and who is 
usually focused, motivated, positive, energized, and aligned 
with the task at hand (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975/2000, 1990). The 
term “flow” describes optimal experiences that are among the 
most enjoyable in human life (Csikszentmihalyi, 1982), and such 
experience may emerge in any situation or place in which there 
is an ongoing activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1997), as well as 
when there are clear goals, immediate feedback, and good 
balance between the skills of a person and the challenge of the 
activity (Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; 
Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre, 1989; Waterman et al., 2003). 
 
From this quote alone we can see immediate parallels to Aristotle’s positions 
on unimpeded activity, engaging in activity that one personally finds 
interesting, and the fulfilment of our highest intellectual capacities. I think it is 
quite clear how Aristotle has influenced flow theory. In a nutshell: 
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• “Intrinsic interests” as mentioned in this quote align with Aristotle’s views that 
the more personally interested we are in an activity, the more it aligns with our 
propensities and “natural state”, the more likely we are to take pleasure in it.  
• “Full involvement”, “aligned with the task at hand” and “ongoing activity” can 
be associated with Aristotle’s ideas about unimpeded activity. Recall the 
example of the violin being played in the room next door when one is doing 
geometry. 
• The point about “the challenge of the activity” relates to Aristotle’s views on 
fulfilling our intellectual capacities, where each “stage” is potentially 
pleasurable, but it is when we have achieved the final stage of intellectual 
activity and overcome that “highest” challenge that we experience the most 
pleasure. 
• “Flow’s” relationship with pleasure is made clear here in the references to 
“optimal enjoyment” and “the most enjoyable human life”. It is therefore 
clearly a theory meant (to some significant degree) to explore engagement in 
activity that offers optimal pleasure and a good life, much like Aristotle’s 
theory.75 
	
75 It is important to point out that in FPOE Csikszentmihalyi himself 
distinguishes between pleasure and enjoyment. He writes: 
 
Pleasure is an important component in the quality of life, but by 
itself does not bring happiness . . . [Pleasurable experiences] do 
not produce psychological growth . . . When people ponder 
further about what makes their lives rewarding, they tend to 
move beyond pleasant memories and begin to remember other 
events, other experiences that overlap with pleasurable ones 
but fall into a category that deserves a separate name: 
enjoyment…Enjoyment is characterized by this forward 
movement: by a sense of novelty, of accomplishment . . . After 
an enjoyable event we know that we have changed, that our self 
	 188	
In the paper, “Optimal Experience and Optimal Identity: A Multinational Study 
of the Associations Between Flow and Social Identity” (OEOI) co-authored by 
Mao Yenhui, they write: 
 
Activities that are important for identity development are those 
that provide the impetus toward self-actualization, which 
involves a developmental process tending toward the actualized 
version of one’s self, specifically, a “full use and exploration of 
talents, capacities, and potentials” (Maslow, 1970, p. 50) 
 
We can see here too the Aristotelian influence of natural states, particularly 
with reference to Maslow’s quote, which suggests that self-actualisation is 
aided by someone exercising their natural propensities and the capacities 
which are characteristic of their . The mention in this quote of a 
“developmental process” is also reminiscent of Aristotle’s suggestion that 
there are stages or a process that one must pursue to achieve eudaimonia. 
And if we need further evidence that a great deal of influence has been 
derived from Aristotelian philosophy, for flow theory as well as other 
psychological theories, consider this quote from “OEOI”: 
	
has grown: in some respect, we have become more complex as 
a result of it.” (46) 
 
I think he makes this distinction so as to offer clarity on the point that “flow” 
requires activity or action and is not a passive or hedonistic state of receiving, 
which is what he seems to take ‘pleasure’ to mean. If we accept that pleasure 
is not a passive state but is essentially what Csikszentmihalyi refers to as 
enjoyment, then perhaps it is not necessary (for the sake of clarity here) to 
make a distinction between the two. So I when I use the term pleasure in 
reference to Csikszentmihalyi’s work, let us imagine that I mean what he does 
when he uses the term “enjoyment”. 
	 189	
 
According to Aristotle (1925) eudaimonia requires activity, so 
that it is not sufficient for a person to possess an unpotentiated 
ability or disposition. Aristotle’s philosophy on eudaimonia has 
provided philosophically grounding influence upon 
psychological researchers across the study of different 
constructs regarding an individual’s growth and fulfilment, for 
instance, Personal Expressiveness and Intrinsic Motivation 
(Waterman, 1993b; Ashforth, 1997); Self-determination (Deci 
and Ryan, 1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000, 2001); as well as 
Parenting (Huta, 2011) 
 
Having established that there are strong and credible links between Aristotle’s 
theories and flow theory, I now move on to exploring what characterises 
“flow” and how those features offer guidance in terms of the conditions we 
might seek in order to get the most pleasure in learning. In doing so, I will 
explain that it is in exercising cognitive control rather than surface methods of 
learning that we are more likely to find ourselves engaged in “flow”, thereby 
making pleasure in learning more likely if we are exercising cognitive control. 
The main reason for this is that we will find that central to most of the 
characteristics of “flow” is that the challenge of the activity be matched to the 
individual.  
 
In “OEOI” they write that flow is:  
 
characterized by a merging of action and awareness, an 
expanded sense of time, a dropping out of self-consciousness, a 
feeling of being in control of his/her action and of the 
environment, a total concentration on the task at hand, and 
intrinsically rewarding action without external reward to 
maintain the behaviour.  
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Let us consider each of these characteristics beginning with merging of action 
and awareness. The merging of action and awareness occurs when one 
becomes so involved in one’s activity that one stops being aware of oneself as 
“separate” from the actions they are performing. In FPOE, Csikszentmihalyi 
suggests that it is usually in states of strenuous physical exertion or highly 
disciplined mental activity that one can reach this state (54). While it is entirely 
possible to be disciplined when engaged in surface methods of learning, for 
example, memorising the times table as a child took great discipline, one is 
more likely to become deeply absorbed in a mental activity if it involves 
understanding, and particularly acquiring or exercising the set of skills 
associated with cognitive control. This is because cognitive control creates 
much more of a challenge for the learner, requiring that they not only retain 
the information but develop the ability to apply and manipulate it. It is also the 
case that acquiring these cognitive control skills, for instance closely following 
an explanation such that one can then explain it in one’s own words, or 
drawing likely conclusions from available information, requires that one is 
systematic and disciplined in one’s engagement with the source of learning. 
 
An expanded sense of time refers to the sense that time seems to pass at a 
different rate when one is fully engaged in an activity. Throughout Flow: The 
Classic Work On How To Achieve Happiness, Csikszentmihalyi uses the 
colloquial phrases “do not know where the time went” and “time seems to 
stand still” to describe this experience. Psychological scientists Philip Gable 
and Bryan Poole suggest that time seems to move faster because activities 
that get us excited narrow our memory and attention processes, helping us to 
shut out irrelevant thoughts and feelings (880). This seems to align with 
common experiences of engagement in activities we find pleasurable, or that 
we find challenging, but I think it is also possible that one can be absorbed in 
an activity, and pleasurably so, without experiencing time as passing more 
quickly. In writing my PhD thesis, I am often so drawn into my research that I 
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do not check the clock or remember when it is lunch time, but I do not always 
feel that time is passing more quickly. Perhaps the reason is simply that I am 
not always in a “flow” state, but I think given that what one wants to capture 
with the “flow” state is the sense that one is so absorbed in an activity that 
one is not aware of anything else, including time, it is also reasonable to 
suggest that what might be happening, as when I am sometimes writing, is 
that I am not as aware of time passing by as I might be when I am engaged in 
an activity that is tedious, boring, unchallenging or too challenging. I think this 
broader description is better because it fits with a broader range of 
experiences of time passing during “flow” states without limiting it to speed; 
at the same time, this broader reading is not doing a disservice to 
Csikszentmihalyi’s original meaning. 
 
The dropping out of self-consciousness is the temporary loss of reflexive self-
awareness. Csikszentmihalyi writes: “When in a flow experience, what slips 
below the threshold of awareness is the concept of self, the information we 
use to represent to ourselves who we are” (FPOE 64). By this I do not think 
Csikszentmihalyi means that we literally forget who we are or go into an 
automaton state where our reflexive ability vanishes  entirely. I think it is 
important to be clear about this in a way that Csikszentmihalyi himself 
sometimes is not, because an awareness of our individual propensities, or 
natural states as Aristotle might call them, is crucial to us enjoying unimpeded 
activity and “flow”.76 Without going into a lengthy discussion on 
	
76 For example, in a short online article also called “Flow: The Psychology of 
Optimal Experience” for Harper Row Csikszentmihalyi writes, “And being able 
to forget temporarily who we are seems to be very enjoyable” when I believe, 
given that he then says, “When not preoccupied with our selves, we actually 
have a chance to expand the concept of who we are”, what he really means is 
not that we temporarily forget ourselves but that we are simply not 
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consciousness, I think, given what we have seen from Aristotle and flow theory 
thus far, pleasure in an activity requires some awareness that our propensities 
and abilities are being well-matched as the activity goes on. This “awareness”, 
though it may be very slight, is what keeps us engaged and returns us to 
engagement should an activity be interrupted by something outwith our 
control. We should not be highly conscious of this “match” and it ideally 
should not be the focus of our minds at the time of the activity. The idea is 
that when we are fully absorbed in an activity, when there are no distractions 
or pulls in other directions, then we tend to be less preoccupied with ourselves 
and with our thoughts, responses and feelings. The more this happens, the 
more likely we are to be able to experience “flow” and the pleasure that it 
offers. The loss of self-awareness in these situations also has the potential to 
fend off self-consciousness, or the fear that we might sometimes have of being 
judged by others. We can see how this effect can support a student who feels 
particularly insecure or vulnerable in the classroom setting and does not 
participate in classroom activities for fear of being judged. It might also restrict 
unhealthy “performativeness” that comes with a heightened awareness of who 
we are and how we want to “come across” to others. Aristotle does not seem 
to discuss the loss of self-consciousness during unimpeded activity but I 
believe that any heightened self-awareness that leads to unnecessary and 
unhelpful interference or disturbance, whether it is in the form of self-
consciousness, performativeness and so on, would not be desirable for 
Aristotle either. 
 
The feeling of being in control of one’s actions and the environment is rather 
an ambiguous one because the quotes we saw earlier, from “OEOI”, seem to 
offer a slightly different sense of control from one in FPOE. In the OEOI quote, 
	




the sense one gets is that one of the characteristics of “flow” is feeling that 
one is in control of one’s actions and environment. In the FPOE passage, this 
sense of control is discussed more as a paradox. Csikszentmihalyi writes: 
 
The flow experience is typically described as involving a sense 
of control--or more precisely, as lacking the sense of worry 
about losing control that is typical in many situations of normal 
life. What people enjoy is not the sense of being in control, but 
the sense of exercising control in difficult situations. (61) 
 
This quote seems to be more in line with the other characteristics of “flow”, 
particularly that during the experience of “flow” there is a loss of self-
awareness. Yet at the same time, studies of “flow” in classroom settings 
discuss in great detail how students’ perceptions of being in control affect 
their ability to enter into “flow states”. For example, in a chapter in the book 
Handbook of Positive Psychology in Schools (HPPS), which is co-authored with 
David Shernoff, they say: “Students experienced greater enjoyment, 
motivation, self-esteem, and overall engagement when they perceived 
themselves to be active, in control, and competent” (134). Perhaps what is 
meant by control in this discussion can be explained by way of suggesting a 
degree of balance: that while agency and the feeling that one is in control of 
one’s actions is important for “flow” to occur; equally, an overt desire to 
control the activity and the environment, such that any subsequent frustration, 
anxiety or negative impact that follows from either the failure to do so or from 
the amount of effort expended in trying, is to be avoided. This would make 
sense given that an important factor in achieving “flow” is ensuring that the 
level of challenge is well matched to an individual’s abilities. In “OEOI”, the 
authors, including Csikszentmihalyi write:    
 
When performing an activity that provides challenges and 
requisite skills, and when both challenges and skills are high and 
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in balance, an individual is not only enjoying the moment, but is 
also stretching his/her capabilities with the likelihood of learning 
new skills and increasing self-esteem and personal complexity. 
 
If a task offers a challenge pitched at the right level, there is a higher 
likelihood that this reinforces someone’s feelings that they are in control of, or 
able to control what they are doing. Cognitive control clearly offers this sense 
of control simply by virtue of the fact that it centres around the idea of 
exercising control over knowledge so that one can think, learn and problem-
solve independently. Given that we have already shown that cognitive control 
can admit of degrees, a state of “flow” for learners can be achieved by 
pegging activities that hone cognitive control to the level of skill of the learner, 
thereby creating a suitable level of challenge. At the same time, ideally, the 
learner’s abilities are extended and they feel more capable of exercising 
cognitive control to a greater degree or with regards to more complicated 
information. With surface learning, there tends to more reliance on various 
external sources, and this can affect the learner’s sense of agency. There might 
also be less opportunity for the learner’s abilities to be stretched in the way 
they are when understanding is being tested.  
 
With reference to Aristotle’s ideas, the sense of agency here in flow theory 
aligns with his views that one is most likely to find pleasure in activities that 
match with one’s natural state. On the basis of this, the agent chooses to do 
the action and, if we recall Amelie Rorty’s intentionality test, chooses to do so 
with the right considerations. All of this points quite clearly to that fact that for 
an activity to be truly unimpeded, an agent must be able to exercise agency. 
 
Total concentration on the task at hand means that the “task requires such 
concentration that only a very select range of information can be allowed into 
awareness” (FPOE 58). This seems to be the foundational characteristic for 
some of the other characteristics – it is only when a task requires full 
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concentration that action and awareness can merge, our experience or 
awareness of time passing is altered, we become less reflexively self-aware. 
Again an appropriate level of challenge can ensure maximum concentration 
and facilitate the maintenance of that level of concentration, so it is not lost 
because of boredom, repetitiveness or in the other extreme, because the task 
seems so difficult that engaging in it feels pointless. In “OEOI” the authors 
write:    
 
When personal skills exceed the situation’s challenge, boredom 
is the consequence (based on the Quadrant Model of the flow 
state); if challenges overpass an individual’s skills, anxiety 
evolves. If both challenges and skills are relatively low, apathy 
will be experienced. (Csikszentmihalyi and LeFevre, 1989) 
 
The final characteristic mentioned is that the activity is experienced as 
intrinsically rewarding. In an earlier text, Csikszentmihalyi writes: 
 
The key element of an optimal experience is that it is an end in 
itself. It is an autotelic experience. The term "autotelic" derives 
from two Greek words, "auto" meaning self, and "telos" 
meaning goal. It refers to a self-contained activity, one that is 
done not with the expectation of some future benefit, but 
simply because the doing itself is the reward. (FPOE 67) 
 
The reference to “flow” activities as “self-contained” activities that are 
worthwhile for their own is directly influenced by Aristotle’s ideas about 
contemplation being self-sufficient. Aristotle also argues for why pleasure 
should not become reason for contemplation, but something that one derives 
“by the way”. This is similar to cognitive control too, because as I have already 
argued in Chapter 4, cognitive control is also intrinsically valuable – it is worth 
having for its own sake and worth engaging in for its own sake.  
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Thus far I have shown how each of the characteristics of “flow” relate to 
Aristotle’s theory of unimpeded activity and how this in turn relates to pleasure 
and cognitive control. I have shown that activities that involve cognitive 
control are more likely to yield states of “flow” because they offer challenges 
that are more likely to draw one in, to demand the concentration and focus 
necessary to absorb one deeply into the activity. The descriptions of “flow” 
here offer us some guiding points, additional to those offered by Aristotle, on 
what we should be taking into consideration if we want students to partake in 
the pleasures that learning has to offer. There has been much research into 
specific activities and tools that teachers can use in the classroom to 
encourage “flow”, and it is no surprise that most of them are activities that 
encourage the use and development of cognitive control or abilities very 
similar to it. The two studies mentioned in this quote by Shernoff and 
Csikszentmihalyi found that:  
 
Concentration, attentiveness, and student engagement were 
significantly higher when instruction was perceived as 
challenging and relevant (Shernoff et al., 2003). This finding 
suggests that students are more likely to become engaged 
when academic work intellectually involves them in a process of 
meaningful inquiry extending beyond the classroom. 
(Newmann, Wehlage, & Lamborn,1992) (HPPS 134) 
 
The phrase “meaningful inquiry” is contrasted with passive, surface learning, 
which focuses predominantly on tests, exams, and covering a set syllabus, as 
opposed to focusing on the development of skills that will help the learner 
truly understand the material so that they can then apply it meaningfully 
outside the classroom context. This seems very much like the range of abilities 
associated with having cognitive control. 
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With reference to contextual factors, Shernoff and Csikszentmihalyi report that:  
 
Student engagement appeared to be significantly influenced by 
the activity in which students were involved. Students were 
more engaged in group and individual work than while listening 
to a lecture or watching TV or a video. While taking a test or 
quiz, students reported very high levels of concentration, but 
low enjoyment. Overall, students were more engaged during 
instructional methods that present opportunities for action and 
to demonstrate their skills, but such activities were rare while 
the disengaging activities were more common. (HPPS 136) 
 
Here, we see the reference to activities that offer opportunities for action, and 
opportunities to show understanding of what one has learned through 
application, which is again characteristic of cognitive control. 
 
In this chapter, I set out to show that if contemplation is pleasurable then 
having cognitive control is pleasurable. In so far as we have already presented 
an argument for why learning should predominantly entail cognitive control, 
we show that learning is pleasurable. And finding learning pleasurable is 
something that contributes to us becoming lovers of learning. Additionally, the 
more pleasurable experiences of learning one has, the more likely one is to 
know how to find the pleasures of learning – what conditions contribute to 
pleasure, how to create and sustain these conditions, and what must be 
avoided if these pleasures are to continue. If we want to make learning 
“lovable”, then there is good advice here from Aristotle and flow theorists on 
how we might achieve this.  
 
In the following two chapters I consider two traits of those who love learning: 
they are vulnerable in learning, and they are wholehearted about learning. 
And in relation to these characteristics they find learning pleasurable in spite 
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of facing challenges in learning. It is my belief that the more that students are 
helped to acquire these traits, together with the right sort of learning, i.e.: 
cognitive control and with successful attempts at making learning pleasurable, 




Chapter 6: Vulnerability  
 
I began by exploring some of the empirical research on deep learning and 
traced the roots of many of those ideas back to the philosophies of Plato, 
Rousseau and Dewey. I argued that to enable love for learning, one must 
engage in the right sort of learning, that is, learning that emphasises cognitive 
control. I then showed that making learning pleasurable will also help students 
develop and sustain their love for learning. I argued that creating 
opportunities for “flow in line with Aristotle’s views on unimpeded activity and 
Csikszentmihalyi’s work on flow theory will increase the opportunities to 
experience pleasure in learning, and that learning experiences that focus on 
cognitive control are more likely to offer opportunities to experience “flow”.77 
In the next two chapters I explore two other characteristics of lovers of 
learning – vulnerability in learning and wholeheartedness in learning.78 Those 
	
77 It could be possible to “love” acquiring knowledge in terms of accumulating 
facts, figures and information too, but I think this is less likely. As I described 
earlier, data shows that students do not even enjoy lessons that focus on the 
straight-up acquisition of information. In any case, this sort of learning is not 
what I am interested in exploring here. 
 
78 What I seek to present here is not a justification for why we should value 
learning but rather, what valuing learning looks like; what it entails. As we are 
taking learning here to be deep learning, and as deep learning is 
fundamentally defined by the ability to understand or to exercise cognitive 
control, the justifications for why we should value learning have already been 
provided in Chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis. Alongside the explication of these 




who possess these traits tend to “stick” with learning in spite of challenges 
and setbacks, develop confidence and independence and find learning 
pleasurable. I hold that these traits, if they are carefully and diligently 
encouraged and developed, with a robust focus on deep learning and in 
particular, developing cognitive control, are sufficient for facilitating the love 
for learning.79 
 
In this chapter, my aim is to contribute a new angle to the existing discussion 
of vulnerability in philosophy. I argue that lovers of learning are not afraid to 
exhibit appropriate amounts of the relevant types of vulnerability in the 
process of learning, and that they acknowledge that this vulnerability has a 
positive effect on their learning. Instead of shutting themselves off from 
learning because of fear, they engage with openness to the world around 
them. I also suggest that when vulnerability is encouraged and responded to 
in appropriate ways, this can inspire and enable love for learning.80  
 
6.1 Describing Vulnerability 
 
Vulnerability is a broad and complex concept. I also think that it is one that is 
significantly entwined with our temporal nature as human beings. In spite of 
this, the concept has not had as much systematic analysis as one might 
expect. The analysis it has had is almost entirely focused on a notion of 
vulnerability that is in line with the wider aims of assessing what moral 
obligations we have to the vulnerable and how we might best realise them, 
	
79 However, I am open to the possibility that there may be more features than 
the ones I explore here. 
 




what are our duties of justice to the vulnerable and who assumes the main 
responsibilities for the vulnerable. As such, notions of vulnerability in most of 
the existing literature concentrate on aspects of vulnerability that revolve 
around the power dynamics of our interactions with others, and in particular 
interactions where the dynamics of power favour one person or group over the 
other. Additionally, the specific analysis of vulnerability with reference to 
learning has had even less thorough attention, so this is the main contribution 
I hope to make to the existing literature on vulnerability.81 
 
To date, vulnerability is often associated with weakness, fear and injury. And to 
be fair, this is not a ridiculous misconception because ordinarily and broadly, 
vulnerability is defined as the disposition to be wounded. It seems reasonable 
to believe that the potential to be wounded is something to be avoided and 
that injury might seem like an indication of some sort of inability to fend for 
oneself. In that regard vulnerability is seen as failure, a flaw or weakness. 
However, this disposition to be wounded is a human condition, meaning that 
all of us are vulnerable, whether we like it or not. Mackenzie, Rogers and 
Dodds write: 
 
Human life is conditioned by vulnerability. By virtue of our 
embodiment, human beings have bodily and material needs; 
are exposed to physical illness, injury, disability, and death; and 
	
81 Another aspect of vulnerability that has not had much attention, and which I 
am also interested in exploring with reference to learning, centres around the 
idea that one can protect oneself to different degrees from feeling vulnerable 
or being wounded; here the immediate focus is not on abuse of power by one 
individual over another, or on our duties of care and protection towards the 
vulnerable, but rather on the decisions one makes about the extent to which 
one protects oneself from wounding and how those decisions might affect 
one’s growth and possibilities. I explore this idea in greater detail later on. 
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depend on the care of others for extended periods during our 
lives. As social and affective beings we are emotionally and 
psychologically vulnerable to others in myriad ways: to loss and 
grief; to neglect, abuse, and lack of care; to rejection, ostracism, 
and humiliation. (1) 
 
We are physically vulnerable simply by virtue of being temporal creatures; we 
can be injured, diseased, killed and we die. As Mackenzie et.al. explain, we 
are, by virtue of being social and affective, capable of feeling emotional and 
psychological hurt and pain as well, vulnerability is not reserved for describing 
just our physical potential for injury, but also our emotional and psychological 
disposition for it. However, since vulnerability is a disposition, this suggests 
ability or potential, and so to be vulnerable, is to possess the ability or the 
potential to be hurt. Therefore, this disposition to be wounded does not have 
to be actualised, but it is a constant possibility. As such, most of us have been 
socialised into believing that it is best to avoid this possibility and to protect 
ourselves, often at all costs, from wounding. When we are wounded, the 
tendency is to see it as only as a failure or disappointment of some kind, 
something that needs to rectified and not repeated. While I hold that there is 
good reason to, and in fact, we should protect ourselves from wounding in 
some instances, in others, such as in learning, some of our vulnerabilities, if 
appropriately welcomed and actualised, can be of great benefit to us. I come 
back to how exactly this is so later in this chapter but for now, l want to 
explore some more of the relevant existing philosophical research into the 
concept of vulnerability so that I can make a case for why actualising this 
disposition wisely could be of benefit to us when we are engaged in learning.   
 
There has been some debate in the philosophical literature about the scope of 
the concept of vulnerability. Should vulnerability be applied to specific 
persons or groups who are more than ordinarily vulnerable or should it be 
applied universally to all human beings? Butler and Fineman are amongst 
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those who have written on this. For the purposes of this thesis, I take 
vulnerability to be universal; in the specific language of this debate, I take 
vulnerability to be an ontological condition of our humanity. As Fineman 
points out, vulnerability is a “universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the 
human condition” (15). Drawing from Mackenzie et al.’s “taxonomy of 
vulnerability’ we might then call the universal vulnerability that is intrinsic to all 
humans “inherent vulnerability”. They write: 
 
These vulnerabilities arise from our corporeality, our neediness, 
our dependence on others, and our affective and social 
natures… Some of these vulnerabilities are constant…Others 
vary depending on a range of factors, such as age, gender, 
health status, and disability…Inherent vulnerability also varies 
depending on a person’s resilience and capacity to cope. (7) 
 
Our “neediness, dependence on others, and our affective and social natures” 
suggest that as human beings we are vulnerable to the actions of others. As 
Butler writes in Frames of War, “The body is constitutively social and 
interdependent,” (31). Mackenzie et al suggest that vulnerability and 
dependency are interweaved, which means we all also depend on the care 
and support of others at various points during our lives depending on the 
extent of our vulnerability (4).82 I think it is also the case that while everyone is 
	
82 This is an important point for this thesis and we will return to review it in 
greater depth later in this chapter. This is because in learning, there are times 
when one is dependent on a teacher, mentor or figure (or text) of authority to 
teach and guide one. I will argue that to be comfortable, to an appropriate 
degree, with some of one’s relevant vulnerabilities during the process of 
learning has the potential to enhance the process, enrich the outcomes and 
facilitate and sustain ‘love’ for learning. However, the intertwining of 
vulnerability and dependence can also lead to an abuse of power that is 
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inherently vulnerable, we may be inherently vulnerable to differing degrees. 
Some people are simply less affected than other people are.  
 
Butler also adds, that our human vulnerability to the actions of others, 
something she calls “precariousness” is not the same across the board for 
everyone; some people and groups are more precarious than others, for 
example, those whose are exposed to poverty, social and political violence (3). 
According to the Mackenzie et. al. “taxonomy of vulnerability” we might then 
call this sort of vulnerability “situational vulnerability”. This area is where most 
of philosophical research has been done so far. They write:  
 
This may be caused or exacerbated by the personal, social, 
political, economic, or environmental situations of individuals or 
social groups. Situational vulnerability may be short term, 
intermittent, or enduring. (7) 
 
Mackenzie et.al. do point out that inherent and situational vulnerability are not 
categorically distinct, because inherent sources of vulnerability can be tied to 
features of the environment into which people are born and brought up and 
situational causes of vulnerability will be impacted by a person’s resilience, 
which itself is arguably an outcome of genetic and environmental factors (8). 
Like Mackenzie et.al., I agree that there are significant links between both, but 
that the differences can be useful for differentiating, for example, the sources 
of vulnerability in specific cases. That said, my interest in this thesis is primarily 
the notion of inherent vulnerability. I began this chapter suggesting that in 
learning, one needs to be vulnerable to an appropriate degree. All of us are 
vulnerable to others in the universal sense, so we are all susceptible to 
	
dangerous and detrimental not just to learning but to the vulnerable person 
involved. This is something I also explore in the section on Rousseau who had 
concerns about the role and power of authority figures in learning. 
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emotional and psychological wounding and the negative social and emotional 
consequences of being vulnerable; for example, being humiliated, rejected 
and ostracized.83 
 
6.2 Being “Open” to the World 
 
What does engaging vulnerably with the world look like? Because we are 
inherently vulnerable by virtue of being human beings, it would not be 
accurate to say that we should “allow” ourselves to be vulnerable at 
appropriate times as “allowing” suggests a choice in the matter. Instead what 
I am trying to convey is that instead of looking to protect ourselves from 
wounding at all times, it might be useful to think carefully about when it might 
be beneficial to “acquiesce” to an appropriate amount of wounding. For 
example, to protect ourselves from emotional and psychological wounding, 
we might “close” ourselves off to emotional encounters. One might have 
heard the phrases to “put up a wall” or “put up one’s defenses” as a means of 
	
83 Those whose personal circumstances have also made them situationally 
vulnerable in some way or the other might be more prone to the detrimental 
effects of being rejected, humiliated and so on. This suggests that not 
everyone should be encouraged to be vulnerably open to the world to the 
same extent. I say more about this later on. Additionally, both inherent and 
situational vulnerability refer to physical, emotional and psychological 
vulnerability. With learning, my focus will be on emotional and psychological 
vulnerability as this is more relevant to the cognitive-based approach I am 
taking. Physical vulnerability such as death and risk of physical injury would be, 
for example, of particular relevance to learning a sport, which is still learning, 
but as my focus in this thesis is on cognitive-based learning, I do not delve 
into physical vulnerability. 
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protecting oneself from negative feelings of rejection, humiliation and so on.84 
I use “engaging” to indicate an attitude that is converse to this; engaging with 
the world describes an “openness” towards situations and experiences; a 
willingness to “set forth” even if situations that might make us vulnerable are 
looming ahead. To be “open” is a helpful metaphor because it symbolises 
accessibility – in this case, that our emotions are accessible and subject to 
forms of engagement that could potentially wound us. Being “open” also 
implies that protective barriers or defences are lowered or removed and we 
are at least somewhat at the mercy of whatever it is that we are subject to. The 
messages we receive as human beings, to protect ourselves by “keeping out” 
things that could potentially harm us, to build big, strong walls to keep 
ourselves safe and to stay in control undoubtedly leads us to associate 
vulnerability with weakness, violence and fear.  The potential to be wounded 
has therefore become something to be necessarily feared, feel ashamed of, 
and viewed as a failure that needs to be overcome. I think there are two types 
of examples of “opening up”: One is consciously and willingly opening up to 
hurt that one knows one will most likely encounter. For example, under special 
circumstances, one might think it is reasonable to “open up” to the hurt 
caused by say a good friend who is ill or has been through an especially 
difficult spell who is then being hurtful. In less exotic cases, and often in most 
cases, there’s less reason to do this; to open up in this sort of willing way 
knowing that hurt is very likely to occur. The second way of opening up is to 
open up to the possibility of being hurt in the hope that you will not be hurt - 
expecting not to be harmed but trusting those around you to treat you with 
respect and dignity. It is this second type of “openness” that I think relates 
more to learning. In most cases, the student opens themselves to the possible 
	
84 There is a host of research into how it is indeed possible to “lower one’s 
defenses” in psychology. Schema Therapy for example discusses “detached 
protector mode” and “avoidant protector mode”.  
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risk of encountering people such as teachers or other classmates who 
humiliate them but that does not usually happen. However, when it does, 
sometimes the benefits may be better than the detriments and it might be 
worth having been “open”. As such I think there are more, or less valuable 
ways of dealing with our vulnerabilities, and these depend on various 
circumstances, some of which may have to do with the whether or not we are 
more, or less inherently vulnerable to begin with, what sort of situational 
vulnerabilities we are exposed to, whether the hurt has any benefits at all and 
what tools we have to turn the hurtful experience into a positive/beneficial 
one. My view is that while it is appropriate to fear being wounded and to raise 
our defences when we feel we cannot cope with the potential wounding, or 
when we feel that we may be exploited, appropriate, vulnerable engagement 
with the world can be positive and need not necessarily lead to weakness. For 
instance, being aware and appropriately responsive to that which can hurt 
others is often viewed as virtuous and when we respond appropriately to 
others’ vulnerability it is usually beneficial to building and maintaining the 
wellbeing of relationships and communities. But how about being aware and 
responding to our own vulnerabilities? When we are aware of what can cause 
us hurt, and when we can respond to these appropriately, this too can 
contribute to building and strengthening ourselves, our communities and the 
relationships we value, and it too, it seems fair to say, is virtuous.  
 
Here’s an example that references physical vulnerability but which I think 
might be helpful in elucidating my point. Take for instance the fact that we are 
mortal, which makes us vulnerable to physical wounding and ultimately death. 
The medical aid worker making the choice to treat victims of Ebola is very 
much vulnerably open to the patients she is treating, as is the passer-by who 
decides to jump into the canal to try and save a drowning man. The 
vulnerability to death and injury in these cases is a crucial factor in the 
decisions taken (or not taken) in these examples. With the medical aid worker, 
the vulnerability to disease, suffering and death is acknowledged and 
	 208	
accepted because certain beliefs and values about responsibility, duty, 
community, empathy and so on are overriding. One’s responses to 
vulnerability in these sorts of examples could be an indication of personal 
virtue, an example to others of virtuous behaviour and undoubtedly 
contributes to supporting and fostering community. One may also argue that 
accepting one’s own vulnerability and engaging vulnerably with the world 
could aid in heightening the awareness of other’s suffering and vulnerability. 
Research has found that we are more likely to feel sympathy, pity and kindness 
towards others because we have experienced or acknowledged what suffering 
feels like for ourselves, even if the circumstances are not identical. That we 
have been exposed to wounds – physical and emotional – compels us to at 
least an awareness of the vulnerability of others. This is one way in which I 
think engaging with our vulnerabilities can be beneficial. It is not the only way 
though. However, in order to present some of the other ways in which 
vulnerability is beneficial, we need to approach the notion of vulnerability from 
a slightly different angle. As I pointed out earlier, this is an angle that has not 
been developed in the existing philosophical literature, which tends to focus 
on vulnerability from the perspective of power, morality and justice. This 
notion has however been explored by psychologists and social workers, most 
prominently by Brené Brown whose Ted Talks and book The Power of 
Vulnerability achieved great popular success. The notion of vulnerability that 
Brown presents is that vulnerability is something people tend to over-protect 
by taking on cynical beliefs, numbing themselves against happiness, avoiding 
“facing” grief and shutting off their willingness to love. Inspired by interviews 
taken as part of her academic research into shame, Brown’s fundamental point 
seems to be that people essentially erect barriers that prevent them from 
experiencing hurt and disappointment and this stunts their potential for 
growth and happiness.85 This idea of erecting barriers in order to protect 
	
85 Even though Brown is an academic and some of her other work, namely her 
research on shame, has been published in academic journals, this book is 
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oneself from potential wounding to the detriment of one’s personal 
development is in particular the idea that I would like to explore with 
reference to learning alongside the approach on vulnerability that 
philosophers such as Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds have taken.  
 
If we were to accept that being willing to engage vulnerably with the world is 
also what allows one to build close and intimate relationships and to grow as a 
person, then we might be more willing to accept that vulnerability is not 
always and necessarily unfavourable. By sometimes resisting the urge to don 
“armoury” to protect ourselves, we can make deeper and more genuine 
connections with others, build trust when those we are willing to “be 
vulnerable with” accept and support us, develop empathy because, as I 
mentioned before, we develop a better understanding of people’s choices, 
behaviours and emotional responses and perhaps even take responsibility for 
our actions and choices because we avoid adopting tactics that protect us 
from coming to terms with truths that might be injurious to us. As a result, we 
could change behaviours that are damaging to our personal growth and 
happiness.  
 
I am not suggesting that one should seek to engage vulnerably with the world 
simply for the sake of being open to harm, as if making oneself open to harm 
was a good in and of itself. It is also the case that engaging vulnerably with the 
world need not always be a good thing. Lowering one’s defences is not always 
the best way to deal with situations that evoke our disposition to vulnerability. 
Sometimes, it might be better for our wellbeing if we erect our defences and 
	
aimed at a general audience and as such it does not contain any of the 
conventions of academic research. As such, I refer to Brown’s ideas here not 
so much to use her work as academic justification but to indicate that there 
has already been some precedent (and success) in taking this alternative 
approach to exploring vulnerability.  
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protect ourselves. It is difficult to say, systematically, when it is best to build up 
or lower our defences. This would depend on the extent of our inherent 
vulnerability, our state of mind at the time, the circumstance we are in, what 
we hope to gain or achieve and what the risks are of exposing our vulnerable 
selves. Recalling what I said earlier about situational vulnerability, people can 
be vulnerable in different ways, to different things and to different degrees. 
For instance, if someone is already extremely vulnerable, it may not be a good 
idea to suggest that they expose themselves to more, at least until such time 
that they feel well prepared. This is where knowledge, understanding and self-
awareness can have an important role to play.86 The more knowledge and 
understanding one has of one’s circumstances, the options available, risks and 
outcomes, the more likely one is able to make the right decisions about how 
to respond to one’s vulnerability. One can be careful and tentative in 
practising one’s responses to vulnerability as well. It does not have to be all or 
nothing. We may be able to lower some of our defences in situations where 
we feel safer or where we understand that what is to gain is worth some 
discomfort for us, and then we can assess how the experience affected us and 
learn further from this by the fact that these experiences can give us a useful 
indication of when it would be helpful to lower our defences and when not, 
how much of our defences to lower and what sort of support systems we may 
need once we have taken the steps to respond to our vulnerabilities in this 
way. Offering a formula of any kind would be difficult given how many 
subjective and personal factors would be at play but here is a guide of sorts as 
to how “open” one should be. For example: It would be advisable to avoid 
situations where being vulnerable might lead to a loss of self-esteem and 
confidence. Being vulnerably open to the world will sometimes lead to 
disappointments and a loss of confidence, the point here is that should not be 
	
86 This sort of reflexive activity is not expected of young children, so this is 
perhaps a good point at which to be reminded that my account of love for 
learning is not applicable to them. 
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so severe that one becomes depressed, has a breakdown or is unable to carry 
on with one’s usual tasks. It would also be pertinent to avoid entering into 
situations if one thinks that one’s vulnerabilities might result in one being put-
off learning from then on. One should also avoid being open in situations 
where they feel there is a risk of being manipulated or exploited. Of course no 
one can be certain of making the right call in every situation, and there might 
be one or more instances where being open results in these consequences. 
The solution there is to take time to recover, reflect on those situations and 
draw useful observations and insights for future situations.87 
 
6.3 Vulnerability in the Learning Context 
 
So far, my aim has been to offer a few exploratory reasons for why it is worth 
investigating how vulnerability, something normally associated with weakness, 
can be viewed not just as valuable, but also as associative with strength and 
virtue. It can be very enriching and perhaps even empowering to practice 
making decisions about the proper responses to vulnerability, that is, being 
open to or dealing with one’s vulnerabilities in a non-defensive way, with 
particular reference to learning. Temporality, awareness of our own and 
others’ vulnerabilities and virtue also feature when we think about vulnerability 
and learning, not least because our lives are finite and we cannot know 
everything there is to know before “our time is up”. Learning involves 
openness and vulnerability too involves openness. Choosing how much and 
what we learn requires us being “open” to knowledge, new perspectives and 
	
87 I think it is also possible that certain vulnerabilities are not static. They may 
disappear or change, increase or decrease over time. Additionally, we see a 
link here between the value of thinking of our experiences within context and 
across the span of our past, present and future, in the way that Dewey 
recommends. This broad perspective gives us better awareness of what we 
can “manage” in terms of being “open”.  
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possibilities and lowering our defences so that we are able to more fully 
engage with our learning and make connections between what we learn and 
our own lives. To some extent this requires us to be “open”, aware and 
reflective – not just about our own vulnerable situations but those of others; 
this awareness helps us understand or make sense of different beliefs and 
values and where they may be stemming from and how to better manage 
them or cope with them. In learning, one “opens” oneself to the world, 
exposes oneself to the possibility that one was mistaken in one’s views about 
some subject matter or beliefs, that one was wrong about certain facts or 
information, that one perhaps does not know as much as one believes one 
does, that one needs to learn from someone wiser, more skilled, more learned 
or knowledgeable, that one is perhaps not as well-disposed to a particular skill 
that one thought they had special talents for; essentially, being vulnerable to 
learning requires that one be “open” and willing to accept that their beliefs, 
attitudes, perspectives and even self-knowledge might be challenged. In this 
sense, learning makes one immediately “known” and vulnerable. Once one is 
“open” and “known” in this way, one is also more at risk of being 
manipulated. For example, when a student “opens” herself up to her teacher, 
there is a chance the teacher might abuse her power. I say more on this in the 
following section on “wounding”. 
 
Vulnerability also comes into play when we take risks with what we venture to 
learn – do we stick with facts and perspectives we are comfortable with or are 
we willing to genuinely and respectfully seek out and consider very different 
views that might make us uneasy. One is likely to feel disappointed if one were 
to discover, by being vulnerable in their learning and acquiring new 
knowledge, that one’s life’s work was misguided and wasted. These kinds of 
realisations can even be traumatic for some. So we can see that considerations 
of when to be vulnerable and when not to, require care and deliberation.  
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What we choose to do with what we learn or how we choose to apply what we 
learn can also put us in a vulnerable position. For example, do we attempt to 
share what we have learned with others who may shun us for having those 
perspectives? Here, Plato’s cave allegory comes to mind. Do we try to apply 
what we have learned to make changes to our lives or those of our 
communities even if this requires taxing, consuming work? These decisions 
can be difficult to make and in the sections that follow, I explore some of the 
considerations we need to keep in mind. 
 
6.4 Wounding in the Learning Context 
 
I have introduced some of the concerns that arise from vulnerability in 
learning, it might be useful first to establish what the risk of wounding is when 
it comes to learning, because wounding is such a fundamental concept when 
it comes to understanding vulnerability.  
 
There are broadly two ways of being wounded that I would like to consider 
here. The first one, is being wounded by others. This, I think is a contingent 
feature of learning from others. Giving authority and power to a teacher or a 
mentor puts one at risk of being wounded because a teacher or mentor might 
abuse that power and you might be wounded as a result, although this is not 
always the case, or even often the case, it remains a possibility. The second 
way is through the possibility of experiencing something I call “epistemic 
vulnerability”.  
 
Epistemic vulnerability refers to situations in which wounds come about as a 
result of one being “carried away” from or “resisting” the truth. In these cases, 
one may hold on to false beliefs and even endorse these beliefs and pass 
them on to others. So, in an effort to learn, someone might “open” 
themselves up and begin to acquire false beliefs, or even substitute true 
beliefs for false ones, causing themselves damage and wounding in this 
	 214	
epistemic sense because they are further away from the truth. I explore the 
philosophical nature of false beliefs in a bit, referring to the work of 
philosophers such as Katherine Puddifoot and WK Clifford, but first let me 
suggest how this “carrying away” or “resisting” could happen. One might 
make oneself vulnerable to someone, or some material that endorses false 
beliefs (for example we see this sort of thing in a more extreme sense in how 
cults operate or with those who buy into spurious conspiracy theories) or 
perhaps because one is in self-delusion of some kind as a way of protecting 
oneself from the consequences of having discovered a truth that will cause 
one significant wounds.  
 
Take the example of a scientist who has been conducting research on whether 
the earth is flat or round. She has up until this new discovery, held the belief 
that the earth is flat but discovers eventually that it is round and not flat. She 
now experiences the negatively disconcerting feelings associated with holding 
this false belief for so long, and perhaps even hedging other beliefs and 
speculations on this false belief. Additionally, endorsing this new belief would 
very likely, at the least, involve ridicule and ostracism by members of the 
scientific, religious as well as wider community. Some of the options now 
available to her are: she could grit her teeth, be willing to face the 
consequences and share these findings even if it means being heavily 
wounded, because she holds that the truth is valuable over and above any 
injuries she may suffer for sharing it; she could decide to keep quiet about it to 
protect herself, and let us imagine that she is already especially vulnerable and 
emotionally fragile because of past experiences so this is an option she is 
seriously considering. She could even begin to actively now search for reasons 
why her new discovery may not be altogether accurate in a bid to convince 
herself or even delude herself that this new discovery is in fact not legitimate, 
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so that she can hold onto the “old” false belief, because this would make the 
situation easier to manage going forward.88 
 
Examples related to epistemic vulnerability, or straying away from or resisting 
the truth (like the one above) are interesting for two reasons: (1) if we are 
vulnerable in learning, and the result is that true beliefs are replaced by false 
ones, is it actually the case that it is valuable to be vulnerable in learning? (2) 
up until now, I have said that deciding when to be vulnerable in learning is 
dependent on one’s situation and life experiences, but when the truth is at 
stake as it is in the example of the scientist above, do we become responsible 
for “opening up”, being vulnerable, even when we know that the injury to us 
may be significant? Note that once the scientist fully endorses this discovery 
and her beliefs, she becomes even more vulnerable to a society that could 
ridicule and ostracize her, or worse. In a situation like this, can it simply be a 
question of weighing up costs and benefits based on her own circumstances, 
or do we need to consider more factors, such as the ultimate societal gain 
from a discovery of this significance, which perhaps outweighs any harm she 
may experience? 
 
In response to (1), we naturally assume that holding false beliefs is not a 
valuable thing, especially when it comes to learning, which has the function of 
leading us to truth. Therefore, we would assume that being vulnerable, if it 
could lead us to believing falsehoods, is not something to aspire to. However 
it is true that there may be instances of learning, because we have to be 
“open” to some extent, that we come across information that is false. Since I 
	
88 In terms of vulnerability in learning, with the scientist, she has made herself 
vulnerable by doing such research to begin with, because there was the risk 
that her beliefs would be challenged and shown to be wrong. There is also the 
additional risk of vulnerability in deciding whether or not to go forward with 
sharing her discovery.  
	 216	
explained earlier that learning is not simply a matter of passively absorbing 
information as presented by others, then if it is passive absorption or 
unanalysed and unquestioning believing that is occurring, then I would 
suggest that actual learning is not taking place in these instances. As 
understanding in the form of cognitive control is a necessary component of 
learning, I would hold that genuine learning should not result in true beliefs 
being replaced by false ones because exercising the abilities that constitute 
cognitive control should usually raise red flags about false information. 
However, given that there are varying degrees of cognitive control, there may 
be some cases in which one does not spot the red flags because one is not yet 
in possession of strong enough cognitive control. I would recommend that the 
learner make attempts to verify what they have learned, particularly if the 
source is questionable. In fact, this is usually good practice for everyone, 
regardless of how good his or her cognitive control is. This is a better option 
than “closing” ourselves up from learning for fear that we may occasionally 
end up in an epistemically vulnerable position. Think about it this way: It would 
be almost impossible to develop a loving relationship with anyone or anything 
if at the first sign of any negativity or discomfort, one “jumps ship”; the same 
could apply to how we relate to learning.    
 
The question of whether false beliefs are unacceptable has had some attention 
from philosophers such as Katherine Puddifoot and Duncan Pritchard and 
even earlier on in the 1800s from the lesser known philosopher WK Clifford. It 
is not possible to explore this debate in great detail here, so I will summarise 
and respond to two of the arguments. 
 
We saw that one of the options available to the scientist in the example is to 
convince herself to resist the true beliefs by trying to find excuses that could 
support the de-legitimising of her discovery so as to mitigate the injurious 
consequences of the truth she has discovered. Is this acceptable? Clifford 
gives the following example to suggest that it is not: 
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A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He 
knew that she was old, and not overwell built at the first; that 
she had seen many seas and climes, and often had needed 
repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she 
was not seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon his mind, and 
made him unhappy; he thought that perhaps he ought to have 
her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even though this should 
put him to great expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he 
succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections. He said 
to himself that she had gone safely through so many voyages 
and weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose she 
would not come safely home from this trip also. He would put 
his trust in Providence, which could hardly fail to protect all 
these unhappy families that were leaving their fatherland to 
seek for better times elsewhere. He would dismiss from his mind 
all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty of builders and 
contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable 
conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he 
watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes 
for the success of the exiles in their strange new home that was 
to be; and he got his insurance-money when she went down in 
mid-ocean and told no tales. (544) 
 
Clifford holds that the shipowner is guilty of these deaths because: 
 
He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient 
investigation, but by stifling his doubts. And although in the end 
he may have felt so sure about it that he could not think 
otherwise, yet in as much as he had knowingly and willingly 
worked himself into that frame of mind, he must be held 
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responsible for it…The question of right or wrong has to do 
with the origin of his belief, not the matter of it; not what it was, 
but how he got it; not whether it turned out to be true or false, 
but whether he had a right to believe on such evidence as was 
before him. (545) 
 
According to Clifford, the rationale for this is that our beliefs affect our actions. 
It would not be controversial to say that what we believe about the world 
influences our behaviour. For example, if I believe that my roof needs fixing, I 
call a roofer, if I believe that speaking ill of others is wrong, I do not gossip 
with malice. If I believe that climate change is fake, I do not heed any advice 
about protecting the environment. Having false beliefs can lead us into actions 
that are impractical, unhelpful and even dangerous to others and ourselves. So 
if we are purposely resisting true beliefs and replacing them with false ones 
that are more in line with the consequences we prefer or would hope to be the 
case then according to Clifford, this is objectionable.  
 
Quite apart from concerns we might have about the self-delusional excuse 
making employed by the shipowner and the scientist to avoid facing the 
wounds of endorsing their true beliefs, if our scientist retains the false belief 
that the earth is flat despite discovering it is not (by stifling her findings and 
her thoughts, for example, or working herself, like the shipowner into a frame 
of mind where retaining the false belief was possible), her actions would likely 
be to continue with her research, publications, engagements with others and 
her projects as if the earth was flat and she had not discovered otherwise. She 
may keep quiet, instead of giving support if another scientist made the same 
discovery and unlike her, spoke up. The outcome of this is that it would 
actively be impeding progress in science and the benefits that would come 
from this discovery. She would also be encouraging the continued false belief 
of others by keeping quiet or continuing to actively endorse a belief she now 
has little reason to maintain, and (indirectly) promoting the progress of useless 
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and perhaps even detrimental projects and activities that rely on the belief 
that the earth is flat. Therefore, by maintaining a belief that she now has no 
reason to, the scientist acts in accordance with this belief, thereby very 
probably setting off a chain of negative consequences not just for herself, but 
for others and society in general. 
 
There is of course the counter-argument that not all beliefs will or must result 
in actions, so in cases where they do not, holding or maintaining false beliefs 
may not be so much of a problem, and in fact, may help one avoid these 
vulnerability-related wounds. Research by Bortolotti and Antrobus suggests 
that it may be advantageous for some persons suffering from some severe 
forms of depression to maintain false beliefs, or ‘distorted interpretations of 
experiences’, that better fit with their existing schema than to eliminate these 
delusions, because the cost in knowledge of this distorted or false belief is 
outweighed by the benefit of reduced anxiety for that person (190-210). So, 
perhaps what is at stake in terms of the knowledge lost should factor into the 
decision as to whether or how much to make oneself vulnerable. And in any 
case, this research seems to indicate that there is epistemic innocence in 
holding false beliefs if one is severely depressed (which fortunately, is not the 
state that most of us are in).89  
	
89 I think in very special cases, where someone is very depressed or holds 
fragmenting/fragmented beliefs, false beliefs may be acceptable. I would 
suggest that the reason not to think of these types of wounds in this case is 
that they do not actually count as the same sort of epistemological wounding I 
am interested in here. In these special cases, we would want to let these 
people have these false beliefs, perhaps even reinforce them. If we wanted to 
insist that these too are instances of epistemic wounding, in the grander 
scheme of things for these people suffering from serious mental health issues, 
the epistemic wounding would be minor in comparison to other sorts of 
wounds they may suffer from knowing the truth.  
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Relatedly, another argument put forward by Clifford suggests that false beliefs 
compromise the work of our forefathers by infecting the existing collective 
body of knowledge. He writes: 
 
That duty (to mankind) is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as 
from pestilence, which may shortly master our own body and 
then spread to the rest of the town. What would be thought of 
one who, for the sake of a sweet fruit, should deliberately run 
the risk of bringing a plague upon his family and his 
neighbours? (547) 
 
And additionally, holding and endorsing false beliefs without questioning, 
critically thinking and doing some of this important epistemic work ourselves, 
we are not doing our part to ‘build up knowledge’ in the spirit in which it has 
been shared with us by those who came before us. He writes: 
 
We shall find reason to answer that it is not only possible and 
right, but our bounden duty; that the main purpose of the 
tradition itself is to supply us with the means of asking 
questions, of testing and inquiring into things; that if we misuse 
it, and take it as a collection of cut-and-dried statements to be 
accepted without further inquiry, we are not only injuring 
ourselves here, but, by refusing to do our part towards the 
building up of the fabric which shall be inherited by our 
children, we are tending to cut off ourselves and our race from 
the human line. (547) 
 
These arguments go to the heart of the scientist example because in 
maintaining her false belief Clifford would argue that she is both polluting 
collective reserves of knowledge as well as failing in her duties as a human 
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being to contribute, through critical thinking and questioning, to the 
progression of the human race as a whole. While these arguments may suit the 
scientist example because of the significant, worldview-altering nature of the 
knowledge she possesses and the damage that her preservation of the false 
belief will bring about, one could say that most of us who do not hold such 
important knowledge could get away with avoiding a true belief, avoiding the 
questioning of suspect beliefs, or providing ourselves with convenient excuses 
and reasoning to maintain a false belief because the true belief is just too 
injurious. So perhaps Clifford is being too demanding or dramatic. Or is he? 
 
In response, it would seem to me that in the times we now live in, where we 
turn to the internet and to Wikipedia and other similar platforms for 
information, that we rely in an unprecedented way on the authority and 
integrity of anonymous people to provide us with information. We rely on 
these people to convey truths that have been critically assessed and 
supported with sound evidence and it is not always the case that our trust is 
repaid with information that is not biased and that is the product of rigorous 
research. This means that we are becoming increasingly epistemically 
vulnerable because of how knowledge is shared and because we cannot 
always rely on the authority of those who are sharing this knowledge. 
Additionally, we live in an age where information about us, and our beliefs, is 
constantly being mined by companies collecting data online who then align 
news feeds, advertisements and so on based on information gathered about 
our preferences and ultimately, beliefs. In this way, news feeds and products 
that reinforce those beliefs can shore up false beliefs, and we are “carried 
away” further and further away from the truth. All of us who use the Internet 
are therefore at risk of the wounds of epistemic vulnerability more than ever 
before. And Clifford’s argument that false beliefs contaminate the reserve of 
shared knowledge to the detriment of all of society then seem less overly-
dramatic and more plausible. So on the basis of what we have seen so far, 
	 222	
what does this mean for encouraging vulnerability in learning? And what does 
it mean for the scientist? 
 
As I said earlier, the risk of epistemic vulnerability should not be met with us 
putting up barriers to learning. With the practice and acquisition of cognitive 
control, the risk of acquiring false beliefs and being “taken away” from the 
truth is less likely. This is especially why we need to reform learning in schools 
and draw attention to the attainment and the constant practicing of cognitive 
control. In terms of the scientist, as I said earlier, the significance of her 
discovery suggests she does have a much stronger duty than others to stick 
with the truth and endorse those beliefs, perhaps even more so because a 
profession like hers is especially tied to the quest for discovering truth, so to 
be both true to herself and to carry out her responsibility to society it would 
seem she should take the risk of further wounding. However, this does not 
mean she has to plunge into it. She could take steps to minimise the wounds 
or make preparations to better cope with them; for example, she could 
approach trusted mentors or colleagues to share her findings and garner 
support before sharing it with the wider community. Where we know wounds 
are likely in this process of learning, the key to reaping the fruits of this risk 
may be to find ways to reduce damage and better prepare ourselves for 
managing the injuries, as opposed to replacing true beliefs with false ones. 
 
Problematic actions that result from false beliefs are not the only complications 
one faces with holding or maintaining false beliefs. False beliefs about one 
thing can lead to or fuel false beliefs about other things, resulting in for 
example, unfair stereotyping and implicit bias. In her paper “Dissolving The 
Epistemic/Ethical Dilemma Over Implicit Bias”, Katherine Puddifoot discusses 
inaccurate beliefs about social facts, specifically, the spontaneous stereotyping 
found in implicit bias. If we take it from an ethical perspective, the general 
agreement is that we should begin from a position of treating everyone 
equally and maintain that belief, until shown otherwise, that everyone is 
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equally likely to possess certain characteristics and qualities regardless of 
gender, race and so on. However, if our focus is on the more epistemic issues 
of knowledge and understanding, then it would be of greater benefit to us if 
our beliefs reflect actual social inequalities and biases and the fact that 
statistically, some social groups are more likely to possess certain traits rather 
than holding the egalitarian belief even if it is the more ethical one. While 
Puddifoot claims that holding these beliefs based on stereotypes offers us the 
greater likelihood of making true assumptions concerning random individuals, 
there are a multitude of drawbacks which include what she refers to as 
“distortion of memory”. Research findings indicate that if a person (A) is 
conscious of the social traits of an individual (B) and those traits match a 
stereotype, then not only does the specific information retained about that 
individual (B) increase, but the person (A) also becomes more biased towards 
believing the stereotype. Additionally, the increase in quantity of information 
remembered does not outweigh the increase in bias, so it would be better to 
remember less and be less biased. Another epistemic disadvantage of 
stereotyping is that in holding these beliefs about stereotypes, one fails to 
take notice of the differences between individuals and the similarities between 
members of different groups. The cost of this is that decisions and judgements 
are made without accounting for potentially significant related information. 
One might also wrongly attribute certain explanations for a person’s behaviour 
that fit the stereotype, disregarding or not even considering other 
explanations that may be more pertinent, or accurate. (S73- S75)  
 
Puddifoot’s claims suggest that while there may sometimes be a benefit to 
holding false beliefs such as stereotypes, (because if these stereotypes are 
indeed true, we may make better and/or faster assessments), there are enough 
of possible errors in forming related beliefs and assessments that it seems best 
to avoid holding on to or endorsing false beliefs. These examples may refer to 
stereotypes and implicit bias but we can imagine them relating to other 
learning contexts as well, because fundamentally, what Puddifoot’s point 
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addresses is the fact that false beliefs can influence other beliefs and attitudes 
in a way that negatively compromises our judgements. If one of the most 
crucial points of learning is to find our way closer to truth and aid our decision 
making processes, then it seems counterproductive, in most cases, unless one 
is severely depressed, to endorse false beliefs even when one suspects or 
knows these beliefs to be false (S79-S83).  
 
Another point to consider has to do with examples where the false beliefs end 
up having no role in one’s cognitive life. Someone may ask, where is the 
wounding in cases like that? Take for example that one has a false belief about 
a very abstract mathematical principle. If one never has cause to use this 
principle then has one actually been wounded in any way? Relatedly, if one 
has acquired false beliefs, and never realises one has acquired such beliefs 
and those false beliefs end up seeming not to have any bearing whatsoever in 
any way on one’s life, how has one been disadvantaged? 
 
The answer to the first question, in cases where one realises they’ve acquired a 
false belief but it has no actual impact on their lives, the wounding, though 
very minor, might occur in the awareness that one failed to acquire a true 
belief – I would suggest this might simply be a very mild disruption to one’s 
self-assurance or “ego” (wounds do not have to be significant to count as 
wounds all the same).  
 
The answer to the second, related question, is that I think in those cases, there 
is still wounding taking place because although it may seem as if the false 
belief has had no bearing on one’s life it is now part of a set of beliefs that I 
am disposed to using at some point in time and that set of beliefs is now 
‘contaminated’ or ‘faulty’ as a result of this one false belief. Even if I never 
directly use that one false belief, this relevant belief may have an impact on 
other beliefs, which I would then use to make some decision or form some 
opinion at some point in my life. If that false belief ends up not affecting any 
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of my beliefs at any point then that is just a matter of luck. So having 
subsumed this false belief into my endorsed set of beliefs is indeed wounding, 
albeit not immediately evidently so.  
 
The value of being “open” to the possibility of these types of “epistemic 
wounding” is that the alternative, which is “shutting oneself off” from learning 
or limiting oneself in learning could have more detrimental effects. As I 
discussed earlier, the way to mitigate against the “fallout” of these sorts of 
wounds is to acquire and exercise cognitive control whenever we are learning. 
The abilities that constitute cognitive control should usually raise red flags 
about false information. When in doubt, carefully and conscientiously 
exercising cognitive control while cross-referencing reliable sources or 
engaging in discussion and debate with reliable authorities on the subject 
could also help limit the acquisition of false beliefs. 
 
For those of us who respond with some vulnerability to learning, the most 
common wounds we experience would be the milder negative disturbances or 
disconcerting moments we might feel when we realise we have been wrong or 
believed in something that was false, or similar periods of unsettling as we try 
to acquire and accept new beliefs. Some of us overcome these moments quite 
quickly and may even feel grateful or happy to have experienced them, but it 
remains that even if for just a moment and mildly, learning always offers the 
possibility of being wounded. This is regardless of whether we are learning in 
a social environment or a private, even solitary one. It may not be the case 
that we are always wounded, or wounded dreadfully and traumatically, but we 
do risk being wounded whenever we choose to truly learn. Being vulnerably 
open to the world is then no small challenge and would appear to require, 
even in mild cases, courage and resilience. 
 
I now consider the other type of wounding, one that occurs when we give 
power to teachers and other figures of authority in learning. As we have seen, 
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much of the philosophical work on vulnerability focuses on our vulnerabilities 
with respect to others. This is certainly relevant to learning because it is often 
the case that we depend on someone, for example, a teacher, a mentor or 
someone else, a figure of authority who is deemed knowledgeable to teach us 
and guide us. In doing so we allow ourselves to be “known” by them. By this I 
mean, being open and honest with them about our weaknesses, fears and 
ignorance so that we can learn more effectively and deeply. This opens us up 
to the possibilities of wounding because teachers and mentors know our fears 
and weaknesses and there is the possibility that they may exploit, manipulate 
or worsen them. The relationship between dependence and vulnerability is 
explained by Dodds, who writes: 
 
Dependence is one form of vulnerability. Dependence is 
vulnerability that requires the support of a specific person 
(or people)—that is, care. To be dependent is to be in 
circumstances in which one must rely on the care of other 
individuals to access, provide or secure (one or more of) one’s 
needs, and promote and support the development of one’s or 
agency. (182-183) 
 
Joel Anderson writes: 
 
Autonomy skills are learned with and from others. Social 
institutions and interpersonal relationships provide the contexts 
and supports for acquiring these competencies. And many of 
the most personally significant contexts in which we exercise 
these autonomy competencies are in social, interpersonal 
relations. (138) 
 
In so far as learners depend on teachers and other figures of authority to not 
only provide them with knowledge and skills to exercise cognitive control, and 
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in so far as autonomy skills are learned from others, as Dodds and Anderson 
point out respectively, the development of learner’s autonomy and agency is 
also part of the experience of learning. In Chapter 3 we saw that Dewey had a 
similar notion. Equipping learners with the abilities to exercise cognitive 
control is precisely the sort of teaching that supports their autonomy. It 
prepares them for making independent judgements and decisions and finding 
solutions to unique problems they may encounter. Caring teachers ensure that 
learners are truly equipped with these skills because they value their students’ 
abilities to exercise their autonomy and agency. Enabling this autonomy and 
agency can take many shapes and forms, from providing opportunities for 
students to practice their skills, ask questions and clarify doubts to treating 
them with respect and dignity when they get things wrong or reveal other 
inadequacies. If treated in this way, students will come to find that being 
vulnerable in a safe space, where there is less judgement and more 
encouragement, and where there is appropriate nurturing of critical and 
questioning abilities that are in line with the abilities of cognitive control, can 
be fruitful, fulfilling and enjoyable. We can quite easily appreciate how 
someone could come to value learning if opening up to it made them feel 
positively challenged, nurtured, and resulted in them not just gaining 
knowledge but skills to be independent and confident in themselves. I 
consider autonomy and agency again in Chapter 7. However not all learning 
environments and journeys are like this. So when they are not, how would 
someone who deeply values learning respond? Here’s an example from my 
own experience of a less than ideal learning experience.  
 
As an undergraduate student, I recall attending the first lecture for a 
philosophy module on language where the lecturer rattled off a list of 
“famous” books and treatises and asked us if we had all read them. As new 
students of philosophy, most of us had not heard of many of them and some 
of us honestly admitted so. He then proceeded to embarrass and chastise us, 
saying we had some audacity to want to study philosophy without reading 
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these great works. A little unnerved by this, no one dared ask any further 
questions or admit any ignorance for the rest of that lecture. The following 
week, a third of the class had dropped that module and opted to take 
something else. However, for those of us who returned, the lecturer, now 
being aware of our ignorance of the philosophy of language, paced his 
lectures accordingly, explained concepts in greater detail and recommended a 
variety of guidebooks he had not initially planned to, to help us master what 
was needed more swiftly.  
 
In this example, some of us decided to be honest about our ignorance, thus 
opening ourselves up to the possibility of wounding in the form of ridicule by 
the lecturer. It would not necessarily be the case that every time one opens 
oneself up to the possibility of ridicule that one will in fact be ridiculed, though 
often it is hard to tell beforehand how someone might respond. In this case, 
the lecturer regrettably used the opportunity to shame us. Some of us 
returned for the subsequent lectures and benefitted from a modified lecture 
plan that took into account our learning needs and addressed the ignorance 
we had admitted. For us returning students, being honest was the right 
response to our vulnerability, because it meant that we were now well on our 
way to learning about something we wanted to know more about, at a pace 
that better suited us.  
 
For some who were not able or willing to return to his lectures afterwards, 
their reasons may have been that they personally felt more harm would be 
caused to their learning attitudes or self-esteem had they continued. Over the 
years that I have been a teacher and mentor, I have heard similar stories from 
students and mentees about teachers who mocked or made fun of them and 
how this resulted in them feeling ashamed and becoming fearful of the 
possibility of ridicule in most learning situations (not just the ones involving 
that particular teacher). For some students even the slightest comment on 
their ignorance about something, or a mild challenge or their beliefs by their 
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teachers or classmates could affect them badly enough that they entirely 
stopped engaging in that subject or in learning altogether.  
 
As we discussed earlier, this may be the sort of case where situational 
vulnerabilities need to be considered as well. Perhaps some of them have 
been emotionally, or psychologically abused and being shamed was a trigger 
for uncomfortable, even painful feelings and memories. For others, it may 
have been similar previous learning experiences that they knew had ended 
badly. In these instances, it is crucial to rightly judge when, and how much of 
our vulnerabilities to expose in these learning situations. In deciding how 
vulnerable one should allow oneself to be, knowing when or how much to 
build up or lower our defences, if someone is already aware that they are 
especially sensitive to being open in some instances, or are at a point in their 
lives, due to personal circumstances at a higher risk of being discouraged, 
disillusioned or depressed, then perhaps responding necessarily with 
openness to those vulnerable situations may not always be the right response. 
However, it may also not be the right response to, from then onwards, never 
attempt to be open again. This requires us to know ourselves well enough, to 
exercise some wisdom, in choosing when, how and how much to expose or 
engage with our vulnerabilities; when we should prepare ourselves to feel 
some humiliation and soldier on, or when we should decide to protect 
ourselves by walking away or putting up our defences. There is of course also 
the option, when we feel we cannot assess these situations for ourselves, to 
seek professional or trustworthy advice and support and use that as a guide. 
 
The options are not of course limited to either taking the course or dropping 
out. One could decide to make an official complaint against the lecturer that 
may result in him adopting a changed attitude or even in someone else taking 
over the teaching of the course. There is a risk here too, and approaching 
figures of authority and power to share such grievances can make one 
especially vulnerable to the abuse of power. I do not want to argue that all 
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learning is in such a special category that a lover of learning should be 
prepared to take on any and all wounding for the sake of learning (Later in this 
section I consider some situations in which some kinds of learning may require 
us to be willing to suffer more significant wounds). I believe that some 
resilience in the face of injury is probably a good thing for most of us because, 
for example, it can help remove us from harmful situations, help us achieve 
goals, help us gain confidence and to realise our autonomy and ability to 
activate change for ourselves and others. Again, how much is appropriate will 
depend on individual circumstances. I would like to recommend, though, that 
because it will often be the case that the more frequent wounds we encounter 
in learning are milder negative disruptions (as I discussed earlier), it is worth 
remembering that this discomfort will most likely pass. That being the case, it 
is then worth carefully considering and reflecting on giving up the learning 
opportunity and its potential for positive outcomes. One may even consider 
seeking out support from others to cope with these feelings before deciding 
to forego the opportunity for learning. This is because the benefits of learning 
could outweigh these often minor and short-lived disruptions and this attitude 
could result in a person, over time and further learning experiences, coming to 
find that they can take these disruptions in their stride and see them as a 
starting point for positive feelings and states, such as self-confidence, self-
awareness, joy and wisdom that will often follow. Therein, potentially, lies the 
key to forming a “loving relationship” with learning. 
  
It could also be the case that some students did not return because their egos 
were bruised and they did not like looking silly to the lecturer and their 
classmates. So, primarily for that reason, they were willing, at least in this 
instance, to give up on learning about the philosophy of language that 
semester. If it was simply a question of ego and pride, then again, perhaps 
taking the embarrassment less seriously may have meant they learned 
something they were interested in from someone who ended up, in spite of 
his brash personality, to be a pretty good teacher.  
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Experiences of learning have the potential to wound one even if one is 
learning independently; without a teacher, classmates or anyone at all present 
to facilitate public embarrassment or lessening of stature of any kind. Let us 
imagine someone living alone on a desert island. They have spent a significant 
amount of time exploring the island and learning about the plant and animal 
life. They have diligently recorded their research and based certain beliefs 
about the island, its location, environment and flora and fauna on this. They 
believe themselves to have expert knowledge on the island but continue to 
explore and research further. One day they learn that one of the beliefs they 
have held, say on the location of the island turns out to be wrong. This means 
that some of the other beliefs they held about the types of flora and fauna on 
the island are also erroneous because such flora and fauna could not exist on 
islands in this sort of location. There is no one else present to witness this 
error, to challenge or ridicule them. Yet, I think it would be fair to say that at 
least at that moment of discovering that their beliefs have been wrong all this 
while, the solitary islander would feel, if not deep disappointment that years of 
research and beliefs have now been shown to be wrong, some twinge of 
negative disturbance or unsettling about this new discovery that has disrupted 
their previous beliefs, making those previous beliefs now false. The wound 
here may not be traumatising or life altering, but it is enough that it causes a 
negative disturbance and unsettling, even if only in a mild sense. Not 
exposing oneself to alternative points-of-views ensures that one does not 
need to experience the stress and anxiety that may accompany the realisation 
that one’s own point-of-view is erroneous or problematic in some way. In fact, 
for some, the experience of challenging or having their beliefs and attitudes 
challenged can be downright terrifying because these challenges could 
potentially result in one’s life being disrupted to varying extents – from mild to 
severe. However, finding genuine value and meaningfulness in learning cannot 
arise from protecting oneself from learning or from approaching learning with 
a shield and armour, ready to dodge and deflect at the slightest sign of 
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discomfort. Abandoning or avoiding opportunities and “journeys” of learning 
like this are likely to leave one feeling unfulfilled, frustrated and ignorant, and 
true lovers of learning will see the importance of pushing past discomforts 
rather than experiencing the effects of deserting what they are pursuing in 
their learning.  
 
In instances where what we are learning endorses what we believe and 
reinforces it, the risk we have taken with being vulnerable has immediate 
payoff in terms of facilitating feelings of joy, excitement and self-assurance. 
Then, the excitement of discovering some new knowledge, even when this 
discovery discounts previously held knowledge and beliefs, will in certain 
cases outweigh the negative, wounded feelings that one may have 
experienced in situations like those in the earlier examples. In these cases, the 
joy of finally “getting to the truth” will make it easier for one to face that 
wound: the emotional benefit of being vulnerable and feeling the negative 
disruptions or emotional outcomes will be outweighed by the emotional 
benefits of the feeling of achievement, resilience, courage and so on.  
 
 
6.5 Conclusion, and a note about the role of teachers 
 
Often, if we want to get the most out of learning, and certainly if we want to 
arrive at a place of loving learning, we must be prepared to approach learning 
with courage and a bit of a “thick skin”. True lovers of learning are more adept 
at not allowing feelings of shame or embarrassment to get the better of them, 
they tend to engage in learning with less fear of disrupting their current 
beliefs, attitudes and preconceptions and without the limiting and damaging 
anxiety that admitting ignorance is necessarily a weakness, even if at times, we 
are made to feel that it is. It is also worth noting that being vulnerable can 
result in both negative as well as positive emotional experiences and 
disruptions, where the negative effects could outweigh the positive ones. It is 
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especially in these instances that learning gives us the payoffs of excitement, 
joy and a sense of accomplishment. 
  
We live in a world where knowledge and expertise are respected and highly 
valued. Admitting that we do not know something is frequently seen as a 
weakness. Control over knowledge, facts, theories and the ability to use them 
practically and faultlessly are rewarded, and any concession of ignorance or 
uncertainty is often shamed. Many of us do not want to admit we are wrong 
because we live in a culture where being wrong, or admitting ignorance often 
results in losing respect and esteem from others. In an environment like this, 
there are those who prefer to avoid the chances of wounding altogether by 
sidestepping learning opportunities, holding on to false beliefs, defiantly 
denying or attempting to trounce views that challenge their own before giving 
those alternative views any careful thought or attention because they fear 
social wounds.  
 
One may adamantly hold onto false beliefs because it maintains a comfortable 
and familiar status-quo, or it protects one from having to come to terms with 
the consequences of the beliefs and attitudes one has held unquestioningly. 
Communities and social groups often share beliefs and attitudes. “Tribalism” 
or peer-group reasoning is a common phenomenon and runs the gamut of 
topics from religion and politics to food and fashion. To be open to alternative 
perspectives is to increase the chance of discovering that the beliefs and 
attitudes held by the tribe(s) one belongs to are not always accurate or ideal. 
This is risky because challenging the status quo can mean exclusion from the 
tribe(s), and going along with the status quo, for fear of reprisal or exclusion, 
could risk a lifetime of living with one’s own nagging doubts and feelings of 
inauthenticity.  
 
To avoid these risks and to stay as a fairly oblivious but content member of the 
tribe would mean that one would have to protect oneself from exposure to 
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alternative views, new learning and self-questioning that may well lead one to 
the confronting difficult discoveries and decisions. This sort of “shutting off” or 
“shutting out” was the concern that promoted me to consider the role of 
vulnerability in learning in the first place. I wanted to show that a lover of 
learning is characterised by their willingness to be appropriately open to the 
world and to opportunities for learning, without unduly fearing the potential to 
be wounded. Making the choice to be open indicates that the learner sees 
that the value of learning often outweighs the disadvantages of the wounds 
they may encounter in the process, making them true lovers of learning.  
 
Practical ways in which vulnerability and the openness of one’s students can 
be protected and encouraged is an important and very useful topic for further 
consideration. However, the limits of this thesis do not permit me to explore 
ideas and advice in this area in enough detail here. I do want to mention some 
very brief thoughts here though. I think a very fundamental starting point is 
that teachers should be aware that students trust them and have handed over 
some power and authority to them, and as such they should strive to respect 
their student’s trust and openness by avoiding abuses of power. Teachers can 
also moderate the classroom “vibe” and “environment” in such ways that 
encourage students to be open and non-judgemental towards other students, 
so that students feel “safe” in exploring thought and ideas openly. These are 
by no means easy to do and it is also important to acknowledge that it will 
take committed and exceptional teachers to facilitate these sorts of learning 
environments.  
As I explained in Chapter 3, Rousseau, for example suggests that vulnerability 
should be embraced even to the extent of the teacher creating and presenting 
opportunities for the student to experience vulnerability. He encourages 
teachers to carefully consider how they may provoke students in this way and 
gradually introduce them to unfamiliar and potentially disconcerting 
experiences so that their fears dissipate, they gain confidence and grown in 
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their knowledge and understanding not just of new things but also of 
themselves and how they respond to their fears. Something like this, as I 
explained, might be useful only in so far as the teacher is mindful and careful 
to avoid any abuse of power and successfully achieving anything like this 
would require a very skillful teacher as provoking students to face their fears 
by orchestrating situations where they may be wounded could backfire.  
Vulnerability in learning is a field that can do with a lot more research and 
exploration – both in terms of philosophy as well as pedagogical approaches. 
My account in this thesis serves as one possible approach to the role 
vulnerability plays in learning and how being open can add value to learning in 
ways that sustain our desire to continue learning, even at times when it is 
challenging.  
We have seen so far that lovers of learning are deeply committed to learning. 
This commitment is sustained even when learning is not enjoyable: when it is 
trying and difficult, or has the potential to cause, and sometimes does cause, 
negative disruptions and disillusionment, or generates situations in which 
difficult decisions need to be made and wounds, both minor and fleeting or 
deeper and longer lasting, are part of the outcomes of learning. Undoubtedly 
this is usually endured for the rewards of learning, which include achievement, 
fulfilment, self-assurance, independence, joy, wisdom and many others, 
including the positive feelings and experiences that come from our learning 
resulting in not just valuable outcomes for us, but for others too, whether this 
is our children, our friends, our colleagues or wider society. It is clear though, 
that consistently enjoying these fruits of learning, having and maintaining a 
“love for learning” require deep engagement and sustained commitment. It is 
my belief that wholeheartedness is something that makes it possible for one to 
both deeply engage with learning and sustain that engagement. I consider 
wholeheartedness in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Wholeheartedness  
 
As ideal as the term “wholehearted” is in describing the sense of commitment 
to learning that I want to communicate, how it has been defined and 
discussed in some of the key literature on the subject has faced some 
significant criticism. Most of this criticism stems from the lack of clarity about 
the role of ambivalence, particularly in the work of Harry Frankfurt, who is a 
key figure in this area of research. A related problem with wholeheartedness 
as it has been defined in many of these theories is that it does not take into 
appropriate consideration that as human beings, circumstances in our lives 
change. As such it is an extremely difficult and perhaps even impossible 
requirement that in order to count as a committed and autonomous agent my 
decision to endorse an isolated desire and action at an isolated and particular 
period of time reflects either my commitment or lack thereof to what are often 
projects or plans that extend over a long period of time or even over the 
entire course of one’s life. Of course difficulty is not always a good reason to 
review a theory, but in this case, resolutely sticking to one’s commitments to 
certain learning experiences may at times limit other learning experiences, 
which may in fact turn out to be more valuable. Additionally, where our aim is 
to encourage students into becoming lovers of learning, we risk alienating 
many students from attempting to achieve wholeheartedness, or from feeling 
that they want to endorse this sort of commitment to learning because the 
chance of failing to do so is extremely high.  
 
As such, my aim is to “soften” or “ease” the account of wholeheartedness that 
Frankfurt endorses. I offer a version that describes our ability to validate and 
commit to desires for the long run, even when the “going gets tough”, but 
that makes some room for changing circumstances and takes into account the 
fuller picture of an agent’s life and their on-going attitudes instead of focusing 
on isolated actions at isolated moments of time. 
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With reference to love for learning, this “softer” version of wholeheartedness 
supports the learner to make a genuine commitment to learning. This 
commitment is crucial because our learning journeys can be challenging and 
the ability to persevere with learning is not only important to ensure we do not 
give up too easily or drop out too quickly, but it also gives learning a special 
status in our lives, as something that we actively and reflectively endorse, as a 
decision that we have freely made, thereby communicating to ourselves that 
learning is something we value. This seems to be an important step because 
so many students seem to feel that learning is not something they want to do, 
or would choose to do. They feel forced or compelled to learn so they can get 
a job or earn an income or acquire respect in society. In looking at 
wholeheartedness, I want to know what makes learning truly one’s own 
commitment and an autonomous one rather than a disinterested obligation or 
purely a means to an end. 
 
I argue that wholeheartedness should not only apply to isolated actions at 
isolated points or moments in time but instead should be understood in 
relation to our “principles of action” (a term I explain later) which gives 
questions about our agency a significant element of diachronicity. 
 
I draw mostly from the work of Frankfurt, but also refer from time-to-time to 
the research by Christine Korsgaard. I acknowledge where there are problems 
and confusions in their theories and attempt where relevant to respond to 
them. I also suggest how we might draw material from their discussions of 
wholeheartedness to offer the “softer” account of wholeheartedness that I 
propose being a good fit for learning. My hope is that this will be a useful 
concept in understanding why some people are able to commit themselves to 
learning projects and principles of learning for the entirety of the project or, in 
the case of principles, for life. And that this understanding will in turn provide 
some insight into how wholeheartedness can help learners endorse, and, 
doing so, sustain their love for learning. 
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7.1 Explaining Wholeheartedness: Frankfurt & Korsgaard 
 
Both Frankfurt and Korsgaard have discussed wholeheartedness primarily in 
relation to agency and autonomy. According to them, actions are autonomous 
only when an agent is wholeheartedly committed to the motivation that 
grounds his or her actions. Agency is the capacity of a person to act in a world. 
According to Frankfurt, a person is someone who identifies herself with a 
desire that moves her to action and she reflexively endorses or identifies with 
this desire that motivates her. This reflexive endorsement is a matter of 
choosing which of her desires are truly hers, and wanting that desire to be her 
will. In order for the motivation to be truly hers the agent must endorse it or 
identify with it without uncertainty or ambivalence: that is, she must endorse it 
wholeheartedly. 
 
In Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person (FWCP), Frankfurt uses the 
terms first order desire and second order desire. First order desires take 
courses of action as their object (7-9). They are desires without reflection. So, 
in light of this definition, both human beings and animals are capable of 
having first order desires. Second order desires follow from first order desires 
and these are unique to human beings. Second order desires concern our 
desires themselves. Desiring what we desire means choosing which of our 
desires is really ours based on a hierarchy of what we value (8-10). 
 
According to Frankfurt second-order desires that are endorsed are volitional. 
He writes, “Someone has a desire of the second order either when he simply 
wants to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will” 
(FWCP 10). When a person wants a particular desire to be their will, in other 
words, they endorse or identify with that desire then Frankfurt says they have 
something called volition (FWCP 8-10). It is volition that is essential to being a 
person, and having agency. This person is someone who reflectively identifies 
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with the attitudes that motivate her. This is a process often referred to as 
reflective endorsement, whereby a person gives precedence to one of their 
desires after a period of reflection.90 
 
Frankfurt needed the concept of wholeheartedness to be included in his 
theory of endorsement because one of the main problems with the 
endorsement view is that it creates a problem of infinite regress. This is 
because one would need to endorse one’s endorsement of the earlier act to 
make it one’s own, but then what about the endorsement for this 
	
90 Persons are beings who care about their wills, that is, which of their desires 
win over other desires, and reflectively identify with those particular winning 
desires. As a further clarification of exactly what he means by “person”, 
Frankfurt takes to describing something he calls a “wanton”. The difference 
between a wanton and a person resides in the fact that a wanton has no 
concern for her will and simply acts upon desires she has without actively 
wanting or not wanting them. She simply pursues her strongest inclinations 
and does not care that she wants to do what she wants to do. She does not 
concern herself with the “desirability of her desires” (FWCP 11). A wanton 
possesses first and second order desires but not second order volition. A 
person on the other hand is a volitional entity. One question that arises here is 
whether Frankfurt means that a person is a being who is simply capable of 
second order desires or whether a person must always actually have second 
order desires? It seems Frankfurt would respond by saying that both persons 
and wantons are capable of second order desires. But a person must definitely 
always have second order desires in the form of volition, as opposed to just 
being capable of it, to be considered a person. Additionally, he would hold 
that we need second order desires to get to volition because we would need 
to want to have a certain desire before we can make that desire our will. In 
that sense, one would not be able to jump from first order desire to second 
order volition without first “passing through” the stage of second order desire.	 
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endorsement, and so on and so forth? Wholeheartedness, it would seem, has 
been mostly introduced in order to curb the infinite regress. Whichever act I 
am endorsing is an autonomous act if I endorse the said act in such a way that 
prevents the possibility that a higher level of reflection could overturn that 
endorsement; that is, I wholeheartedly endorse the act. So the loop of regress 
is in this way, eliminated. However, wholeheartedness, while a very intuitively 
sound idea, is not without its own set of problems. 
 
The problems with wholeheartedness as I briefly alluded to at the start are 
that: 
 
a) it is not clear to what extent ambivalence and changing of one’s mind is 
compatible with being wholehearted; how consistent does one have to be 
about being wholehearted about a particular desire over the course of one’s 
life for one to count as being committed and being an autonomous agent? 
 
b) relatedly, it is not clear that it is always the case that wholeheartedness is 
worth pursuing at the cost of meaningful growth and change. For example, a 
change of heart (an apparent weakness of one’s will) might be the result of 
greater self-awareness, or the beginning of significant growth and valuable 
changes to one’s life and circumstances 
 
c) it is not clear if my status as an autonomous agent comes into question in 
situations where I have to choose between two conflicting desires, both of 
which I have wholeheartedly endorsed. 
 
Let us consider these problems in a little more detail. With particular reference 
to caring (which Frankfurt discusses as a significant form of commitment), 
Frankfurt writes in The Importance of What We Care About (IWWCA): 
 
	 241	
. . .the notion of caring, implies a degree of persistence. A 
person who cared about something just for a single moment 
would be indistinguishable from someone who was being 
moved by impulse. (84) 
 
It is clear here that Frankfurt holds that being wholehearted requires one to 
care about the object of care over a period of time – “persistence” being the 
word that indicates the significance of temporality in this discussion. 
 
Similarly, Korsgaard writes in “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency” that 
that as an agent, “. . .implementing something like a particular plan of life . . . 
you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now” 
(113-114). What Korsgaard is suggesting is that when we commit to a project 
or a cause, or to a particular way of life, and when we endorse our motivations 
in a wholehearted way, we do so not just for the moment but over time and in 
line with our futures; there must be a degree of persistence over time because 
if we endorsed or identified with an action for just a moment, we could 
essentially be at risk of acting on impulse. Korsgaard writes in The Sources of 
Normativity (SON): 
 
If I change my mind and my will every time I have a new 
impulse, then I don’t really have an active mind or a will at all – I 
am just a kind of location where these impulses are at play. And 
that means that to make up my mind even now – to give myself 
a reason – I must conceive my reason as an instance of some 
general type (232). 
 
The fact that wholeheartedness seems to require commitment both to an 
individual action at a particular time but also to a wider set of “principles of 
action” suggests, as Marya Schechtman argues, that wholeheartedness 
requires one to unify one’s will both synchronically and diachronically. This 
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requirement, she says, is problematic because firstly, it is unclear whether 
wholeheartedness requires one to be unambivalent about the project as a 
whole at the time of taking whatever action that facilitates it or whether one 
must remain wholehearted throughout the course of the whole project (180-
182). 
 
This sort of critique against wholeheartedness, that is to say ones that derive 
from questions about the role and value of ambivalence, are perhaps the most 
commonly recurring type of critique. Most of our real-life experiences would 
indicate that we can feel committed to something but also experience periods 
of ambivalence, in fact, there are commitments that we change our minds 
about sometimes too. Committing, and particularly so in any wholehearted 
way to something is often a process that spans over time. Many of our projects 
and lifestyle choices take time or occur over time, for example, our careers, 
writing a PhD, marriage, raising children and so on. It would be unhelpful for a 
theory on a topic such as wholeheartedness to not offer a clear response to 
some of the real-life difficulties that arise in being wholehearted across a span 
of time. 
 
Frankfurt, unfortunately, is not especially clear on this matter. He writes In The 
Reasons Of Love: 
 
Being wholehearted means having a will that is undivided. The 
wholehearted person is fully settled as to what he wants, and 
what he cares about. With regard to any conflict of dispositions 
or inclinations within himself, he has no doubts or reservations 
as to where he stands. (95) 
 
This is confusing. If a person is ‘fully settled’ it seems unlikely that they would 
experience conflicts of disposition or inclination to begin with, and if they do 
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experience these then it would be unlikely that they would then have no 
doubts or reservations as to where they stand.  
 
In Necessity, Volition and Love (NVL) Frankfurt writes: 
 
Wholeheartedness does not require that a person be altogether 
untroubled by inner opposition to his will. It just requires that, 
with respect to any such conflict, he himself be fully resolved. 
This means that he must be resolutely on the side of one of the 
forces struggling within him and not on the side of any other. 
(100) 
 
Again this is confusing. Here it seems that feeling torn, uncertain and having 
moments of doubt are consistent with wholeheartedness, but once one has 
decided to endorse some desire or action wholeheartedly then either a lower 
desire or even a “higher” reflection just cannot displace it. If they “attempt” to 
“squeeze” in then one must shut them off and remain allied with the 
earlier/wholehearted endorsement. If this is true, which is likely given that 
wholeheartedness was introduced to cull infinite regress, then should our life’s 
circumstances change, should there be new opportunities and desires that 
may in fact help us to grow and change for the better, or ones that could even 
increase our autonomy (something that Frankfurt clearly values), this would be 
out of bounds because we have already endorsed an earlier desire 
wholeheartedly. This seems to be counter-intuitive to the fact that we see 
opportunities in life for growth and development as valuable and therefore 
something to be welcomed and embraced. 
 
On the other hand, Korsgaard’s response to ambivalence is clearer. She writes, 
“Of course this is not to say that I cannot ever change my mind, but only to 
say that I must do it for a reason, and not at random” (SON 232). I think this 
seems a fair “caveat”. It is a view of wholeheartedness that allows for doubt, 
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ambivalence and change of mind on the basis of judicious reflection, which 
seems more compatible with our experiences of the inescapable 
unpredictability of life. If wholeheartedness is meant to reflect our 
endorsement and identification with our motivations and actions, it would 
seem that the criteria for changing one’s mind is that this change comes about 
as a result of a process of judicious reflection and understanding that is in line 
with one’s self-understanding and one’s understanding of what constitutes 
one’s self.  
 
A “softer” approach to wholeheartedness that permits the changing of one’s 
mind and allows for periods of ambivalence, but within an appropriate context 
and at the end of a careful process of assessing one’s reasons and 
circumstances with self-awareness and understanding, would offer us a way to 
be genuinely wholehearted but not at the risk of personal growth.  
 
7.2 A “softer” approach to wholeheartedness 
 
In light of this, I suggest that instead of considering an account of 
wholeheartedness where the endorsement of each individual action is what 
decides commitment, agency and autonomy, we take into consideration the 
agent’s past and present actions, attitudes and circumstances as well as a 
broader picture of the trajectory of values and principles that have governed 
their actions and motivations.91 This allows for wholeheartedness, a concept 
	
91 Marya Schechtman discusses very similar concerns and solutions. However, 
my argument offers a slightly different perspective in that it seeks to offer a 
“softer” approach to wholeheartedness, instead of eliminating it entirely, 
arguing that Frankfurt’s existing theory does already seem to make some 
room, though not always very clearly, for a diachronous view. It is also 
interesting to note here that again we similarities with the sort of views that I 
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that, for all intents and purposes, captures our intuitive sense of what it means 
to “stick with something”, to be committed and to care, to remain as a useful 
theory for understanding.  
 
Korsgaard also echoes this view on how the self is constituted by this kind of 
self-unifying commitment, using an analogy between person and state. In Self-
Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, she writes: “. . . the agent is 
something over and above her parts the way the constitution of a city is 
something over and above the citizens and officials who live there” (135). The 
idea she is exploring here is that like people who organise themselves into a 
state with a constitution and thereby become something that can be treated 
as one unified entity, a person who constitutes him or herself through 
wholehearted endorsement becomes a unified whole. This “unified whole” is 
more than just a collection of individual parts (or every individual thought and 
action); the unified whole is an entity that represents principles, beliefs, values 
and so on that embody the agent. 
 
This “embodying” I think can be usefully explained through the idea of 
“principles of action” – a term Marya Schechtman uses. Self-constitution 
implies that what we endorse is linked not just to one moment or one action at 
some given time, but as Schechtman says, to our “principles of action”, which 
represent how we decide to act based on our broader principles, our longer 
term projects and ways of life (175). Our actions at any isolated point in time 
are a representative or part of these wider principles of action. Schechtman 
writes that: 
 
A man may be seen simply to be digging a hole, but he may 
also be seen to be gardening, or getting exercise or spending 
	
explained Dewey held about experiences being relative to context and taking 
into account the span of time over one’s past, present and future. 
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more time outdoors, or trying to please his wife. When we 
evaluate our motivations in the way that leads to autonomy as 
the strong unity view describes, we are not just asking ‘Do I 
want to do X?’ but ‘Do I want to be the kind of person who 
chooses to do X?’ What we are evaluating is thus not simply an 
action or impulse, but rather a plan, project, relationship, or, in 
Korsgaard’s term, a “practical identity” (an identity like mother, 
philosopher, union president, Democrat, recovered addict) that 
the action implies (Korsgaard 1996, 101). (178-179) 
 
This seems to make sense because the self is not constituted solely by 
individual actions at particular times but by wider encompassing principles 
that guide our choices and actions over the course of our lives. The idea then 
is that “permission” to upturn certain decisions and abandon certain projects 
are granted and one may count as having acted wholeheartedly even in those 
cases, if the wider principles are still maintained.  
 
To illustrate this point, let me give the example of a PhD student who 
experiences significant stretches of doubt and uncertainty about her area of 
research before then deciding on each occasion to set aside those doubts and 
continue with the research that she wholeheartedly chose to begin with. 
 
Schechtman suggests (about her (similar) example of a lawyer) that: 
 
During her periods of ambivalence and doubt, however, she 
fails to be wholehearted and at these times there is no real fact 
of the matter about what she wants to do, which means that at 




When it comes to the Frankfurtian account of wholeheartedness as it stands, it 
is unclear what the PhD student’s status as an autonomous agent is at the 
moments in which she is doubtful. If indeed her status as an autonomous 
agent is no longer valid each time she has a doubt, then in many practical 
cases, the autonomous status of agents will be in constant flux. 
 
Schechtman’s suggestion is to remove wholeheartedness entirely from the 
picture and focus only on temporally extended plans and projects. Mine is to 
reconfigure wholeheartedness for a “softer” approach, so that we allow for 
someone to count as being wholehearted so long as ambivalence or change 
of heart about temporally extended plans and projects are well considered 
and have good reasons. The reason I do not want to eliminate 
wholeheartedness altogether is that I think Frankfurt already makes some 
room within his theory for this sort of diachronicity, so there is no need to 
completely get rid of a term that otherwise does a very good job, better than 
most other terms, of intuitively describing the sort of commitment we want 
when people make decisions. I also think that “wholeheartedness” is state of 
being that many of us aspire to – for that state to be so impractical to attain 
may make the pursuit of it seem pointless, which would be rather unfortunate, 
to say the least. What would help in this endeavor is to try to offer Frankfurt a 
way to overcome the problem of infinite regress so that he no longer needs to 
describe wholeheartedness in the way that he does. 
 
The problem of infinite regress comes about as a result of having to endorse a 
particular, isolated action at a particular and isolated period of time. The 
regress loop has to be closed so that the endorsement does not require 
further endorsements thereby complicating the claims about autonomy that 
are the fundamentally crucial component of this discussion. The concern for 
Frankfurt is that if we allow an infinite regress we can never be certain that our 
decisions at any given time are “truly” ours because it is the endorsement that 
confirms this. Schechtman offers the solution to replace the claim that we 
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should aim at the isolated event as the point of endorsement with the claim 
that we should aim at the “temporally extended project or plan” as the point 
of endorsement (195). So in order to know if the PhD student is truly 
committed to her research, we need to know not just about the actions she 
endorses in her moments of doubt but also what her position is on the PhD as 
a whole – what made her want to do a PhD? What caused her doubts? How 
often has she experienced them? Are there triggers that cause them? Does 
she address these doubts immediately? How so? Have her plans for what she 
wants to do after her PhD changed? Why have they changed? And so on. It 
would be in the understanding of the answers to these wider questions about 
her long term plans, her past actions and their reasons that we would get a 
sense of whether her actions are truly her own, whether she has felt compelled 
or overwhelmed in certain moments but not others, and how these moments 
weigh up against each other. If we take this route, the issue of infinite regress 
is irrelevant because the strength of our endorsements are decided based on 
what is happening now in relation to attitudes and behaviours over a period of 
time.  
 
Perhaps if not for the need to address the infinite regress problem, Frankfurt 
could potentially say that one must be fully resolved in the face of conflict, one 
must stick resolutely to the side of “one of the forces” and not on the side of 
any other, but that this “side” need not be the very same one that one started 
out with. He could stipulate that there must be a clear and decisive decision, 
not one that is the result of the lack of will or the outcome of simply “falling 
into an option” out of wanton indecision.92 This clear and decisive decision 
	
92 There is some debate about the distinction between choice and decision 
and whether Frankfurt is right in insisting on “decision” over “choice” as the 
appropriate word. It is not especially relevant to this thesis to explore that 
debate so I stick with “decision” here, as that is the term Frankfurt uses.  
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cannot be an impulsive one of course; it would require careful thought, self-
awareness and understanding of one’s desires and motivations and aligning 
these with one’s principles of action. 
 
This reading could be compatible with Frankfurt’s other arguments that are 
more visible in his writings on caring.93 In “On Caring” in NVL he writes: 
 
Suppose we cared about nothing. In that case, we would be 
creatures with no active interest in establishing or sustaining any 
thematic continuity in our volitional lives . . . (caring is the) 
foundational activity through which we provide continuity and 
coherence to our volitional lives. (162) 
 
I think that based on the use of the phrase “volitional lives”, one might 
suggest that the unity and commitment that Frankfurt calls for through 
wholeheartedness is a unity and commitment in line with long-standing, and 
even lifelong values, principles and attitudes that are all in line with each other 
and that make up a coherent picture of what guides and motivates us 
throughout our lives. If not for his conception of wholeheartedness, Frankfurt 
could say that doubts or ambivalence may therefore be an indication that 
someone must perhaps return to reflecting on changes to their attitudes, 
values, broader principles and life circumstances, and either re-endorse the 
ones that they earlier endorsed or endorse new ones that better reflect what is 
	
93 I avoid focusing explicitly on Frankfurt’s views on caring for this thesis 
because his discussions on it lead to conceptions of “concern” and then 
“love” as a specific and important mode of caring. Concern and love are both 
discussed largely in relation to objects that have autonomy and agency, in 
other words, people. As mentioned before, since learning has no agency as 
such, these concepts cannot be easily applied or borrowed for the purposes of 
discussing love for learning.   
	 250	
now meaningful to them. However, since he cannot say this, doubt and 
ambivalence are cast as entirely negative states to be avoided or simply 
pushed aside and overrode by loyalty to earlier endorsed desires and 
motivations. If this is so, then it would seem that the authenticity of our actions 
and decisions becomes just as problematic as in situations where these actions 
and decisions occur as a result of indecision or wantonness. Again, the main 
issue that seems to be preventing Frankfurt from adopting such a view is his 
conception of wholeheartedness. 
 
Taking this “softer” approach to wholeheartedness would also relieve the 
problems associated with conflicting life plans. To illustrate, let us say the PhD 
student has now become a mother. She is wholehearted about both doing her 
PhD and being a mother but she feels conflicted when it comes to deciding 
whether to attend an important research-related event or to attend an 
important event in her child’s life. There is therefore competition and conflict 
between two projects that she is equally committed to. Schechtman for 
example, thinks that it is this sort of dilemma that ends up 
. . . undermining her unity as an agent and making a truly 
autonomous action impossible. It is just this kind of ambivalence 
that strong unity theorists insist we must overcome in order to 
be agents. (187) 
 
To support this she presents the following quote from Frankfurt: 
 
. . .what good is it for someone to be free to make significant 
choices if he does not know what he wants and if he is unable to 
overcome his ambivalence? What is the point of offering a 
beguiling variety of alternatives to people who can respond to 
them only with irresolute vacillation . . . unless a person is 
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capable of a considerable degree of volitional unity, he cannot 
make coherent use of his freedom. (NVL 102) 
 
What Frankfurt says here is compatible with the diachronous re-definition of 
wholeheartedness. That circumstances in our lives can change frequently and 
sometimes drastically seems a fact that most of us acknowledge. I suspect this 
is something Frankfurt would have to accept too. It is also the case that most 
people are able to overcome their ambivalence or vacillation at some point, 
not usually at the very instant they feel it, but over time – and it might be that 
this ambivalence is overcome when they choose a different course of action 
from one they chose earlier. So long as this choice is in line with their volitional 
unity in a diachronous sense, it seems reasonable to say that they are indeed 
making coherent use of their freedom. Without the need to account for 
endorsement with regards to isolated actions in isolated moments of time, we 
could now see the Frankfurtian quote above as a criticism of the type of 
people who find it difficult to ever make decisions that are volitionally unified, 
those who do not use their agency and autonomy, and who allow impulses to 
make their decisions for them on a regular and protracted basis. 
 
If we return to the example of the PhD student, if in her reflection process and 
in deciding between the various desires she wants to endorse, she has 
deemed that the flourishing of her research and learning journey is one of 
them and being a mother is another, then yes, it is true that there will almost 
inevitably come a time when they conflict and she will be torn. If she decides 
to side with one over the other, it could be the case that she never truly 
desired or truly acted for (in the sense of an autonomous agent) one of them, 
that she endorsed one more than the other, or that she is endorses both 
equally but in these circumstances, she has simply had to prioritise one over 
the other.  
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To say that she simply did not truly desire or act on one of these decisions 
seems a rather severe conclusion, especially if she has dedicated time and 
energy to doing both. If in some instances where there are genuine conflicts 
and decisions need to be made, it seems reasonable that an autonomous 
agent can retain both their autonomy and agency by deciding to side with one 
over the other. In fact, Frankfurt accounts for conflicts similar to this. He gives 
the example of one desiring both to go to a concert and to a film that are 
programmed at the same time. Conflicts of this kind, he says “. . .require only 
that the desires at issue be ordered” (IWWCA 66). The reason this kind of 
conflict is easier to overcome is because, according to Frankfurt, the desires 
are both “on the same level”. He offers a contrasting example of a conflict 
where someone wishes to congratulate someone else on a recent 
achievement but also finds that they have a jealous wish to insult this person. 
This jealous desire is not something that is endorsed or identified with. So, in 
the concert-film conflict, because both desires are “on the same level” if one 
of them cannot be fulfilled for some reason the natural course of action is to 
try to fulfill the other, but in the compliment-insult example they are not the 
same level because insulting the person is not a desire one endorses. (IWWCA 
67). 
 
It is because the two desires in question for the PhD Student are on the “same 
level” that it is possible to retain autonomy and agency by siding with one. It is 
also the case that with the new definition of wholeheartedness, prioritising can 
be done on the basis of seeing both these projects, or ways of life as being 
temporal and diachronous. So, for example, this time the student chooses to 
attend the research event because it is the only one of its kind this year and 
also her daughter is playing another football game next month, which she will 
be attending. If the student was always choosing to prioritise her PhD over her 
daughter, then it would be reasonable to question whether she is indeed 
wholeheartedly committed to both options.  
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One of the problems that could arise out of this re-defined view of 
wholeheartedness is that if an agent’s isolated actions do not need to be 
endorsed, then what prevents them from never having to endorse any desires 
or actions, or from endorsing a temporal plan that involves them acting 
entirely on impulse or giving in to compulsions of some kind or the other? I 
think the answer is that nothing prevents them from this, but if they endorse 
such a lifestyle then this validly calls into question their status as an 
autonomous agent. To decide to never have to decide is essentially to give up 
your autonomy and such a person would simply not be considered 
autonomous and, by Frankfurt’s account, would in fact be a wanton.  
 
To translate this discussion of wholeheartedness into the context of learning 
we might say that a lover of learning is one who possesses volition with 
respect to learning. This means that lovers of learning want to learn and they 
endorse their desire to learn. They have very likely given thought to whether 
or not they find learning valuable and why, and decided that they do. One can 
make the case for the fact that we are very often learning something or the 
other and that sometimes learning is not something that takes place on the 
back of a conscious or active decision to learn. I do not disagree with this; I 
think it is entirely correct to say that learning happens even when we have not 
actively endorsed a desire to learn and then volitionally act on that desire. 
However, the sort of learning that I am interested in exploring in this thesis, as 
I clarified at the start, is intentional learning, and in particular learning that 
occurs in a formal setting, such as a classroom or an institution. In these 
situations, the idea of endorsement is important particularly because, as we 
have seen, learning experiences can be negatively disruptive; this might give 
some people sufficient reason not to pursue formal learning or value it (for 
example, they find it too disruptive and damaging). As there might be reasons 
not to value learning, it seems especially important that lovers of learning 
endorse their desire to learn.  
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If someone “loved” learning – as opposed to simply liking it, or not minding it, 
or doing it for the sake of getting a job, or making their parents happy and so 
on – then they would commit themselves to learning over time, to make 
choices and to act in accordance with this commitment, and would identify 
deeply with learning so that learning is part of their personal identity, 
something they believe constitutes who they are: they would see themselves 
genuinely as learners. Those who commit to learning in this way would not be 
apathetic, or, to use Frankfurt’s term, wantons when it comes to learning. This 
would be in reference to the sorts of students for example who come to 
school every day but do not care if they learn or about what they learn. They 
simply sit in the classroom passively, not taking an interest or even an active 
disinterest in what is being taught.  
 
Encouraging wholeheartedness in learning is important for reasons beyond 
just preventing early school-leaving. It makes learning, and learning in the 
right way, something that is linked to self-constitution, to one’s principles and 
identity and allows one to exert more autonomy when it comes to choices in 
learning – this renders learning more than just a means to an end. Being 
wholehearted in learning also supports one to be vulnerable in learning to an 
appropriate degree because as we saw earlier, wounding in learning can more 
easily become a deterrent to learning if one is less committed to it. 
  
Taking into account this “softer” approach to wholeheartedness in relation to 
temporally extended projects, there is room for a learner to endorse their 
desire to learn and truly act on that desire, but also experience doubts and 
ambivalence about this desire to learn. In fact they may even change their 
minds about learning, deciding now that they no longer desire to learn in any 
intentional way. Whether or not these decisions then render them as having 
been not wholehearted to begin with, not autonomous or even not an agent, 
will depend on attitudes, values and behaviours of the learner that pertain to 
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this ambivalence or change of mind.94 I think this “softer” approach will 
encourage learners to see wholeheartedness in learning as something that is 
genuinely achievable and worth pursuing. In turn, their wholeheartedness will 
contribute to them sticking it out when things get difficult, honing their 
cognitive control committedly over time and nurturing their love for learning 
along with reaping the other benefits of learning. 
  
	
94 The discussion here could extend much further, but the limitations of the 
thesis do not permit further exploration of just this topic. Some other 
interesting points of discussion for future consideration might be, for example, 
what it means to endorse the desire to learn – does this also mean endorsing 
certain other desires related to learning, such as discovering the truth or 





In this thesis I aimed to respond to the questions: How do we help someone 
come to love learning? And, what facilitates a love for learning? The answer to 
those was to begin by first determining what is the “best” kind of learning to 
facilitate love for learning. To better understand this, I looked at what people 
on the empirical side of this discussion mean by surface and deep learning, 
concluding that deep learning, which is characterised by understanding, is 
crucial because evidence suggests that learners engaged in this kind of 
learning tend both to stay in school and ultimately find learning more valuable. 
I then argued that deep learning is not a concept that is entirely new to 
philosophy. As I presented, philosophers such as Plato, Rousseau and Dewey 
have historically taken a great interest in differentiating superficial learning 
from deep learning, prizing the latter over the former for a variety of reasons. I 
then showed that contemporary philosophers such as Hills and Pritchard 
amongst others have produced illuminating research on the notion of 
understanding, differentiating it from knowledge and the acquisition of 
information in more superficial ways. To varying degrees, both educational 
theorists and philosophers hold that understanding is an important facilitator, 
if not the defining characteristic, of deep learning. However, concentrated and 
robust discussions about what understanding actually entails are found more 
readily in the philosophical literature. This is seen particularly in Hills’ account 
of understanding as something characterised by “cognitive control”. I then 
drew from Hills’ account to ground my own views on the role and value of 
understanding going forward. One of my contributions to this area of research 
has hopefully been to develop a more thorough account of deep learning by 
bringing together the philosophical research, especially in cognitive control, 
and the educational and psychological research on deep learning.  
 
I then argued that pleasure, and in particular Aristotle’s account of pleasure in 
relation to contemplation, gives us good reasons to believe that pleasure is an 
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important aspect in fostering love for learning. I then related this to Flow 
Theory, a psychological theory that is inspired by Aristotle’s views on pleasure, 
to show that pleasure in learning can be achieved by creating states of flow in 
learning. I explained that pleasure in learning acts as an incentive to 
encourage students to find learning “lovable” and that the more students find 
learning “lovable” the better they are likely to become at finessing cognitive 
control, which in turn will add to their pleasure. 
 
Following that I argued that lovers of learning are vulnerable and “open” to 
learning. My contributions to this area of research were to offer a way to re-
think our perceptions of vulnerability to include aspects that are positive and 
worth seeking out – this is something that has not had much consideration in 
the current literature – to expand on the current research about intrinsic 
vulnerability with unique application to learning. I also introduced something I 
called “epistemic vulnerability” which considered the relationship between 
truth, learning and vulnerability. The conclusion in Chapter 6 was that lovers of 
learning are more inclined to see the value of learning in spite of the 
“wounds” that may sometimes result because of disruptions to their existing 
beliefs or to their “egos”, and that the more adept one is at coping with these 
“wounds”, the more likely one is to benefit from the many advantages of 
learning with an “openness” to the world, which includes further nurturing and 
growing one’s love for learning. 
 
Finally, I argued that a lover of learning is someone who is wholehearted 
about learning. Here I proposed a “softer” account of wholeheartedness, 
which permits one to be considered to be wholeheartedly committed to 
learning even if there are instances where one feels ambivalent or changes 
one’s mind, so long as these instances are based on careful and conscientious 
reflection and are in line with one’s “principles of action”. This I suggested 
would take into account the nature of learning as a lifelong process informed 
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by the context of our past, present and future. It would also make commitment 
to learning something that is worth pursuing. 
 
There is still more work to be done in the area of love for learning. As I 
mentioned the characteristics I consider here are those I think it is useful to 
begin with. We might also consider the value of curiosity, wonder and other 
such characteristics that could contribute valuably to a list of the traits we 
might want to nurture in order to foster love for learning. There would also be, 
of course, practical steps and suggestions for how to translate these theories 
into curriculum plans, syllabus, classroom activities and assessment. Some 
such ideas can already be found, for example, in more forward-thinking 
academic literature in educational theory, in progressive textbooks and 
teacher’s guides, though would require some adapting to fit the characteristics 
and goals as stated here in this thesis. 
 
I began research on this topic because it struck me that the belief many 
educators held that nurturing a love for learning would encourage learners to 
commit to learning, to genuinely enjoy it and see its value beyond it being a 
means to securing a job, was intuitively accurate. Yet, there seemed to be no 
account of this love for learning and no clear way in which an educator or a 
learner might first make sense of it in order to help nurture it. As a teacher 
myself, I immediately recognised the value that such an account might have 
for helping both educators and learners to not only understand what this sort 
of “love” entails but also to set distinct goals for fostering and nurturing this 
love. It is my hope that this thesis has made some headway into offering such 
an account and that with a better understanding of the love for learning that 
we are desperate to foster in students, we might also see that in order to 
genuinely do this, it is crucial and urgent that we re-think educational policies 
and systems that prioritise surface learning, that see vulnerability as a 
weakness to be avoided at all cost, and that peg the value of learning to the 
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